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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Great Crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic crisis were watershed events
in modern American history.1 The economic crisis forced American citizens to re-think the
concepts of economic independence and interdependence that had long characterized their
political culture.2 It set in motion a series of political and economic debates in the United
States. As citizens faced unemployment and failing wages, they came increasingly to
believe that federal, state and local authorities should intervene in the national economy.
Further, for many, the events confirmed, the idea that social inequality would be difficult to
address and eradicate. If the problems that stemmed from social inequality and economic
crisis were to be solved, then efforts had to be made to redistribute wealth more equitably,
and regulate the market so that some measure of fair competition and uniform standard
pervaded.

During the presidencies of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

these ideas were tested and expanded. Even though their administrations created new
government agencies to deal with specific aspects of the continuing economic depression,
debates over the adequacy and appropriateness of government intervention in the private
economy dominated public life and discourse.
The subject of this dissertation is to explore the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, its origins, and its significance as it paved the way for dynamic economic and

1
Christina D. Romer, “The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
105, no. 3 (August 1990): 597-598, 614, 616, 618; William L. Anderson, “Risk and the National Industrial Recovery
Act: An Empirical Evaluation,” Public Choice 103, no. ½ (April 2000): 139; Hugh Jebson, “The Great Crash of 1929,”
Hindsight, January 2005, 22.
2
Lionel D. Edie, “The Banks and the Stock Market Crisis of 1929,” Journal of Business of the University of Chicago
3, no. 1 (January 1930): 21; Elliot A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt and the Brains Trust: From Depression to the New
Deal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 5; Amity Shlaes, “How Presidential Administrations Cheat at
Monopoly,” USA Today Magazine, January 2011, 12. http://www.usatodaymagazine.net. (accessed March 14,
2015); Joseph Nolan, “Boom and Bust in the 1920s,” Vital Speeches of the Day,” December 1, 1995.

2

industrial change in the United States. The National Industrial Recovery Act was designed
to target high unemployment rates in the private sector and improve wages through the
use of industry codes.3 It, also, reduced child labor, which enabled American corporations
to hire more able-bodied and older Americans.

Tentatively, it established collective

bargaining rights that allowed some workers to negotiate for better labor conditions and
benefits. These policies aided citizens participating in the labor market, where they could
make more money and earn a higher standard of living. In its design, the NRA differed
from the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the early years of the depression that reduced the
prices of consumer goods and commodities, due to excessive competition in industrial
sectors and stagnant wages.4 Even as the national economy became more consumeroriented, the Roosevelt administration did not want to leave working and middle class
citizens on the wrong side of the financial road.
President Roosevelt believed in an expanded role for the federal government, while
his predecessor, Herbert Hoover relied chiefly on the private sector to take control of
recovery efforts, with the limited federal government assistance.5

The Roosevelt

administration acted on the belief that a laissez-faire national economy had not and could

3

Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005), 107-109.
4
Frederic F. Clairmont, “The Grand Malediction: Bretton Woods in Retrospect,” Economic and Political Weekly 29,
no. 42 (October 15, 1994): 2728, 2730; Ellis Hawley et al., Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Schnenkman Publishing Company, 1973), viii. Welfare capitalism that characterized American
life before WWI consisted of the belief that business executives were enlightened corporate leaders who provided
public services. Business leaders worked on American prosperity and benefited their workers through a host of
programs designed to improve their day-to-day lives.
5
Thomas E. Cronin and William R. Hochman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Presidency,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly (Spring 1985): 278; Telegrams to Governors Urging Stimulation of Public Works to Aid the
Economy, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Volume 1: Herbert Hoover, November 23,
1929, Herbert Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West Branch, Iowa; William F. Jasper,
“The Rise of the Administrative State,” The New American, January 21, 2013. http://www.thenewamerican.com.
(accessed March 12, 2015).
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not address the growing financial needs of ordinary Americans nor could it resolve the
public’s concerns. Given the scale of the economic crisis, the federal government had to
step in. This dissertation seeks to clarify the role of the Roosevelt administration in
pursuing that line in comparison to its predecessor, Herbert Hoover.6

The National

Recovery Administration was a central political agency in this process and enabled
Roosevelt to approve dynamic changes to the national economy and manufacturing sector.
Without the NRA, industrial codes, and other economic and industrial reforms would have
been non-existent. Thus, both policymakers played important roles as president in trying
to spur economic recovery. Some scholars argue that Hoover only wanted to support
private sector efforts. He declined to support an expansion of public works and federal
relief as solutions to economic deprivation among American families.7 The majority of
historians argue, however, that the belief in limited government had to change if the United
States was to move forward and revitalize the national economy.8
Scholarly and Historical Context

6

Ellis Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism, ix. Most Republican policymakers following
the Harding administration argued for public works, but only during times of economic depression. In 1928,
Hoover campaigned on the premise that, during times of plenty, revenues should be set aside for periods of
economic stress, which led to the promotion of public works projects that stimulated high employment levels.
7
Statement Announcing a Series of Conferences with Representatives of Business, Industry, Agriculture and Labor,
The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Volume 1: Herbert Hoover, November 15, 1929, Herbert
Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West Branch, Iowa.
8
Please see the following sources that are used throughout the dissertation: John Kenneth Galbraith and Liaguat
Ahamed are two scholars who focus on the roles of the stock market, central bankers and other economic actors
to discover the causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Herbert Hoover in his memoirs and pamphlets discussed
how American Individualism shaped American thought about conservative fiscal and financial values that
dominated American core values. William E. Leuchtenburg and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., chronicled the events
leading to the emergence of the Great Depression; and how the Roosevelt administration responded and resolved
this economic crisis. Charles Dearing, Clair Wilcox and Frederick Roos documented the organizational structure of
the NRA and the many other executive branch agencies used to address the economic emergency of the 1930s.
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After World War I, the United States became a creditor nation.9

American

businesses and banks lent Western European countries capital to rebuild and revitalize
their national economies.10

Advocates of expanded foreign loans believed that they

benefited the global economic system. Most state and national banks were members of the
Federal Reserve System, and they did not believe that they had over-extended themselves
in terms of the extent of the domestic loans or those to Great Britain and other European
countries.11 Overextension of credit, and the expansion of government guarantees for
loans meant that the federal government was at risk of defaulting on its own debt,
especially if gold reserves were minimal or limited. Problems with the gold standard,
foreign debt, and the issue of monetary contraction domestically, thus, were among the
central reasons for the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.12
Scholars such as H. Parker Willis and Liaguat Ahamed have argued that the Federal
Reserve was mistaken that intergovernmental loans in the 1920s would permanently
enhance and promote economic growth in the United States. In the short term, economic
prosperity did occur and Americans did experience dynamic change. In the long term, the
loans were detrimental to the economic health of the United States especially as European
nations defaulted on their public credit accounts. The Great Crash of 1929, this school of
thought argued, was caused by the snowball effect of defaults on domestic and

9

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1959), 64; Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 32-35.
10
H. Parker Willis, “Who Caused the Panic of 1929,” The North American Review 229, no. 2 (February 1930): 177.
11
Liaguat Ahamed, Lords of Finance: The Bankers that Broke the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 292-293,
289, 309.
12
Michael Bordo et al., The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth
Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 8-9; William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 31; David McGill, “The Great Depression and the New Deal,” Hindsight, April
2008, 26.
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international loans that crippled the American economy.13 The steep decline in U.S. exports
that followed foreign defaults also weakened the national economy. In contrast, Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., in The Age of Roosevelt, asserted that the Federal Reserve contributed to the
crisis by increasingly restricting such loans. George Harrison, president of the New York
Branch of the Federal Reserve System after 1928, pressured the Federal Reserve Board of
Washington, D.C., to tighten the money supply. He warned American banks to discontinue
the practice of establishing cheap money policy and easy credit that had underwritten
widespread speculation in the Stock Market by the late 1920s.14
As economic distress increased in the late 1920s, the Hoover administration argued
for intergovernmental reforms for the purposes of promoting free trade and other
agreements, such as establishing the economic moratorium that provided some financial
relief to post-war Germany.

Hoover believed in global growth and argued that the

developing economic crisis was an international issue as well as domestic. He also believed
that trade policy might be used to stimulate growth.15 Moreover, Hoover contended that
the economic crisis had not originated in the United States; but he looked abroad for the
financial roots of the crisis.16 Neither the Great Crash of 1929 nor the Banking crisis of the
1930s, which sparked the emergence of the Great Depression, changed Hoover’s mind.

13

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1952), 8; Maury Klein, “The Stock Market Crash of 1929: A Review Article,” The Business History Review
75, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 326-327;“The Age of Monty and Ben,” The Economist, December 22, 1990; “Blind Spots:
Central Bankers in History,” The Economist, January 10, 2009.
14
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II: The Coming of the New Deal, 156-157; Milton
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States: 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963), 255-256, 267-268; Janine Richardson, “Letting in the Light,” 13, Cobblestone, March 2008.
15
The President’s News Conference, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Volume 1: Herbert
Hoover, November 5, 1929, Herbert Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West Branch,
Iowa.
16
Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1952), 1-2.
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In response to the deepening economic crisis, Hoover turned to private charitable
organizations to aid destitute American workers, and pushed for a balanced federal budget.
He sought to sustain the gold standard to stabilize prices for consumer goods and exchange
rates.17 His policies were, in some respects, contradictory. He opposed expanding the
federal government as an economic foundation of individual welfare. He, also, believed in
decreased spending, an enlarged tax base, and self-help for all Americans. He emphasized
globalization, despite the domestic crisis, and asserted that the United States could not
remain isolated from the rest of the world.18

In doing so, he distinguished federal

intervention in the global economy and corporate support from individual welfare. But one
question that remains unresolved was whether Hoover or Roosevelt attempted to use
Woodrow Wilson’s perspective on the rising phenomenon of globalization to target
reforms to the national economy following the Great Crash of 1929?
The issues of globalization and expanding the money supply were among the main
arguments behind the Reconstruction Finance Corporation credited under Hoover during
the banking crisis of the early 1930s.19 With the RFC, Hoover argued that American
businesses could obtain loans to improve upon the production of manufactured goods,

17

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1952), vi, 1-2, 7-8; Winifred Wandersee, Women’s Work and Family Values, 1920-1940 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981), 32. Wandersee argues that after the Great Crash of 1929, the cost of living in the
United States decreased and consumer goods became less expensive.
18
Dexter Perkins, “Woodrow Wilson: An Interpretation,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series
29 (1947): 128-129.
19
J. Franklin Ebersole, “One Year of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 47,
no. 3 (May 1933): 474; Joseph Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A Look at the New Deal (New York: Doubleday, 1988),
72-98; Jordan Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair: Hoover, Congress and the Depression (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1970), 51, 91-93; James L. Butkiewicz, “The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Gold Standard
and the Banking Panic of 1933,” Southern Economic Journal 66, no. 2 (October 1999): 275; Gerald D. Nash,
“Herbert Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” The Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 46, no. 3 (December 1959): 462; Beryl Wayne Sprinkel, “Economic Consequences of the Operations of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” Journal of the University of Chicago 25, no. 4 (October 1952): 211, 213.

7

invest wisely in the domestic economy, and compete internationally with their foreign
counterparts.

By 1932, many political figures believed that Hoover’s public policies,

especially the RFC, were efforts to increase government spending while avoiding
expenditures to provide public relief. As historian Gerald D. Nash has argued, during the
negotiation process for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Hoover continued to
assert that voluntary efforts in the private sector were sufficient to spur economic growth
and deal with unemployment. He hoped the RFC would, indirectly, add new jobs in the
American labor market. While Hoover supported limited government intervention to
stimulate investment, he was not a proponent of public sector growth and relief, with the
exception of limited expenditures for public works. 20
For the economic observer, the problem in trying to expand available credit in the
early 1930s was compounded by the fact that the Hoover administration supported a
renewed metallic standard in the United States and globally.21 This economic stance was
problematic, because gold and silver coinage promoted deflation and further depressed
prices. Further, the Hoover administration’s monetary policy in the late 1920s led directly
to a contraction of credit in the private sector, as corporate banks and corporations
reduced the money supply.22

20

Despite arguments to the contrary, Hoover stubbornly

Gerald D Nash, “Herbert Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review 46, no. 3 (December 1959): 455.
21
William Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 31; Elliot A. Rosen, Roosevelt,
The Great Depression and the Economies of Recovery (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005); 15.
22
Michael D. Bordo et al., The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the
Twentieth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 8-9.
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reaffirmed his belief in the value of gold to global exchange rates and the importance of
stable prices for consumer goods.23
The economic crisis had, however, altered the context for monetary policy. Hoover’s
efforts to balance the federal budget and the emphasis placed upon financial and material
assistance from private charities failed to address the needs of ordinary American citizens
who suffered from a crippled national economy.24

During his presidency, Hoover

wondered about the gold standard as a mechanism for depressed exchange rates. He did
not want to leave a metallic standard but he retracted the money stock, because he was
concerned with gold flight.25 Hoover’s policies may have contributed to the emergence of
the Great Depression as a global event, because many nations were affected by his
restrictive American monetary policy. Moreover, all nations, especially Western countries,
maintained interconnected monetary policies that tied nations together for the sake of
economic survival and prosperity.
By the end of Hoover’s presidency, many economists, political leaders, and ordinary
citizens believed that the economic crisis required the intervention of the federal
government and a new monetary standard.26 Policymakers and ordinary American citizens
both sought the means to address unemployment and to ameliorate the poverty and
displacement that resulted. Consequently, the Roosevelt administration made moves to
use public sector goods to bolster the private economy. The Roosevelt administration
became involved in regulating the manufacturing sector through policies that would,
23

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton
Mufflin, 1959), 233; “Herbert Hoover’s Tragic Presidency,” http://www.austincc.edu/lpatrick/his2341/tragic/html.
(accessed February 17, 2013).
24
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II: The Coming of the New Deal, 233-235.
25
Robert A. Garson and Stuart A. Kidd, ed., The Roosevelt Years: New Perspectives on American History, 1933-1945
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 141.
26
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II: The Coming of the New Deal, 82-83.
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through planning, reduce cut-throat competition, increase purchasing power, and improve
upon the working conditions of Americans.27
With Roosevelt’s election success, in 1932, the political climate shifted again.
Vowing broad experimentation in policy, the Roosevelt administration pushed through a
full slate of sweeping legislation, including the National Industrial Recovery Act.28 Through
a newly created National Recovery Administration, the government sought to increase
economic growth through improved wages in the private and public sectors. In theory, the
agency should have increased the purchasing power of American citizens and bolstered
employment levels in the United States. With more money in the hands of ordinary
citizens, they could participate in the market place and acquire goods that sustained or
improved upon their standard of living. Furthermore, the cutthroat competition that had
driven overproduction and simultaneously lowered prices would be addressed through
cooperation in industry. Government, industry, and--to a limited extent--labor negotiated
codes and thus participated in recovery.29
The economic well-being of American workers became one of the focal points of
government policy under the newly-elected president Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his book,
The Great Depression, Robert McElvaine argues that economic individualism had influenced
27

Franklin Roosevelt’s Statement on the National Industrial Recovery Act (June 16, 1933), Franklin Delano
Roosevelt Library & Museum website, http://www.docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odnirast.html, author: Staff of the
Roosevelt Library, version date 2015, (accessed January 23, 2015); The Social Welfare History Project, “The
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 Signed into Law on June 16, 1933,”
http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/eras/national-industrial-recovery-act-of-1933/ (accessed January 23, 2015).
28
Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Milleu, The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2002), 41.
29
“Teaching with Documents: FDR’s Fireside Chat on the Purposes and Foundations of the Recovery Program,”
National Archives and Records Administration website at College Park, Maryland,
http://archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-fireside/ (accessed January 23, 2015); Lowell B. Mason, “Darrow vs.
Johnson,” The North American Review 238, no. 6 (December 1934): 524, 526-527; Donald Richberg, “Progress
under the National Industrial Recovery Act,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 15, no. 4 (January
1934): 395.
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Depression-era politics, but Roosevelt represented a break from that tradition.30 Franklin
Delano Roosevelt was not an overt deficit-spending advocate. Indeed, he did not embrace
Keynesian economic theory, but he believed that financial and material relief programs
were important factors in preventing the destitution of the American workers.31

As

historians have long claimed, Roosevelt received pragmatic approval in addressing these
problems.
After the presidential election in November of 1932, Roosevelt sought to address the
crisis in different ways from the prior administration and thus changed the American
political landscape. During his first one hundred days, FDR used his political mandate to
pass a series of economic reforms and stimulus programs, such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Emergency Banking Act. The
National Industrial Recovery Act was the culmination of Roosevelt’s efforts to stem the
economic crisis and put Americans back to work. Further, Roosevelt, as a product of the
progressive drive to reform the national economy and promote better social conditions for
all Americans, saw his national economic policies as a means of addressing not just the
economic crisis, but also lasting inequality. Viewed by some conservatives as “traitor to his

30

Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941 (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1993), 58-59;
“The United States Turns Inward: the 1920s and 1930s,” Scholastic,
http://www.scholastic.com/browse/subarticle.jsp?id=1674. (accessed April 5, 2013); Ellis Hawley et al., Herbert
Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism, 5. In the United States, there were two economic visions that
pervaded until the Great Depression. A laissez-faire system with independent businessmen was on one hand,
while Christian Capitalism and its emphasis on morality and ethical tenets existed with compassionate men leading
the charge against social and economic decay. Hoover believed in both Americas, and sought to use both premises
to design social and economic reforms.
31
Special Report, “Text of Roosevelt’s Message to Congress, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 5, 1935. In this State of
the Union speech, Roosevelt confirmed that American workers should have some rudimentary socioeconomic
rights such as housing, and a higher standard of living, and that Congress should enact laws that enabled these
economic and social dreams occur. Moreover, the federal government, during times of need, should provide
Americans with relief even if this was not initially budgeted by the various branches of government.
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class,” Roosevelt believed in the “common man” and sought to provide ordinary Americans
with relief and emergency financial support.32
The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, was an important effort that
paved the way for dynamic change and attempted to resolve the national emergency in the
United States. It sought first to address those competitive practices that contributed to the
emergence of economic deprivation and collapse.33 The law restructured the national
economy and its industrial sectors to create a new environment characterized by high
employment in the labor market that ideally benefited American workers and consumers.
The New Deal also changed the ways in which the public sector viewed those who worked,
and it provided working and middle class Americans with opportunities to petition their
employers for better working conditions and benefits. Roosevelt had a sense of action to
address the people’s concerns and Americans had more confidence in his administration to
mitigate the crippling effects of the Depression.34
Under the leadership of the Roosevelt administration, Congress passed the National
Industrial Recovery Act and modeled the new NRA on the War Industries Board (WIB) that
had been established after the United States entered the First World War in 1917. The WIB
had been the first attempt of elected officials to link a centralized planning approach to
economic policy in the United States’ government.35 The WIB was responsible for the

32

Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: The Viking Press, 1946), 71, 154, 166; Philip A. Grant Jr., “The
Presidential Election of 1932 in Michigan,” Michigan Historical Review 12, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 89; Sidney M. Milkis
and Jerome M. Milleu, The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
2002), 27.
33
Special, “Text of Richberg’s Business Report to Roosevelt,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1934; “National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,” The Social Welfare Project, http://www.socialwelfare.com/eras/nationalindustrial-recovery-act-of-1933/. (accessed April 1, 2013).
34
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II, 1-3.
35
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II, 37, 65; Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A
History of the American Worker, 1933-1941 (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010), 19.
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logistics of consumer goods and commodities to American soldiers fighting in Europe.
American policymakers strove to ensure that American soldiers were well cared for and
had the necessary tools and equipment to fight the Central powers in Europe.36 Lastly, the
WIB was concerned with the pricing of commodities and other materials used by military
forces so that stock levels were maintained and managed efficiently. The NRA used many
of these innovations in seeking to address the imbalances within the market and the
economy.
More importantly, the NIRA was the first federal law enacted that promoted
centralized planning of the national economy during peacetime.

Historian William

Leuchtenburg has argued that the NIRA was an important law that enabled American
policymakers in the Roosevelt administration to win the war against the Great
Depression.37

This critical period in American history was described using war

mobilizations metaphor. The Great Depression was what Roosevelt described as the
analogue of war, and it had to be eradicated through the creation of federal agencies
including the National Recovery Administration. This metaphor enabled Americans to rally
behind New Deal programs, establish a common sense approach to ending the crisis,
promote the national interest, and end all opposition to new policies. It enabled a new crop
36

Leo Wolman, “The Statistical Work of the War Industries Board,” Publications of the American Statistical
Association 16, no. 125 (March 1919): 249, 252-253. The WIB also maintained statistics on commodities and
supplies to determine domestic consumption levels; Robert D. Cuff, “A Dollar-a-Year Man in Government: George
N. Peek and the War Industries Board,” Business History Review 41, no. 4 (Winter 1967): 407. This article
illustrates that George Peek was concerned with the proper allocation of materials to American soldiers during the
First World War. Logistics is an important part of any military exercise, and this issue was one of his top concerns
and served as the major goal of the WIB.
37
William Leuchtenburg, The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy (New York: Columbia University Press,
2001), 36-38, 66. One must also mention that American corporate executives and policymakers wanted to reestablish the WIB to serve as an apparatus to combat the Great Depression. The WIB and the 1917-1918 wartime
mobilization were viewed as examples of cooperation and successful coordination to defeat the Central powers,
and now these same types of institutions were to defeat poverty and destitution during the interwar period in the
United States.
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of American scholars in public sector agencies to mobilize and fight against unemployment
and poverty during the Depression years.38
The National Industrial Recovery Act’s principal strategy in confronting the crisis
was to centralize industrial planning to address the negative effects of competition on the
economy and to help stabilize the boom-and-bust cycle that had led to the crisis. The NRA’s
fair codes of competition further enabled policymakers and corporate executives to work
together to regulate the various industries in the United States to stave off overproduction,
the corrosive effect of competitive price wars, and the long-term effects of corporate
monopoly on prices, wages, and working conditions.39 In addition, while highly contested,
NIRA’s section 7(a) established the right to collective bargaining, and thus trade unionism
in the United States.40 The role of the federal government, with the passage of the NIRA
expanded dramatically; and working Americans benefited from some of the industrial
rights under the National Labor Board and the NRA. Section 7(a) was essential to the NIRA,
because it was the first attempt by policymakers to manage and regulate workplace
conditions and expand employee rights and benefits in effect, to create “industrial
democracy.”

38

William Leuchtenburg, The FDR Years, 35, 39.
Jim Powell, “How FDR Prolonged the Great Depression,” CATO Policy Report, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/v25n4/powell.pdf. (accessed April 1, 2013).
40
Charles L. Dearing et al., The ABC of the NRA (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1934). 121-122; Lewis
L. Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards: The Regulation of Collective Bargaining under the National
Industrial Recovery Act (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1935), 45-46; Arthur B. Adams, Our Economic
Revolution: Solving Our Depression Problems Through Public Control of Industry (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1934), 121-123; William H. Spencer, Collective Bargaining under Section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935), 1-6; John Kenneth Galbraith, ed., Recollections of
the New Deal: When the People Mattered (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), xiii.
39
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In 1932, Congress had passed an act limiting labor injunction, entitled the NorrisLaGuardia Act, that opened the door for broader labor union action.41 Senator George
William Norris of Nebraska and New York Representative Fiorello H. LaGuardia introduced
this important bill, which had an enormous impact on worker relations in the private
sector.

This law enabled workers to strike without interruption for better working

conditions, wages and benefits. It prohibited corporate executives from relying on labor
injunctions to get their employees back to work in cases of labor disapproval.42 The law
had a significant influence on future legislation, such as the National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933 and the National Labor (Wagner) Relations Act of 1935. Moreover, the new
NIRA law differed from earlier federal policy, and especially from the Hoover
administration’s reform strategies, which had stressed corporate subsidies and private
relief.43 Section 7(a) had a regenerative effect on the labor movement, because it enabled
American workers to collectively bargain to rectify worker grievances, factory conditions,
and dissatisfaction with the labor market.
Literature Review
This dissertation differs from the works of prominent global historians that may
have focused entirely on foreign policy, such as Martin Kitchen, and Charles Poor
Kindleberger; labor and the history of American consumers, such as Lizabeth Cohen; the

41
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Great Crash of 1929, such as John Kenneth Galbraith; the Great Depression and the
interwar period, such as George McJimsey, and David M. Kennedy; the political and
economic agendas of the New Deal, such as Alan Brinkley, Eric Rauchway, Ellis Hawley,
William E. Leuchtenburg, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, such as Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr and Bernard Asbell. It seeks to examine the business history of American
corporations in the automobile and petroleum sectors, and how these businesses were
affected by the presidency of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as both
policymakers sought to rectify the private sector decline.

This historical account

enumerates how geopolitics affected the United States as American corporations, for the
first time, were regulated by an expanded federal government. It illustrates how the
federal government became proactive in its economic responses to mitigate the effects of
the Great Depression. It attempts to perform a comparative analysis between the Hoover
and Roosevelt presidencies following the Great Crash of 1929 until 1935, and the effects
that the federal government’s policies had on American workers as the NIRA and AAA took
hold in the United States.
Historical scholarship on the New Deal literature has focused mainly on the Second
New Deal period that occurred from 1936 to 1945. It was during Roosevelt’s second
administration that many laws such as the Wagner Act, or National Labor Relations Act of
1935 that validated trade unionism and the Social Security Act that created social
insurance were passed. The First New Deal agenda, in which laws, such as the Agricultural
Adjustment Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act were passed, was in many ways
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equally important.44 As some historians have argued, it set the template and limitations for
federal policy. In this narrative, I will discuss the major components of the National
Recovery Administration and how the various branches of this agency functioned by
analyzing primary and secondary source materials.45 The National Archives contain
significant amounts of literature on the Consumer Advisory and Industrial Advisory boards
that served as important administrative organs within the NRA. These documents enabled
me to scrutinize in more detail the duties and responsibilities of both sub-agencies.
Moreover, the National Archives contains the Donald Richberg Papers.

The Donald

Richberg Papers were an essential part of this dissertation, because they enumerate and
provide a first-hand account of his actions as general counsel for the NRA. As readers may
recall, Richberg was an influential and successful labor attorney, who played a prominent
role in the NRA as general counsel.46 He worked closely with General Hugh Samuel
Johnson, who served as the chief administer for the NRA.
In order to paint a more vivid picture of the NRA and how its policies affected the
average American worker, this dissertation uses primary source materials from the
Reuther Research Archives at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan.47 The Reuther
Archives contain New Deal labor newspaper articles, letters, and written essays that
activists published in labor magazines and scholarly journals. It also contains the private
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papers of New Deal scholars and trade unionists Mary Van Kleeck, Mary Heaton Vorse,
Harry O’Connor and Robert Dun, including their manuscripts and documents with
descriptive citations and notes on them. These New Deal scholars’ papers compose a
critical portion of the dissertation. The New Dealers provide enormous detail into the
relationship that they had with the federal government, corporations in the private sector
and their colleagues throughout organized labor. Their works allowed me to paint a vivid
picture of the Great Depression and how the New Deal paved the way for dynamic changes
in the private sector through the enactment of federal regulations that promoted private
sector growth.

Contemporaries during the New Deal, such as Charles Roos, Alfred

Bernheim and Dorothy Van Doren, Charles L. Dearing and others, and Lois MacDonald,
Gladys L. Palmer and Theresa Wolfson; provided readers with detailed information about
the agencies of the NRA, how they were organized and the responsibilities of the different
internal boards.48 This dissertation relies upon these works as well. Subsequent analyses
have expanded on these early works on the NRA and enumerate some of its deficiencies.
In newspaper coverage from the New York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune in
1933 and 1934, General Hugh Samuel Johnson and other officials discusses the roles and
responsibilities of the NRA. Some of Johnson’s speeches in which he addresses his critics,
were reported in newspapers as well. The NRA was viewed by many, especially American
corporate leaders, as a controversial agency. These primary sources illustrate in detail how
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the NRA officials attempted to weather the political storms that came their way during the
process of the carrying out many of their duties.
Beyond the NRA, this dissertation examines the roles of Herbert Hoover and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in bringing about economic and industrial changes during the
Great Depression. Hoover wrote three sets of memoirs that address the Great Crash of
1929, how the Great Depression started, and who should be held responsible. In them, he
described his opposition to the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to
resolve the economic crisis. Hoover’s public papers contain letters, media statements and
speeches from his presidency in which he discussed in great detail his economic and
political policies.49 Hoover wrote two books, in which he discussed his beliefs in American
principles and how they differentiated the United States from the rest of the world.50 For
Hoover, these Republican ideals fell by the wayside during the New Deal, because his
successor, Roosevelt, espoused central planning of the national economy and social
programs, not the self-help that Hoover envisioned and emphasized.

Although this

dissertation touches upon Hoover’s role as a food administrator during the First World
War, much effort is placed upon defining his responsibilities as Commerce Secretary and
President. His memoirs and public statements enabled me to document his political
mindset as a public official and the negative effects that the Great Crash had on his
administration.
49
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The New Deal era generated a voluminous public record. Roosevelt’s public papers
are much more extensive than Hoover’s, because FDR served four terms as president of the
United States. The archives contain his letters to American and foreign policymakers and
corporate leaders, his speeches to the American people, such as his 1932 campaign
addresses and some of his Fireside chats, his press releases and public media statements in
which he addressed his presidential press corps as well as correspondence with
constituent voters.51 Roosevelt’s children along with historian Bernard Asbell published
his memoirs and these serve as an indirect method of explaining Roosevelt’s political
mindset as he created the New Deal and the NIRA.52 This dissertation will not describe
Roosevelt’s private life, such as what Bernard Asbell accomplished in his Roosevelt
biography, but will discuss his roles as governor of New York State and president of the
United States during a period of profound economic collapse. It differs from other works
because it examines the Roosevelt administration’s expanded role in the private sector as
the Executive Branch enacted the NIRA and the AAA. In addition, it elucidates the duties of
Roosevelt and his efforts along with Frances Perkins, Donald Richberg, Harold Ickes and
General Hugh Samuel Johnson to redefine the federal government’s private sector
responsibilities.

Each policymaker was obligated to work with corporations in the

automobile and petroleum sectors to promote industrial growth during a period of
economic collapse.
Frances Perkins’ The Roosevelt I Knew examines the roles that she, as labor
secretary, played during the negotiations for the NIRA and the professional relationships
51
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that she maintained with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, General Hugh Samuel Johnson, Harold
Ickes, and Donald Richberg.53 These memoirs reveal the process by which the New Deal
was created, and stand as evidence of Roosevelt’s unique approach to policymaking.
Frances Perkins was instrumental to the creation of the NIRA, but this dissertation
somewhat departs from her analytical work, because it examines the substantial team
effort that it took to enact this important bill. Her role is muted slightly in this dissertation
in an effort to describe the organizational structure of the NRA and its role as a federal
regulator for the national economy.
Third, this dissertation discusses how the automobile and petroleum industries in
particular were affected by the NIRA.

Historian Sidney Fine, along with Clarence J.

Huddleston whose papers contain interviews about the Banking Crisis in Detroit in the
1930s, enumerated the roles of Henry Ford during this period.54 Sidney Fine’s papers
contain newspaper articles and accounts of the Edgewater strike in New Jersey during the
1930s, in which Ford workers agitated for the legitimation of trade unionism. Both Sidney
Fine and Clarence J. Huddleston describe Ford Motor Company during the Great
Depression and this dissertation differs from their works in that it enumerates the
interdependent roles of both Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation during
the negotiation process for the automobile code. Sidney Fine focused on Ford Motor
Company and its relationship to the NRA but this dissertation seeks to go a little farther to
provide more information about the industrial codes that affected the automobile industry
from 1933 to 1935. Additionally, it touches upon how the automobile industry was
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interwoven with the petroleum sector as oil commodities along with the manufactured
products from the automobile industry became essential consumer goods for the American
people and global citizens.
The Benson Ford Research Collection at the Henry Ford Museum contains account
books and ledgers used by management at Ford Motor Company.

They reveal how

management functioned under the NIRA.55 The Ford Archives have anonymous letters to
Thomas Edison, in which an unknown author advocated against the passage of the NIRA;
and discussed the supposed damage that it would cause the automobile sector if enacted.
The Ford Archives have the petroleum and automobile codes in their entirety. Historians
Lonnie Bell, Douglas Brinkley, David L. Lewis, Sidney Fine, and John B. Rae provide readers
with snapshots into the origins and history of Ford Motor Company and how this company
fared during the New Deal.56 These books also analyze the effects that the NIRA had on its
corporate operations and provide detailed analysis.
David Farber’s Sloan Rules illustrates the responsibilities of Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who
served as the president of General Motors until 1956, and his efforts to work with the
NIRA.57 However, the history of General Motors is difficult to dissect during the 1930s,
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because the GM Heritage Center Collection has few of the firm’s files from the New Deal
period to the present. Sloan’s private documents have been destroyed, and there are only
limited primary sources at the GM archives, such as sales account books and ledgers from
the 1930s. Sloan’s manuscript from his My Years with General Motors is on file at the GM
archives.58

This book provides readers with first-hand information about the

interworkings of General Motors Corporation under his helm. Moreover, there are many
New York Times articles from the summer of 1933 that illustrated the roles of Sloan who
served in the NRA’s Industrial Advisory Board. Sloan’s critical position in the NRA allowed
him to shape the board and the agency itself. This dissertation attempts to illustrate vividly
General Motors Corporation during the Great Depression and fills in the gaps in this
company’s historiography throughout this critical period in the United States.
In addition, Ed Cray’s Chrome Colossus discusses some corporate aspects of GM, but
it relies solely on newspaper articles from the period and limited private correspondence.59
Farber’s Sloan Rules examines more primary source materials, such as letters between
Sloan and Roosevelt and other New Deal policymakers, and has a host of secondary source
material.

Kettering University, which had been named previously General Motors

Institution in Flint, Michigan, has some New Deal primary source materials, such as letters,
corporate documents and account books; but their records are limited, because of the
paucity of surviving GM documentation.60 Douglas Reynolds and Ernest Dale chart the
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history of General Motors under Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who had a powerful automotive mind
and his efforts to work with the Roosevelt administration during the New Deal period.61
In terms of the petroleum industry, the literature is rich with detail.

This

dissertation is somewhat similar to prior works from Donald R. Brand and Norman E.
Nordhauser that describe the petroleum industry during the Great Depression and provide
expanded views of the negotiation process for the oil code throughout 1933.

Many

corporate executives and governors especially from the Southwest, were mentioned in
Congressional hearings for the NIRA. The oil industry in the 1930s is further discussed
thoroughly in many newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, the
Chicago Daily Tribune and the Los Angeles Times. The Department of Justice also contains
some files about the Teapot Dome crisis from 1921 to 1924 and how the petroleum
industry fared, because of this political event in the years before the Depression. In the
1930s, this crisis was overshadowed by the emergence of the Great Depression.
There were some efforts by Harold Ickes to regulate the oil industry and to apply
the petroleum code to corporations in this sector. In Fightin’ Oil and The Secret Diary of
Harold I. Ickes, Ickes discussed his efforts at reforming the petroleum industry; but he
mainly illustrates his role in the logistics and shipping of oil to American soldiers fighting in
Europe during the Second World War.62 Ickes’ memoirs describe his political life during
the heart of the New Deal from 1933 to 1936. Norman E. Nordhauser, and the National
Petroleum News cover the development and shifts in the petroleum industry during the

61

Douglas Reynolds, “Engines of Struggle: Technology, Skill and Unionization at General Motors, 1930-1940,”
Michigan Historical Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 69-92; Ernest Dale, “Contributions to Administration by Alfred
P. Sloan and General Motors,” Administrative Science Quarterly 1, no. 1 (June 1956): 30-62.
62
Harold I. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold I. Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1954) and Fightin’ Oil (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc, 1943), 53.

24

New Deal period.63 Historian Gerald D. Nash examines the negotiations for the petroleum
code while Donald R. Brand described the petroleum industry during the New Deal and
how the industry faced difficult challenges with the enactment of the NIRA.64 Collectively,
these works help to provide a picture of the NRA through two of its most important target
industries. This dissertation relies heavily on these works about the petroleum industry
during the Great Depression and describes how price and production controls were
debated upon and negotiated during the hearings for the oil code throughout the summer
months of 1933.
Dissertation Chapter Review
Ideally, this dissertation will contribute to the historical and political debate about
the New Deal, its successes and its failures, by examining the passage of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933. This dissertation scrutinizes its implementation
and effects, and its demise after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Schechter v. the
United States in 1935. First, this document outlines the problems that faced the Herbert
Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt administrations and their efforts to redress the
effects of the economic crisis that took place from 1929 onward. All of the chapters
attempt to link the political and economic events of the 1920s, such as the Great Crash and
the emergence of the Great Depression in the 1930s to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to
target reforms to redress the industrial and economic crisis. Much effort is devoted to
63
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describing the economic and industrial events before the emergence of the NIRA and AAA
and sets the tone for future discussions.

By focusing on the events that led to the

enactment of the NIRA and AAA, readers can comprehend more thoroughly the need for
the federal regulations inherent in both laws. The American economy was in a shambles
and this dissertation enumerates the differing roles of the presidency as both Hoover and
Roosevelt sought to devise solutions to the industrial and economic crisis.
In Chapter Two, I focus on how the petroleum and automobile industries fared
during the 1920s, before and during the Great Crash of 1929. This chapter will examine
how both sectors expanded their international market-share as the federal government
sought to create the conditions for economic growth. The chapter will discuss Ford Motor
Company, General Motors Corporations, and the myriad of petroleum companies. The
chapter illustrates how both industries developed global relations as they expanded their
business operations. It will discuss the important issues, such as conservation, production,
technology, corporate and market innovations, and labor relations, that affected
corporations in the petroleum and automobile industries.
Chapter Three discusses the Great Crash of 1929 and the coming of the Great
Depression in the 1930s. Scholars believe that there were many reasons for these financial
crises.

Under-consumption, overproduction in American industries, technological

innovation in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and the price instability of
manufactured goods were the key industrial causes of the economic crises. The national
economy’s problems with a metallic standard, the lack of programs to address the crisis
under President Herbert Hoover, the promotion of private charities and a balanced federal
budget, Stock Market speculation, and the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve System
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were implicated in the continued economic, social and monetary crises of the 1930s. Thus,
the national economy was changing under the Hoover administration, but it could not
respond effectively in large part due to Hoover’s lack of flexibility, while the Roosevelt
administration addressed the crisis with Keynesian policies that Roosevelt termed
“experimentation.” FDR decided to act for the American people and reform the diverse
elements of the national economy.65
Chapter Four addresses arguments about a laissez-faire approach to the crisis in the
United States as well as the introduction of alternative economic ideas and policies. It
further follows the scope and range of political responses to the economic crisis. Both
Hoover and Roosevelt maintained divergent political views about the national economy.
This dissertation seeks to point out those differences and examine their policy approaches
through their speeches, press releases, public statements and correspondence, and other
primary and secondary source material. Moreover, it contends that the United States and
its approach to the national economy were adapting to the new context of the global
economy. Politicians and government administrators sought to address the global crisis
with new policies.
Chapter Five examines the interregnum period following the presidential election of
1932. It discusses the lingering conditions present during the early years of the Great
Depression. It elaborates on how Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, and
the petroleum industries maintained their profitability during the growing crisis. The
chapter provides a glimpse into how families survived during troubling times and the role
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of Hoover and Roosevelt as policymakers who attempted to resolve the crisis. How
families made ends meet during a period of widespread unemployment and how the
petroleum and automobile industries maintained difficult relations are addressed as well.
Lastly, the chapter looks at the foreign debt crisis between Europe and the United States
that was not resolved before the presidential inauguration of March 4, 1933. During this
period, Hoover and Roosevelt began to drift apart ideologically, and their differences were
not resolved.
Chapter Six examines the Roosevelt Administration’s efforts to stem the problems
of the Great Depression by adopting a form of centralized planning in the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. The War Industries Board, headed by Bernard Baruch and
that had been established during World War I, served as a successful template for
centralized planning of American industries.66 The WIB had regulated the production
process of American corporations in the United States to mobilize material resources for
the war effort.67 It enabled policymakers realize that centralized planning of the national
economy offered some positive effects for corporations and had the capacity to enhance
their profits. Run by corporate executives called “one dollar men,” the WIB became both an
example of overreach for some conservatives but also an exemplar of the potential of
economic planning to resolve economic uncertainty.68 Johnson and others who served in
this agency realized the importance of maintaining sound interconnected relationships

66

John Kennedy Ohl, “The Navy, the War Industries Board, and the Industrial Mobilization for War, 1917-1918,”
Military Affairs 40, no. 1 (February 1976): 17; Leo Wolman, “The Statistical Work of the War Industries Board,”
Publications of the American Statistical Association 16, no. 125 (March 1919): 249;”Bernard Baruch,” Spartacus
Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/usabaruchb.htm. (accessed April 5, 2013).
67
Daniel R. Beaver, “Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board, 1917-1918,” The Journal of
American History 52, no. 1 (June 1963): 43, 45, 52, 57.
68
Robert D. Cuff, “A Dollar-a-Year Man in the Government: George N. Peck and the War Industries Board,” The
Business History Review 41, no. 4 (Winter 1967): 404, 414, 418.

28

with the private sector, because this improved supply chains or logistics for American
soldiers fighting in Europe during the First World War.
In this section of the dissertation, I discuss the provisions of Title I, which created
the NRA, the codes of fair competition, and collective bargaining.69 Both provisions in the
NIRA were aimed at putting the United States on the right track toward economic recovery.
The Title I provisions paved the way for worker rights and better labor conditions, because
corporate executives had to follow the codes of fair competition that contained collective
bargaining stipulations. The industry codes intervened in both the commodities and labor
markets, and they were originally designed to provide workers with an improved work
environment. The codes were the first step toward economic justice and financial solvency.
The NRA became an important agency that worked with industry leaders to devise,
approve and enforce the codes of fair competition.70
Although the NRA was not long-standing, it created hundreds of codes that
reformed the economic environment and provided workers with tangible rights.71
American workers had new access to better wage determination schema, improved
working conditions and benefits for themselves and their families. Moreover, American
workers did not have to join company unions or be subjected to yellow-dog contracts. The
NIRA expanded upon worker rights and freedoms and led to new judicial interpretations of
labor laws.

69

The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, http://www.ourdocuments.gov; Malcolm P. Sharp, “Title I
of the National Recovery Act,” The University of Chicago Law Review 1, no. 2 (November 1933): 323-324.
70
Alan Brinkley, “Roosevelt, Franklin Delano,” American National Biography Online,
http://www.anb.org/articles/06/06-00567.html. (accessed April 1, 2013).
71
Sidney Hillman, “The NRA, Labor and Recovery,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences
172 (March 1934), 72.

29

The NIRA, however, was not without its critics.

The National Association of

Manufacturers and the corporate executives who were its members were opposed
vehemently to the NIRA. They did not approve of this law and protested against the
passage and implementation of the NIRA. The American Liberty League, which was a nonpartisan organization with conservative values, such as the intense protection of private
property and limited government regulations of the national economy, also opposed both
the NIRA and the NRA.72 Their opposition led to court challenges and the eventual
dismantling of the NRA and AAA in the mid-1930s.
In Chapter Seven, I look at the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and how its
operations developed the codes of fair competition to which corporations in each industry
were to adhere. The NRA codes set up production quotas, eliminated child labor, improved
wages, limited weekly work hours, and provided employees with collective bargaining
rights. Contemporary observers, such as Clair Wilcox in America’s Recovery Program,
Charles Frederick Roos in NRA Economic Planning, and Charles L. Dearing in The ABC of the
NRA illustrated the steps that American corporations had to follow in an effort to receive
the Blue Eagle seal.73 The Blue Eagle was a federal license that corporations obtained, if
they had approved and adhered to an industry code of fair competition. With the Blue
Eagle, the federal government recognized corporations as having the approval to conduct
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business operations under this new law.74 Codes of fair competition were in place, and
American corporations could transact business with domestic and foreign counterparties.
By early 1935, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began to seek a two-year
extension to the NIRA, but events during this period prevented him from achieving this
goal. In May 1935, the Supreme Court ruled that the NRA was unconstitutional, because
the law interfered with the interstate commerce authority of Congress.75 In particular,
Schechter v. the United States served as a test case for the many individual suits that were
argued in the lower branches of the Federal Judiciary, State Supreme Courts and Courts of
Appeals.76 Many court cases had targeted and attacked the codes of fair competition, public
works’ provisions of the NIRA, and collective bargaining rights. Another issue that the
Supreme Court reviewed was the determination of intrastate commerce versus interstate
commerce in the transactions of American businesses.77

If a company maintained

primarily local operations while only minor transactions were national or international,
did this imply that it had violated the interstate commerce authority of Congress and, thus,
the United States’ Constitution?
The court cases that dealt with violations of the petroleum and live poultry codes
were central to the discussion, because they addressed the constitutionality of the NIRA
and its industry codes. The petroleum code cases dealt with the excess shipment of oil or
74
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petroleum products throughout the United States and how that affected the prices for those
goods (cut-throat prices). The live poultry code law suit dealt with infringements against
wages and hours provisions of the code. The petroleum and live poultry code violations
were argued in federal court, because the justices had to iron out whether the commerce
clause of the United States’ Constitution had been violated.

These code challenges

determined the fate of the NRA.
Overall, the Supreme Court decision’s overturning of the NIRA paved the way for
new industrial reforms.

The Executive branch realized that it could affect indirectly

collective bargaining through the discontinuation of federal agencies, such as the NRA and
stimulate American industrial production in other ways than regulation. In 1935, National
Labor Relations Act was passed, and it affected private sector industrial growth and wages
in the national economy.

Policymakers sought to push for trade unionism and the

emergence of collective bargaining between workers and employers as a necessary step to
protect American workers and corporate management entities. This freed the hands of the
Roosevelt administration.
Chapter Eight focuses on the death of the NIRA, but it contends that collective
bargaining after the curtailment of the NIRA became the norm in the United States through
other means. In fact, the NRA’s hearings on industrial conflict, done through regional labor
boards, provided the model for the National Labor Relations Board’s system of adjudicating
labor conflict, running certification elections, and hearing worker and union grievances.78
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Section 7(a) then was only the first stage of the Roosevelt administration’s experiment with
labor.79 The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which followed the demise of the NIRA,
played an important role in continuing the tradition of collective bargaining and trade
unionism in the United States. The NIRA and its section 7(a) were only the beginning steps
toward establishing worker rights in the labor force and corporate settings, and with its
curtailment, a new industrial and economic methodology has been promoted since the New
Deal period to promote the longevity of trade unionism in the American industrial
landscape.
In many ways, the United States is still affected in a positive manner by the passage
of the NIRA during the New Deal period. The law, importantly, was the first step in
peacetime to regulate directly the national economy. As students and scholars examine
this period, they will witness the unfolding of the modern political state in the United
States. Roosevelt opened the presidency and his administration to the American people
and this differed immensely from President Hoover, who was not convinced that
Americans understood the foreign and domestic policies that he attempted to establish.
This dissertation serves as a mechanism for debate about these issues in the United States
and global system. These lessons can strengthen American concepts of independence
versus interdependence, and the country can move forward.
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CHAPTER 2: THE INDUSTRIAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE
1920s
In the 1920s, American businesses experienced a series of economic highs and lows
due to monetary deflation and financial crises.1 There was a minor recession after the First
World War, and, despite widely perceived prosperity, by 1926, real wages were stagnant.
During these minor recessions, 4,750,000 persons remained on the unemployment lines
and could not locate work.2 In addition, there was enormous volatility in the financial and
stock markets.

As the United States moved to a consumer-based national economy,

corporate executives such as Henry Ford, William Durant, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. and Pierre S.
du Pont faced enormous economic instability as they sought to promote the viability of
their respective companies.3 In the past, scholars may have discussed the monetary causes
of the instability prior to 1929; but the manufacturing sector and its practices contributed
to economic volatility even during the 1920s. While many middle-class Americans were
participating in the Stock Exchange, industrial practices such as overproduction and price
fixing, as Michael Bernstein and other economic historians have shown, were at the
forefront of the economic discussions in the United States.4 Scholars such as Arthur B.
Adams have argued that business booms have often been followed by national and/or
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global depressions.5 This chapter seeks to address the economic circumstances of the
1920s focusing on the industrial sector and in particular automobile manufacturing and oil
production. It examines the automobile and petroleum industries and how they fared
during this dynamic period in United States’ history. Even as Americans were purchasing
vehicles in mass numbers, and new highway construction linked the rural areas to urban
sector, there were signs that the prosperity built on the new car economy had its limits.6
Additionally, I discuss the business practices of Henry Ford, who considered himself
an American Individualist, and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., a calculated risk-taker at the helm of
General Motors, to illustrate how they adapted their companies and production processes
during the economically volatile 1920s.

The ways in which their businesses were

organized determined whether Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation
would re-emerge as industrial juggernauts during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Both
companies, in the early 1920s, experienced an economic slowdown in vehicle sales and
profitability, but they weathered the storm well when compared to smaller automobile
companies that lost market-share or went bankrupt during the decade. Although the
automobile industry became more concentrated as many companies folded, the Big Three,
consisting of General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation
became dominant in this sector. This chapter also seeks to illustrate the emergence of
Fordism in the United States, because Ford Motor Company enabled average Americans
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own vehicles and improve upon their standards of living.7 With Fordism, Americans
entered the industrial age.8
General Motors had not always been a successful enterprise and had ample
competitors for market dominance before the Great Crash of 1929. So, how did General
Motors Corporation become such a powerful corporation in the United States? How did it
surpass Ford Motor Company, which had been the industry leader until the replacement of
the Model T with the Model A in 1927?9 While both Ford and GM had been competitive
before the Great Depression, and suffered in the initial stages of the economic crisis, they
emerged at the end of the decade stronger, while smaller competitors failed. Both General
Motors and Ford Motor Company were able to adapt to a difficult economic environment
and reshape their corporate policies, which enabled them to mitigate harsh industrial and
financial conditions. In fact, the two companies took different approaches to the National
Industrial Recovery Act and the industrial codes that were designed to address the crisis of
overproduction and high unemployment.
In its second half, I discuss the emergence of the petroleum industry in the United
States as it profited from its manufacturing connections with the automobile sector. The
petroleum sector became an important industry by 1924. It produced commodities that
were used throughout the United States and the global system, especially the automobile
sector. The public and private sectors had begun to use oil and gasoline products to power
7
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their newly developed technological innovations, such as cars, airplanes, sea vessels or
tractors. The petroleum industry further benefited from domestic policies that contributed
to high levels of profitability. The 1920s proved to be a period of profound economic
growth and uncertainty. Both the automobile and petroleum industries worked hand in
hand to promote the nation’s economic viability. Although corporate executives from both
sectors were not always altruistic, they developed industrial technologies that enabled the
United States to become an economic and industrial hegemon.
Ordinary citizens from the 1920s onward wondered about the industrial
modifications of the national economy in the United States. The national economy already
had become global, and many corporations that used advertising campaigns to showcase
their products could not keep pace with new global competition. The production of
consumer goods was expanding, and American corporations began to use research and
development strategies to determine and grow customer demand.10

The economic

conditions of the 1920s were somewhat volatile as monetary contraction gave way to
monetary expansion. Some industries failed to muster enough financial support to sustain
profitability and remain competitive, even though their advertising campaigns promoted
new product designs. American businesses in the 1880s spent about 200 million dollars on
advertising for their various products, but by 1920, they paid about 3 billion dollars for
print campaigns.11 By 1929, American advertising companies were spending more than six
billion dollars targeting domestic consumers through their print campaigns in national
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newspapers and magazines.12 Daniel Pope illustrated the importance of advertising by
arguing, that in 1920 alone, there were three companies that spent millions of dollars on ad
campaigns--Proctor & Gamble, Goodyear Tire and Quaker Oats.13 Ad agencies became
informational missionaries that discussed and enumerated the major qualities of consumer
goods. They were the nation’s “town criers” who brought to the general public interesting
details about manufactured products sold on the open market.

They educated the

American people and helped them to improve upon their standards of living.14 Because of
the efforts of advertising agencies, corporations in the automobile and petroleum sectors
enhanced their profitability.
By contrast, many companies in the textile and apparel industries did not fare well
during this period. Synthetic textiles such as rayon and nylon replaced wool and silk as
prominent commodities.15 Rayon became so popular among consumers that, by 1925,
corporations produced annually about fifty-three million pounds of that fabric, taking a
significant share of the textile market.16

Other manufacturers in industries such as

metalworking and cabinet-making could not generate enough profitability to remain
attractive for investment. They struggled with new market conditions. Small businesses in
a number of sectors began to lose market-share. The small business owners did not
generate enough revenue to survive in a newly volatile marketplace, because they could
not compete with the newly developed multinational corporations. In 1908, there were
12
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253 automobile companies that produced cars for the national economy; but this number
decreased to 44 in 1929.17 The automobile sector is a case in point that illustrates
industrial consolidation. By 1929, three car companies—General Motors Corporation, Ford
Motor Company and Chrysler--controlled the global market.
The number of factory workers in the United States also continued to increase.
Leland Olds in the Federated Press argued that between 1899 and 1925, factory employees
advanced from 5.2 million to about 9,772,000.18 This consisted of an increase by more than
88%. In other corporate sectors such as manufacturing and mining, there were 221
consolidations as these industries became smaller in size.19 In 1925, 554 firms closed their
doors while in 1928, approximately 1,038 similarly closed down. Consolidation reshaped
the market and competition became intense as multinational corporations began to
dominate the global marketplace.

Automobile corporations continued to expand

production and hired more workers. For example, by 1913, Ford Motor Company had
about 14,000 employees that produced 248,307 cars per year.20 This number increased
more dramatically in the 1920s. By 1929, Ford Motor Company’s Rouge plant employed
more than 103,000 white and blue collar workers.21
During the decade, the automobile industry flourished; and by 1929 about one in six
American families had acquired a vehicle for home use.22 It was the new mass production
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methods that enabled Americans to make more consumer goods available and to purchase
them in the marketplace.23

With increased use of electricity and new production

technologies, consumer goods could be produced more efficiently and effectively. Along
with consumer goods, electricity enabled many American households to use new
technological innovations such as refrigerators, phonographs, irons, fans, lighting, toasters,
and vacuum cleaners.24 Moreover, from 1920-1930, American inventors filed and were
granted more than 400,000 patents in the United States alone.25 If the 1920s was a period
of economic growth, some Americans still faced acute deprivation and destitution.26 Social
stratification continued to be the norm as Americans had differing income levels and
different racial and ethnic communities. While many households witnessed economic and
social change, others failed to benefit from these new technologies.
As historian Frank Stricker has argued, the United States was an affluent nation by
the 1920s; but prosperity had its limits. For many workers, wages began to decline by the
end of the decade.27 The stagnation of wages had several causes, including upgraded and
more efficient machine production, scientific management, and what some began to call
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“technological unemployment.”28 It also had several consequences. While many workingclass and middle-class people were spending more, and acquiring durable goods such as
cars and household appliances, everyone did not had access to the new consumer culture.
Indeed, many sought and obtained a higher standard of living in ways that created dynamic
social change in a wide range of arenas—transportation, urban growth and city culture, as
well as work. Unfortunately, there were large parts of American society that lacked access
even to the electrical power to fuel these goods or consumer credit to finance them.29
In terms of consumer credit, Martha Olney, to cite one example, argues that most
Americans, before the mid-1910s, purchased their automobiles with cash. In the 1920s,
credit became an important financial tool used as a mechanism to improve living standards
especially during an absence of liquidity in the private sector.30 Private credit companies
were virtually non-existent before the First World War. But when private credit companies
emerged in the 1920s, they asserted themselves in the automobile and other
manufacturing sectors. As a side note, Olney argues that since Black Americans had lower
incomes than their White counterparts, they were more than likely to use installment plans
to acquire new merchandise, especially in the durable goods market.31 Lastly, as it pertains
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to the difficult situation of providing Americans in the south with electrical power, it was
partly rectified with the coming of the Roosevelt administration and the emergence of the
Tennessee Valley Authority that built dams and power plants in Tennessee, North Carolina,
Kentucky, Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia and Alabama.32 The Southern states did not have
greater access to new consumer innovations than the north, initially, but President
Roosevelt attempted to improve upon their social conditions and standards of living.
Despite worries about job prospects, consumers spent more money on recreation
and entertainment during the 1920s.33 New consumer goods led to higher standards of
living and increased demand for leisure time and activities.34

Most citizens began to

venture out to theatres, where they could see plays or watch movies. They also began to
spend their money on enhancing their education and that of their children. Women
increasingly entered the labor force throughout the 1920s, and working in the outside
world contributed to family and economic success. The emergence of commodities and
mass culture enabled Americans to live longer, and life expectancy rates improved to well
over fifty-eight years of age.35
From the end of the First World War until 1929, there were a few short recessions,
and some volatility in the market; but outside rural areas, most Americans remained
confident that they could handle any instability that came their way.

For some

contemporary observers, however, the handwriting was already on the wall. Overvalued
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stock, weakness in the agricultural sector, loose credit policies and global instability led the
country into depression. Still most economists and politicians believed that the prosperity
would continue into the foreseeable future. It is important to remember that Americans
who participated in the stock market boom of the 1920s did not have the modern-day tools
that stockbrokers on Wall Street use today. Most contemporary market observers, despite
these tools, failed to see the 2008 crisis. In the 1920s, when broad-based stock investments
were relatively new, failure to see the ensuring crises might have been expected.
With greater access to living wages, a greater number of Americans were acquiring
cars even as massive highway construction projects were underway.36 People used less
public transportation, and they became more independent socially, because of the
emergence of automobiles and a national system of roads and streets.37 Automobile icons
such as Henry Ford, William Durant, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., and the DuPont family, who
controlled a majority of GM preferred and common stock and its board of directors after
1920, began to apply their material and monetary resources for the construction of new
transportation networks.38

Many thousands of miles of roads were constructed.

Transportation times decreased, because the emergence of a new highway system that
linked states together and increases in the production and sale of automobiles.39 Scholars
have shown that modern style roads made from cement or asphalt increased in mileage
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from 161,000 (1905), to 521,000 (1930).40 More cars were on these roads. Private car
registrations advanced from 8,000 (1900), 1,258,062 (1913) to 26,545,281 (1930). Thus,
there was more road construction in the United States that was used by new American
vehicle owners.
As new technological innovations came to the forefront in the United States and the
global system, Michigan emerged as an important state that led the nation through its
promotion of economic growth and higher standards of living. Prominent scholars such as
Doris B. McLaughlin and Charles K. Hyde argue that Michigan was the logical geographic
center and production capital for the automotive industry.41 The state had important
copper, lumber, and iron resources and a small but easily accessible steel industry. It also
was the home of the bicycle and carriage sectors before the automobile industry took hold.
In Michigan and other parts of the Upper Midwest, there was a skilled labor force,
experienced in machine tools and in locomotion, that supported the industry’s emergence
in that region.42
In 1887, the Olds Motor Works Company produced the first American mechanized
automobile. The carriage had a steam engine that was run by coal, and it was cumbersome
because of its massive size/weight and lack of maneuverability.43 These first automobiles
were very expensive, ranging in price from between one to two thousand dollars. At the

40

Richard B. Morris and Jeffrey B. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History (New York: HarperCollins Publishers,
1996), 589.
41
Charles K. Hyde, “Detroit the Dynamic: The Industrial History of Detroit from Cigars to Cars,” Michigan Historical
Review 27, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 57, 66; Mike Smith, “Let’s make Detroit a Union Town: The History of Labor and
the Working Class in the Motor City,” Michigan Historical Review 27, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 160.
42
Doris B. McLaughlin, Michigan Labor: A Brief History from 1818 to the Present (Ann Arbor: The Institute of Labor
and Industrial Relations, 1970), 95.
43
Christopher W. Wells, “The Road to the Model T: Culture, Road Conditions, and Innovation at the Dawn of the
American Motor Age,” Technology and Culture 48, no. 3 (July 2007): 503-504, 511; James J. Flink, “Three Stages of
American Automobile Consciousness,” American Quarterly 24, no. 4 (October 1972): 452-453.

44

time, the average male worker earned about five to six hundred dollars annually.
Automobiles were priced out of an average person’s range. By the 1920s, however,
installment payment plans were created that finally enabled middle and lower class
families to acquire automobiles.44 The technology used to build cars had improved, and
over time, the price for them decreased.

This link between new technologies, and

especially new forms of automated production, bolstered the rapid growth of the auto
industry, but had paradoxical effects on its labor force. According to Joyce Shaw Peterson,
the number of vehicles registered in the United States increased from 55,290 in 1904 to
26,704,825 in 1929.45 Clearly, Americans were acquiring vehicles and earning a higher
standard of living.
Over time, the manufacturers in the automobile industry increased the wages of its
employees, and jobs in automobile plants were among the best paid in the manufacturing
sector during these decades.46 The practice of providing auto workers with decent wages
and benefits was continued after the 1910s, when Ford created the assembly line and
established the five dollar a day wage. Upton Sinclair in The Flivver King argued that Henry
Ford spent about one billion dollars per year in wage costs.47 Although wages increased at
Ford Motor Company, employees still worked in physically difficult conditions even as
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many Americans viewed Henry Ford as the “Great Benefactor.”48 Henry Ford became a
Horatio Alger economic success story and many citizens wanted to emulate his work.
Thus, for many people, Henry Ford was an automotive icon and legendary car
manufacturer.49 He built an industrial empire in which village or cottage factories took
center stage.50 He understood, and later proclaimed in an almost ideological way, that
producing low-priced or economical vehicles that maintained their value both expanded
the market and democratized automobile ownership. It also made Ford one of the richest
manufacturers in the country.51 Ford liked to claim that he wanted to make vehicles for
“the common man” who could become socially mobile in life’s journeys.52 In Henry Ford’s
quest to develop inexpensive cars that consisted of interchangeable parts, he created a
factory system that enabled him to capitalize on the labor of unskilled workers in his plants
throughout the Detroit area.53 Like other believers in scientific management, Ford believed
that most workers did not have to think; machines did this for them.54 With the emergence
of the assembly line that Henry Ford perfected in the 1910s, he developed a factory system
in which fewer workers labored more efficiently, because they had only one task at a time.
From there, Ford workers produced more vehicles per shift and maintained a market-share
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of about 50 percent.55 With the use of interchangeable parts, Ford Motor Company could
produce a more affordable car that was durable and met the needs of the American public.
The entire industry became so successful that by 1929 Ford and other car companies
manufactured about four million vehicles per year.56
In 1903, Henry Ford became a permanent fixture in the automobile industry. At the
inception of Ford Motor Company, there were “more than 2,000 steam, electric, and
gasoline automobiles in the United States.”57 Moreover, there were over one hundred
automobile companies, but many underperformed because of George B. Selden and his
patent (no. 549,160) for the internal combustion engine.58 Between 1903 and 1911, Henry
Ford had to contend with George B. Selden and his patent of two stroke internal
combustion engines.59 Thus, Henry Ford and George B. Selden went head to head in federal
court in the Southern District of New York in the case--Electric Vehicle Company and George
B. Selden versus C.A. Duerr & Company and Ford Motor Company, because the Associates of
Licensed Automobile Manufacturers believed that Selden’s patent of a gasoline-powered
engine was legitimate and valid.60 This patent (No. 549,160) would have given Selden an
absolute monopoly within the automobile industry as new manufacturers would have had
to pay royalties to utilize his product designs. Ultimately, Judge Walter Chadwick Noyes
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provided Ford Motor Company with a favorable decision at the Court of Appeals in
Southern New York, in January of 1911, and the Selden patent was invalidated.61
While the Selden case continued, on March 18, 1908, Henry Ford introduced and
began to manufacture his famous Model T, or the Tin Lizzie.62 The vehicle had four
cylinders and was priced at $850. Between 1908 and 1927, when the Model T was
discontinued, Ford Motor Company sold over fifteen million of them. The Model T was so
popular that it eventually found new audiences in Great Britain, France and Germany.63 It
was advertised in the Saturday Evening Post and throughout the press, as a vehicle with
four cylinders, twenty horsepower and could seat up to five persons. Henry Ford was
confident that he could produce them for the American people at an affordable price. “On
top of the starting price of $850, a customer could easily add $135 for extras, that figure
covering a top, windshield, speedometer, headlamps, and a carbide generator to power the
last two.”64 By 1909, the extra features were included in the base price for the Model T at
$950.
On January 5, 1914, Ford Motor Company released its newest incentive for current
and future employees.65 Henry Ford sought to pay his workers five dollars per day.66 The
Board of Directors at Ford Motor Company established a ten million dollar profit-sharing
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program that led to the implementation of this new incentive package.67 John R. Lee was
selected by the Ford Board of Directors to administer the new incentive plan. A plenitude
of Ford hourly workers had originally made $2.34 per nine hour shift.68 When this new
incentive was announced to the general public, it caught everyone by surprise. This
minimum wage standard was an impetus or catalyst to recruit new workers and retain
those employees with a high seniority. The new Ford wage was about 62.5 cents per hour.
This new money wage rate was one of the highest in the country and when James Couzens
made the announcement, he knew this would garner a lot of attention.
After the First World War, Ford Motor Company experienced some economic and
financial growth. From 1920 to 1927, Ford Motor Company continued to expand its
domestic and international transactions and investments. More Model T’s were produced
and the company sustained its profitability.

In 1921, Ford Motor Company had

manufactured one million Model T’s at the Rouge plant in Dearborn and the Highland Park
plant in Detroit. This unprecedented production awed, shocked and surprised the world.
Overall, 928,750 cars had been produced in the United States, 42,860 abroad and 42,348 in
Canada.69 Ford Motor Company became the number one automobile maker in the global
system. Henry Ford continued to expand his business and he hired an unprecedented
amount of laborers at his new Rouge plant. As David Lewis reported, “by 1924 the Rouge
had 42,000 workers; by 1925, 58,000; by 1926, 75,000; and by 1929 more than 103,000.”70
The new Rouge manufacturing site was located on more than 1,115 acres, and overall the
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factory maintained about 160 acres of work spaces to manufacture the Model T and
subsequent vehicle models.

Ford Motor Company became one of the nation’s first

multinational corporations with global and domestic operations. Henry Ford became one
of the wealthiest men in the United States with enormous personal assets at his disposable.
Moreover, during the 1920s, Henry Ford attempted to re-establish his company in
the public spotlight. These were rebuilding years for Ford Motor Company. Although the
Model T was still the top selling car in the United States, the vehicle was becoming
outmoded and its features were obsolete. Edsel Ford, who had become president of the
Lincoln division in 1922, sought to convince his father that the company needed a new
flagship model. The Model T was not selling as well and initially, Henry Ford did not listen
to his son. Acquiring Lincoln was an important step for Ford Motor Company, because it
was a luxury brand and some of its designs could be used in the process of developing the
new Model A. Ford Motor Company purchased the Lincoln branch for about eight million
dollars.

The purchase of this luxury car company was inexpensive, because this

corporation had been in bankruptcy.
The Lincoln acquisition was also important, because this business brought in new
ideas to Ford Motor Company during a period of time in which General Motor was
attempting to flex its industrial muscles. Ford Motor Company and its Model T could not
compete with General Motors and its Chevrolet and Cadillac models. These General Motors
cars were high tech for the period and had newer features that attracted the attention of
American consumers. Edsel Ford attempted to convey these ideas to his father but initially,
he would not listen. He was loyal to the Model T, because that vehicle had brought Ford
Motor Company great success and wealth. But Henry Ford began to listen to his son when
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he realized that sales of the Model T were down. The Model T continued to be priced
cheaper than its General Motors’ counterparts but the features of the Model T became substandard.
After 1924, Ford Motor Company had reached a crossroads.71 What had been
working in terms of production and marketing was no longer as effective. The Model T was
not selling as well, and Chevrolet was competing strongly with Ford products. The Model T
was a sound product, but many of its features were outmoded. Consumers sought a little
more power, a better design, and more choices in their automobiles. By 1924, the price of
the Model T continued to decrease until the overall cost stabilized at $265.72 The low price
kept Ford in the market, but the company began to lose market-share. Dealers were
disappointed with Henry Ford, because he did not have different models of cars that could
sustain the company’s profitability, once the Model T became obsolete. The change in
consumer taste and demand hurt Ford Motor Company’s business operations, because
Henry Ford depended upon one type of vehicle to earn all of its revenue and maintain its
competitiveness.
In 1927, Henry Ford and his engineering staff crafted the new Model A. For this
vehicle, nine different styles were offered from “a snappy roadster to a dignified Fordor
Sedan, complete with a landau roof.”73 The Model A even reached speeds up to sixty miles
per hour, which was an improvement from the Model T’s forty miles an hour pace. By
December 1927, many hundreds of thousands of orders for the Model A had been placed
and Ford Motor Company became another industrial and financial success story. In 1927,
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Henry Ford began to mass produce the new Model A car, but he could not regain his
dominant position in the automobile market.74 With the coming of the Great Crash, Ford
Motor Company continued to perform well but the Great Depression that followed was
difficult to bear. Ford Motor Company sold approximately two million of the Model A
vehicles in 1929; but in 1930, sales of the car dropped by one and one half million
automobiles.75 By that time, Ford’s market share had declined to 31.3 percent while
General Motors took the lead at 32.3 percent.76 Ford Motor Company needed to find new
ways to appeal to customers, because the mass production of one or two models of
automobiles put it at a disadvantage to General Motors, which had a growing market with
its many different car lines.77

General Motors and the Political Economy of Automobile Manufacture

The history of General Motors is a different industrial and economic story. With the
ascension of Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., as president of GM in 1923, the company underwent
unprecedented change. Sloan began to establish new forms of statistical data to improve
GM’s profitability and sales. Sales projections and corporate executives began to examine
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their profit margins to determine which vehicles to mass produce, in order to capture a
larger share of the market.

General Motors differed substantially from Ford Motor

Company, because of the use of statistical analysis. This enabled GM to position itself to
challenge Henry Ford’s efforts to produce an in-expensive and standardized vehicle that
appealed to the masses.78 General Motors analyzed cost projections to establish payment
plans for its customers, so that the cost of a vehicle became more affordable.79 The
company’s strategy also focused on designing and producing diverse models for its
different car lines. Durant and Sloan aimed to produce a different car that was affordable
to ordinary consumers. Both Durant and Sloan sought to manufacture a “car for every
purse and purpose.”80
In 1908, William Durant established General Motors Corporation and became its
president with the merger of Buick and Oldsmobile into one automobile company.81 His
presidency was marked by rapid growth and the diversification of the company, but Durant
left General Motors with some structural and organizational problems and a large
leadership gap. During his tenure as president, Durant acquired other car companies and
incorporated their ideas and resources into the parent company.82 Without relying on the
technical advice of his division heads, Durant could not determine the pace and growth of
the consumer market.

In 1909, to use one example, Durant purchased the Elmore

Manufacturing Company for one-half million dollars; seven years later, it sold for only
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$50,000. Durant was certain that the company produced marketable goods, because it
manufactured the two-cycle motor that, in thirty years, became the diesel engine. Durant
lost money on this acquisition. This occurred on many other occasions, such as the
Durant’s unprofitable purchases of Carter Car Company, Scripps-Booth Car division,
Sheridan Car project and the Sampson Tractor Company.83
President of General Motors until 1920, Durant had shown great intuition and
insight. As one observer said, he “worked from the top of his head.”84 Durant did not
commit his concepts and ideas to paper. He worked without direction and mastered the
details of the inter-workings of GM. Under Durant, General Motors became a diversified
entity with many different divisions and segments.85 Durant was seen as more risky than
his successor Sloan, and even reckless in how he moved the company forward. Later GM
president Sloan took risks, but he did so when he had the statistical data to support his
claims.86 Durant believed in the individual or executive who maintained an audience of
subordinates that turned to him for direction. In many ways, his company leadership was
similar to the administrative skills of Henry Ford, who believed in corporate centralization
and worked only with a few given individuals. When Durant was ousted in 1920 due to his
unsuccessful stock market dealings, Sloan was given a free hand by Pierre DuPont to
restructure GM and make it a more profitable and organized entity.
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Under the leadership of the DuPont family from 1920 to 1923, GM executives and
management practiced corporate paternalism in its factories and among its workers.87
Douglas Reynolds argued that this practice of promoting corporate paternalism was
necessary for establishing social control over workers and maintaining organized work
conditions at the level of manufacturing plants. It also was important in retaining workers,
especially skilled workers, for efficient factory production. Corporate paternalism enabled
General Motors to become more technologically astute; because most workers benefited
from a vast array of corporate social programs, and new machines were continually
introduced at the various General Motors plants. The DuPont family cared for many of its
employees within this rhetoric of paternalism and sought to produce vehicles for the
masses. But according to John Cunningham Wood and Michael Wood, GM’s paternalist
housing and savings programs were eliminated in 1932 as the Depression took hold.88
Under Durant’s leadership, GM had begun to show signs of trouble due to its lack of
management centralization.89

Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who was then a junior executive,

observed these problems, and he created an “Organization Study” after Durant’s departure
in 1920.90 In this study, Sloan developed the concept of organized decentralization or
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diffusion for the company.91

Each division would be independent and have its own

responsibilities, but division heads would be brought together to discuss management
policies and practices under the leadership of the company’s president and directors, who
took on the ultimate management role. Each division handled its day-to-day operations,
and the centralized management core made the executive decisions.92 At the same time,
each division contributed to the decision-making processes of the entire corporation
through new channels. Each division was linked by an administrative core that worked on
budgeting, hiring, forecasting, and reporting sales.93 Lastly, each division maintained subdivisions that were responsible for advertising, purchases, car design and production.
GM’s Executive Division was the central planning entity that, combined with the
Finance and Inventory Divisions, was in charge of the allocation of resources and logistics.
The Operations Division handled the ideas and contributions from division managers,94
but, here too, the Executive Division maintained the ultimate decision-making powers. It
confirmed and ratified any proposals from the lower echelons of General Motors
Corporation. Sloan believed in sustaining this type of de-centralized process, because he
maintained that the division leaders followed more willingly and enthusiastically decisions
and directions in which they took a part in developing. The division leaders realized that
their ideas had a place in the company. Sloan did not believe in using the carrot or the stick
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to reward or sanction corporate behavior. He wanted all parties to become involved and
play a dynamic role in the betterment of corporate practices.95
Sloan used cost accounting and profitability measures to shape the company’s
expansion and diversification. Sloan did not just examine sales percentages but he looked
at profitability. In contrast, Sloan believed that cost accounting could be used to augment
sales projections and establish their relationship to profitability.96 In Sloan’s eyes, the
volume of sales was less important than profitability and performance.
From its origins until the 1920s, GM produced a wide range of vehicles, but it did not
examine supply and demand curves to determine production levels.

The number and

diversity of models that GM produced each year left the company with excess inventory
that both reduced cost effectiveness and ate away at profits. This differed from Durant who
was only concerned with producing vehicles. He did not examine what was in demand or
the marginal utility of certain products. What appealed to the consumer was not discussed
until Sloan began to forecast sales and analyzed supply and demand. As a result, Sloan
established the “annual operating forecast,” which enabled executives to perform a
comparative analysis with the other divisions and coordinate production with their
financial aims.97
Sloan encouraged each division to create sales reports and budgets to illustrate how
the allocation of capital would be used and its projections on an annual basis. Each
divisional chief executive produced pricing studies and monthly sales projections, so that
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GM could establish a pricing system that was competitive with other automobile makers. It
allowed them to design a product line that appealed to the masses. Monthly forecasts
enabled divisional managers to examine trends from other companies in the automotive
sector and project their sales percentages.

Every effort was made to determine the

conditions of the marketplace so that GM products could be placed safely in the consumer
demand environment.98
General Motors integrated new production technologies during the decade, creating
greater efficiency, but also reducing the number of workers needed to produce vehicles.
The adoption of each new generation of machine technology eroded the skill base of
assembly line workers. Innovation created machines that performed a growing number of
tasks. This meant two things—first, the amount of training most production workers
needed steadily declined; second, most workers were no longer specialized in particular
tasks. Many General Motors’ employees worried about their jobs and sought to retain their
positions, even though they could be terminated at any time. With corporate paternalism,
management controlled worker behavior and conditions in plants could improve.99
On May 10, 1923, Pierre S. DuPont resigned as President of General Motors and was
replaced by Alfred P. Sloan Jr., who also served as Chief Executive Officer for the
company.100 This was an important step for Sloan, who had an extensive industrial and
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manufacturing background. He had graduated with a degree in electrical engineering from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the age of twenty and worked for Hyatt Bearing
Company of Newark, New Jersey, before taking a position at General Motors
Corporation.101 Sloan had been so successful at Hyatt that he invested five thousand
dollars in that company and within six months had generated a profit of over twelve
thousand dollars.102 Sloan had maintained complete control over Hyatt and the company
had been better served, because of his presence and decision-making capabilities.103
Sloan was selected to become the Chairman of the Executive Division, the entity that
made the important administrative decisions for GM. The Executive Division consisted of
the president of GM and member representatives from the various sub-divisions. Sloan
maintained executive control, and he made the most critical decisions for GM. Sloan
worked with the Financial Division, which made all of the economic and financial decisions
for the firm. The Financial Division allocated capital and material resources to the many
divisions at GM so its industrial role was taken seriously.
General Motors Corporation began to work on the organization and the updating of
production, inventory control, and economic planning during the early 1920s.

This

occurred, because Sloan and Donaldson Brown, who served as vice president for the
Financial Department, argued that material resources used in the production process were
in peril; inventory control was non-existent, and the company had borrowed over eight
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billion dollars.104 There were no financial or fiscal requirements or stipulations that each
division had to follow.

Brown felt that it was imperative and essential for him to

communicate his viewpoints with Sloan who immediately provided him with the necessary
assistance to track inventory stocks. Normally, if sales projections were high, then the
volume of inputs or material resources was increased to target and meet demand.
Corporate executives at GM had to publish and present to the management core an Analysis
of Production Requirements. According to Anil K. Kashyap and David W. Wilcox, “the
function of this analysis was to record each of the elements of the inventory accumulation
identity: stocks on hand at the beginning of the forecast period, projected retail deliveries
during the forecast period, desired stocks at the end of the forecast period, and—as a
residual—the indicated maximum production required.”105 This report enabled corporate
executives and dealers-principal at GM to anticipate stock levels and consumer demand.
Moreover, dealerships held on to merchandise during the off-season and received more
vehicles during peak periods. The analytical report enabled dealers and GM executives to
determine when to deliver cars to all dealerships and when to anticipate their arrival date.
By 1929, GM was faced with deteriorating economic conditions, including declining
stock prices, tighter credit, a slow-down in consumer purchasing, and price deflation. It
also had a growing inventory at a time when competition among car companies increased.
As two analysts noted, “new car registrations fell more than 2.7 million units (over 70
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percent) between 1929 and 1932.”106 Fewer Americans were purchasing vehicles; still, if
the new sales and inventory projections had not been put in place, GM would not have been
able to keep track of its inputs and vehicle accessories and overproduction would have
continued to hinder the company’s performance. Its monetary resources would have been
wasted on unneeded spending. While it did not serve its workforce well, company
leadership cut production lines and tried to adjust to the economic crisis. With the Great
Depression came new GM policies such as the curtailment of the Preliminary Analysis of
Production Requirements. After May 1932, the management core or central office was only
notified by the various divisions about inventory levels when there was a modification of
ten percent or more in the total production figures for a given forecast period, because this
affected the entire GM sales predictions. Under Sloan, G.M.’s market-share increased from
12 percent to 52 percent globally.107 General Motors Corporation surpassed Ford Motor
Company in 1927, because of its strong Cadillac and Chevrolet sales; and assumed the
responsibilities of an industrial superpower in the production of more diverse vehicles
from its various car lines.
In summary, General Motors Corporation experienced some of the economic
downturns and successes in parallel ways to the Ford Motor Company in the 1920s. For
example, in terms of profitability during the first half of 1926, General Motors Corporation
generated a profit of $93,285,674 or $17.33 per share of common stock.108 Clearly, GM did
make substantial profits that drove them pass Ford Motor Company and into the number
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one spot in automobile sales and market-share.

Ford and GM, however, maintained

different corporate policies that drove their day-to-day business operations. GM believed
in using projections and forecasting to sell their durable products while Henry Ford sought
industrial centralization. Henry Ford did not want to relinquish control over his decisionmaking processes to interior or outside parties. He sought total control. Both Sloan and
his predecessor, Durant, believed in corporate diffusion, which was a tool used by Ford
Motor Company and Chrysler in later years.109 The ways that both companies operated
determined the rate at which they handled the effects of the Great Crash of 1929 and the
Great Depression in the 1930s. Both companies weathered the storm, but Ford Motor
Company suffered a little more, because of the lack of diverse product lines while GM sold a
plenitude of vehicles that had different design features. Standardization affected Ford
Motor Company in a negative way, because it only mass-produced one type of vehicle that
could be “painted in any color as long as it was black”110 while GM purchased new
companies to incorporate design qualities into their final products.
As we will see in later chapters, both Ford and GM were affected with the emergence
of the Roosevelt administration and the creation of industry codes under the National
Industrial Recovery Act. Henry Ford was dissatisfied with the ascension of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to the American presidency while Sloan was more content with Roosevelt and
the New Deal’s initial policies. Sloan was excited with the inauguration of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt on March 4, 1933.
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Administration, because he had been an avid supporter of Herbert Hoover.111 Henry Ford
did not sign the codes of fair competition for the automotive industry until August of 1934,
while Sloan approved them wholeheartedly. Both companies believed in fair wages and
the reduction of hours to improve upon employment levels, but Henry Ford did not
approve of section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.

Sloan was more

accommodative in the sense that he argued in favor of the codes and collective bargaining,
but did not stand for the closed shop. We will see in subsequent chapters how Roosevelt’s
policies played out in the automotive sector and the roles of Henry Ford and Alfred P. Sloan
Jr. It made for interesting politics and profound business transactions.

The Petroleum Industry and the Political Economy of the 1920s

The petroleum industry was another key player in the market for automobiles and
in the economic expansion of the 1920s. The remaining portion of this chapter will discuss
the efforts of American policymakers and corporate executives from the petroleum
industry to control their business operations. It will also illustrate the efforts of American
policymakers to handle the Teapot Dome crisis from 1921to 1924, as this event shows a
different relationship between government and industry.
The oil industry in the 1920s emerged from the Great War with great confidence.
Petroleum was and is an important commodity. Oil production and refining helped drive
the national economy, especially as the automotive sector developed rapidly in the United

111

Philip A. Grant Jr., “The Presidential Election of 1932 in Michigan,” Michigan Historical Review 12, no. 1 (Spring
1986): 87-88.

63

States and global system.112 Throughout this period, the oil industry experienced an
economic boom and production increased exponentially. For example, from 1910 to 1920,
oil production in California increased from 77.7 million barrels to 103.4 million barrels.113
Also, Oklahoma served as the nation’s largest oil producer until 1923, when it was
surpassed by California.

Oklahoma produced 278 million barrels of oil in 1927.114

Moreover, in the United States, gasoline production increased at a rapid pace. Petroleum
production accounted for about 48 percent of all forms of oil commodities and by 1929, its
manufacture increased fourfold.115
Overproduction and the determination of oil prices have been a controversial issue
in the petroleum industry. American businessmen such as John D. Rockefeller of Standard
Oil sought to control the production and shipment of oil and gasoline in the United States.
But he was not able to corner the market, in part because each state maintained its own
petroleum regulations.116 Moreover, the number of oil companies proliferated as gasoline
became the oil industry’s chief product, because most technological sectors benefited from
the rise of the internal combustion engine that used gasoline. Their central market was
supplying filling stations with enough gasoline to cater to their consumers on roads
throughout the United States. For instance, by 1929, there were approximately fifteen and
one half thousand petroleum companies that provided gasoline stations with their
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manufactured products throughout the Middle West.117

The federal government had

regulated loosely the oil industry during this period, but state laws also shaped petroleum
drilling, transport, and refining. Further, each state had its own goals and obligations. As
an example, the state of Texas had its own regulations regarding proration which were
forms of price and production controls.118 Humble Oil (Exxon) under its President William
S. Farish attempted to receive a proration contract to produce 30,000 barrels of oil per day
at the Hendrick field in Texas in the 1920s.119 Although Farish was unsuccessful, this move
would have been unprecedented if it had been implemented.
Surpluses of oil have always been problematic for the large producers such as
Standard Oil.

Large supplies and multiple suppliers lowered prices and led to an

oversupply of oil. The federal government, however, maintained an enormous amount of
public lands that had mineral resources. If these lands were sold to the private sector, then
the government might, on the one hand, encourage further oil drilling but also stood to lose
strategic oil reserves. Under the business-friendly Harding and Coolidge administrations,
this was not entirely unwelcome.

At the same time, however, greater oil production

lowered oil prices. For example, in 1929, the American Petroleum Institute attempted to
limit oil production in Texas, because the supply of this commodity expanded greatly
causing depressed prices from 3 dollars per barrel to a few pennies per barrel.120
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Private lands in the United States were utilized by petroleum corporations to
generate high profit margins, but public lands were not tampered with and oil companies
had to receive special permission to lease those lands. Thus, the private sector worried
about the oversupply of oil. They were concerned deeply if and when public lands were
placed within the hands of the private sector and how the transfer would occur. Obviously,
companies wanted access to petroleum reserves, but they sought to limit competition and
discourage new companies from entering the market. Malfeasance and corruption did not
always plague the private and public sectors, with the exception of the Teapot Dome
Scandal of 1921-1924. Both sides sought to ensure that the American people benefited
from the regulation of the oil industry and that the interests of oil corporate executives
were satisfied.
During the 1920s, there was an enormous scandal that involved the leasing of public
lands reserved for the United States’ Naval fuel.121 The naval oil reserves were necessary,
because naval sea vessels were no longer using coal.

The United States had begun

powering their ships with petroleum by the First World War.122 From 1921 to 1924,
Secretary of the Interior Albert Bacon Fall sold the rights to the naval petroleum reserves at
Elk Hills, Buena Vista in California and the Teapot Dome in Wyoming to private sector oil
corporations.123 The leasing of these public lands was not the problem, but Secretary Fall
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accepted a questionable loan of about one hundred thousand dollars from Edward B.
McLean and Edward F. Doheny.

Secretary Fall’s son-in-law received three hundred

thousand dollars in bonds from Harry Sinclair. Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil Company provided
these funds to Secretary Fall and his family members, because the company acquired a
lease of the entire Teapot Dome reserves in Wyoming and other reserves in California. The
lease contract was questionable, because Secretary Fall did not allow other private
companies in the United States bid for the rights to drill on these lands.124 Secretary Fall
argued that he could obtain more lucrative leases without the establishment of public
auctions. An investigation uncovered this scandal.
After Senate hearings headed by Thomas J. Walsh from Montana,125 and a court case,
Secretary Fall was sentenced to one year in prison and one hundred thousand dollars in
fines. Other parties, including Sinclair and Doheny, as well as the Attorney General, were
involved in this debacle, but no one else was prosecuted.126 Historian Frederick Lewis
Allen has argued that even Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon may have been
involved in this scandal, and accusations of graft and corruption surrounded the Harding
administration.127
During the 1920s, the oil industry in the public sphere argued for a policy of
government non-intervention, but, in fact, like most mining and mineral concerns, the
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petroleum industry was heavily subsidized by government resources. Each company had
its own corporate rules and regulations, and the state, local and federal governments did
attempt unsuccessfully to regulate the industry and ensure that each business played by
the same rules. Moreover, corporations began to examine supply and demand curves as
well as production figures to develop their prices for oil, prices that many argued were the
products of corporate collusion and clandestine dishonesty.

Further, restrictions on

petroleum extraction and refining served the interests of corporations. High demand
meant a lowered supply with high prices for petroleum while high supplies led to
discounted oil prices.128
With a growing emphasis upon the use of proration, which were forms of price and
production controls, supply and demand levels for oil and, thus, prices were controlled to
make sure that all businesses benefited from this industrial and economic system. As
overproduction in the United States became more problematic, the oil industry continued
to press the federal government to limit supply and provide this sector with price supports.
The south and southwestern states such as California, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas
produced the majority of this nation’s oil, and it became necessary to provide these states
with the appropriate regulations to raise oil prices and establish production controls.129
Throughout the 1920s, oil supplies in the United States were high, which caused
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Persian to export a large part of
their oil reserves overseas.130 Moreover, in 1900, the United States produced forty-three
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percent of the world supply of oil, while, in 1926, American corporations produced seventy
percent of the global reserves.131 The United States was noted for its automotive industry,
but the petroleum sector supported the economic transactions of their automotive
counterparts.132 Oil became a defining commodity that could be used for the betterment of
the national economy. The rise of the internal combustion engine and its use in automobile
production meant that oil and gasoline were two commodities that redefined American
living standards and promoted social mobility. Moreover, it led to the rise of American
multinational corporations that controlled valuable material resources and pursued strong
American policies domestically and internationally. Oil companies and their counterparties
in the automobile sectors dominated public policies and promoted the growth of their
business practices.
Although oil supplies were already high in the United States and corporations began
to perform their own statistical analyses, new oil fields, especially in Texas, were
developed. Some corporate leaders such as Henry L. Doherty of Empire Gas and Fuel of
California started to advocate for conservation policies, in part to control access to
petroleum reserves and out of a sense of how future supply and demand might play out.133
Other Americans sought to preserve the national landscape and to avoid looking for new
reserves, because oil was so plentiful in this country. In the Southwestern part of the
United States in such places as Texas, Oklahoma and California, new reserves were located
and oil was drilled, which increased the supplies of this commodity nationally. However,
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transportation networks that needed to move the commodity from the drilling grounds to
the filling stations may have been largely underdeveloped. This implied that oil stocks
were not widely available in all parts of the United States.134
American corporations, following the Great War, sought to work together for the
benefit and betterment of the oil industry, but Norman Nordhauser believed that their
efforts were somewhat misplaced. The maturation period of American oil companies may
not have occurred, because the oil men did not worry about working together when there
were no new oil fields and the supply levels could be maintained. Thus, corporations did
not discuss the unification of state and federal laws, because supply levels did not always
increase dramatically. But as the automobile companies produced more vehicles, demand
for oil increased and this implied that petroleum corporations had to work together to
maintain supplies. For example, American oil consumption increased by fifty-three percent
from 1915 to 1919, and in 1920, the use of petroleum advanced by 27 percent.135
In December of 1924, Doherty’s efforts at conservation came to the forefront; and
the Coolidge administration created the Federal Oil Conservation Board.136

This

organization had been designed to study and research issues of grave importance to the
petroleum industry, and to report their findings to the federal government and industry
leaders. Finally, corporate executives and government officials began to communicate with
one another for the betterment of the oil industry. In an effort to assist the Conservation
Board, the American Petroleum Institute established a special committee to locate
134
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statistical data and provide that information to the Conservation Board. Their job was
strictly research and their findings could enable the Conservation Board to develop sound
industrial and economic policies. This was a significant development in the United States.
By 1929, American oil corporations produced a substantial amount of energy
commodities.137 The United States became the largest energy producer and led the world
in the production of coal, petroleum and electricity. American corporations produced a
majority of steel and natural gas on the globe in the 1920s and the national economy was
able to use petroleum and oil commodities to further standards of living in the United
States.
In summary, in ways similar to General Motors in the 1920s, corporations in the
petroleum industry began to use statistical analysis to limit the oversupply of oil in the
United States. Although the petroleum industry was rocked by scandal, proration138 and
conservation, initiatives emerged as a means to control the supply and market for
petroleum. But after 1929, the petroleum industry pressed for economic and industrial
change. Oil companies not only sought to adapt to the reduced demand of the Depression,
but also as a means of controlling market conditions in the future. Corporate executives
argued that government controls over production were problematic and a detriment to
their industry, but they wanted assistance in shaping the market.

They sought

policymakers who addressed these important issues. During the Great Depression of the
1930s, the NIRA and the industry codes provided sanctions to the oil industry; but overall,
the oil men were not completely satisfied with the laws, statutes and other forms of
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regulations that had been written in their favor. For example, throughout the 1920s and
1930s, there was an intense debate about price controls or proration versus anti-price
regulations or production controls.139
Moreover, policymakers and corporate executives from the petroleum industry
vacillated as to whether the Interior Department could develop regulations for the oil
sector. However, in other parts of the United States, especially the city of Los Angeles,
policymakers had to contend with pollution in commercial fisheries as drilling sites
proliferated.140 Los Angeles had experienced an oil boom toward the end of the 19th
century, and by the 1920s, Union Oil Company of Los Angeles became one of the largest
petroleum firms in the region.141 But with excess pollution, the California state legislature
sought to regulate the oil industry. The state of California attempted to nationalize the
entire oil industry in the Los Angeles area to prevent pollution from destroying its natural
wild life. This implied that some states that produced large oil stocks strove to promote
conservation as an alternative to poor environmental conditions that resulted from
excessive drilling. Additionally, by the beginning of the Great Depression, production and
price controls became essential for the oil industry, including Union Oil Company, that
experienced a supply boom, which hampered the sector as petroleum decreased in
value.142
During the Great Depression, the Department of the Interior became an important
cabinet level agency that served as a dominant regulatory agency for the oil industry.
139
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Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior under the Roosevelt administration, was an
industrial czar for the oil industry, and he provided petroleum companies with information
so that their professional operations improved. The petroleum industry did maintain some
industrial codes, but overall various companies were not completely satisfied with the
ways in which the regulatory system was established. When the NIRA was declared
unconstitutional in 1935, oil companies breathed a sigh of relief. Corporate executives had
been concerned about the roles that the industrial codes played within their business
operations. Industry leaders did not want the federal government to tell them how to
conduct themselves in the domestic and global marketplaces. They wanted industrial and
economic change, but the nature of these changes was in dispute.

73

CHAPTER: THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929

The causes of the Great Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Depression of the 1930s
have been the subject of ongoing economic and political debates in the United States and
global system.1 Central to these academic exchanges have been whether global or domestic
circumstances such as the Treaty of Versailles, the use of a metallic standard and gold
outflows, Stock Market speculation in the United States, or Federal Reserve policies and the
banking system under the New York Branch Presidents Benjamin Strong and George
Harrison were the major explanations for the economic crisis.2 As Commerce Secretary
and President, Hoover believed that globalization was key to understanding the crisis and
that the United States could not remain an isolated nation in a multilateral world. Others
such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt looked at domestic policies, such as Hoover’s use of
American Individualism and other self-help strategies, investments among the middle and
working classes, and growing unemployment toward the end of the 1920s due to
overproduction and depressed pricing for commodities and consumer goods.3
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Michael Bernstein, Eric Rauchway, William Leuchtenburg, Elliot Rosen, Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., Bernard Asbell, George McJimsey, Peter Temin, Charles Kindleberger, Ellis
Hawley, David Kennedy, John Kenneth Galbraith, Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson
Schwartz and others have argued that there were internal and external reasons for the
coming of this difficult period in American history. This chapter seeks to point out the
primary reasons for the emergence of the Great Depression by enumerating the central
causes for the Crash of 1929. It will largely look at global and financial concerns, especially
investment and credit strategies of consumers and corporations during the Hoover
administration, and how they affected American and European economies.4 It will assert
that speculation, foreign loans, the Treaty of Versailles and German reparations, and the
use of a metallic standard played a major role in bringing about economic and financial
instability in the United States and its allies during this complex period in American
history.5
This chapter seeks to chart the events that paved the way for the Great Crash of
1929.

It will address the reasons for the economic crisis, examine the various

interpretations of this event, and highlight the approaches that scholars have taken when
they discuss this important event in American history. It will examine the domestic and
international economic environment and how that affected public policy in the United
States. There were many economic and political developments that took place globally
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following the First World War. This chapter enumerates how the early years of the roaring
1920s became one of economic strife in 1929. It illustrates the emergence of economic and
political interdependence, due to the coming of the collective security pacts of the League
of Nations, and economic strategies such as the use of metallic standards and stock market
speculation.
The Great Crash of 1929, from the stock market crisis to the onset of the economic
depression, was a catastrophic event that caused political and social instability at home and
abroad.6 Some scholars have speculated whether it could have been prevented.7 This
chapter will not address this hypothesis but will focus on the central reasons for the
emergence of one of the worst economic crises in American history. The Great Depression
changed the ways that Americans and their international allies viewed the economic
system in ways that are still reflected in domestic and foreign economic policies; and it
must be understood as a crisis of the global system. The global system had become more
interdependent and both Hoover and Roosevelt realized that the United States could not
remain isolated from the rest of the world.
For most of the 1920s, the United States experienced unprecedented economic
expansion and growth both domestically and globally. First, following the First World War,
the United States became a creditor nation with a net balance of approximately $3.5
billion.8 It furthered its status as an economic juggernaut. Although many Americans were
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cautiously optimistic, they seemed somewhat uncertain about their nation’s new global
role and its expanded responsibilities.9 Public opinion was increasingly isolationist during
the interwar period, as some scholars have denoted; but the United States took on its newly
acquired global status, especially in the areas of international trade and investment.10
As Western Europe sought to recover from the war’s devastation, the United States
saw a mild postwar depression followed by rapid economic growth in key sectors of the
economy.11 The country controlled about forty percent of the world’s gold reserves and,
after the war, reigned as a powerful nation that provided liquidity or monetary resources
to its European allies.12 Since the United States became an immense global creditor nation,
its portfolio contained about 12.6 billion in public accounts and among corporations of the
private sector.13
With the end of the war, Woodrow Wilson asserted that Americans had to adopt a
more international face.

His successors followed that advice.

From 1921 to 1933,

American policymakers looked abroad and expanded their vision of foreign policy as a way
to sustain world peace and further domestic economic growth.14 Throughout the 1920s,
the Republican administrations of Harding and Coolidge gave new priority to assisting
9
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their allies through the support of international trade and investment, even as they
emphasized the importance of domestic issues on the public agenda. No one expected that,
toward the end of the decade, economic instability would become a global norm.
Americans began to suffer from acute financial insolvency and a lack of liquidity that was
equally, if not more, dire than Europe’s postwar situation.15 America’s postwar economic
strategy of loans and investment partially set the stage for the economic woes of the 1930s.
Historian Martin Kitchen has argued that Western European governments were
isolationist after the war, because they had to face constituents at home, who may not have
been as supportive of the League of Nations. Despite the guarantees of the Versailles
Treaty, European nations worried about their national security concerns. For example,
France demanded punitive restrictions be placed on the German military in the peace
process and sought to control the Rhineland, which served as the German industrial base.16
France sought further reassurances from the United States and Great Britain that both
nations would come to its aid militarily in the case of another German invasion. Although
the United States did not ratify the League of Nations treaty, its foreign policy sustained
relations with other nations through trade and treaty obligations.17 The Postwar treaty set
the context for economic relations and also for the economic developments of the decade.
The Wilson administration fell short of its international goals in terms of the League,
because of the absence of the Senate’s ratification of the League of Nation’s pact. His
successors pursued an expansive trade policy and continued intervention in the Western
Hemisphere. Franklin Delano Roosevelt completed the task started by his Democratic
15
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predecessor with continued engagement in European affairs and a foreign policy
positioned for American leadership. Roosevelt’s stance eventually modified public opinion
and enabled Americans to assume their important place in the global system. He formed
the industrial and manufacturing sectors in the United States and this relieved the domestic
and global pressures for economic change.
In The Great Crash: 1929, economist John Kenneth Galbraith argued that, while
many Americans were unsure about the country’s role internationally, some of them began
to invest in the Stock Market, foreign investments, and to speculate on Wall Street.18 For
middle-class Americans, stable production, steady wages, and low unemployment allowed
them to imagine investing in the market. A growing number of citizens learned about
stocks and bonds, and they were able to purchase shares of stock in American
corporations. They did not necessarily want to “get rich,” as scholars have traditionally
asserted.19 They were in it for the long haul and wanted to improve upon their economic
station in life. Harold Bierman, Jr., also argued that investors that participated in the stock
market were knowledgeable individuals.20

They understood the fundamentals of

economics and used their know-how to buy and sell stocks.21 The new stock market trends
led middle class Americans to invest in the global economy.
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The new middle class’s new approach toward spending money purchasing stocks
caused Herbert Hoover, in his memoirs, to discuss the issue.22 Hoover’s concerns remained
muted temporarily. He did not issue warnings against speculation, in large part because he
did not want to promote further financial instability or volatility on Wall Street.23
However, by 1925, the New York Times and the New York Financial Chronicle provided the
general public with some warning that the stock market speculation must end.24 Hoover
protested to the Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel Crissinger and President Calvin
Coolidge that the stock market was in a volatile range. Calvin Coolidge remarked that the
Federal Reserve was a separate and independent agency and that the Federal government
could not intervene. Later, in his memoirs, Herbert Hoover stated that he did not mention
his concerns about the private sphere in press statements, because he believed that this
might have contributed to economic problems.25 But he did speak with his fellow public
servants that the Stock Market on Wall Street may be in peril. Herbert Hoover believed
that Americans were capable workers in the labor force. He asserted in press statements
that Americans should not lack economic confidence,26 even while he believed that
Americans could turn around any economic storms that came their way.
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At first, the stock market speculation of the 1920s only seemed to contribute to a
growing economy.

Hundreds of millions of stocks changed hands on Wall Street.

Contemporary analyst H. Parker Willis confirmed the new phenomenon:
During the year 1925, shares to the number of 452,000,000 had been traded in, and
during 1926 as many as 449,000,000 shares, but during 1927 the tide mounted to
577,000,000 shares which were brought and sold.27
Despite new investment opportunities, Willis argued, interest rates were increasing, as
American and British firms attempted to generate some revenue from the creation of new
loans both at home and abroad.28 These new loans were used to further speculate on Wall
Street.

It appeared that stockjobbers were making money, as the volume of trades

increased steadily. Casual speculators did not make lots of money, because obtaining loans
was expensive and subject to high rates of interest that American banks charged. Bankers
made some money through the use of high interest loans, but what about stockjobbers? H.
Parker Willis confirmed that, in 1928, loans on callable funds stood at about 15 to 16
percent.29 Even if Americans or Europeans made money from stock market speculation,
paying back their loans became a daunting task in the face of rising interest rates and
fluctuating market prices.
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By the late 1920s, as contemporary columnist Harold James has shown, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average increased dramatically. He wrote:
Between early 1926 and the spring of 1929, the Dow Jones Industrial Average index
almost doubled, from 158.54 at the beginning of 1926 to 308.85 at the end of March;
then it moved ahead even faster during the summer; with a peak of 381 on
September 3.”30
The widespread speculation in stocks drove up stock prices. While some investors became
squeamish, others sought to take profits from the market while it was at its zenith. George
D. Green, a Federal Reserve researcher, reported that between 500 to 600 thousand
individuals owned between 75 to 80 percent of the common stock issued in the 1920s.31
The new middle class owned common stocks, but it was the prominent investors who
controlled Wall Street. Stock Market wealth seemed to be concentrated mainly at the
higher echelons of American society, but gradually, more ordinary Americans attempted,
sometimes unsuccessfully, to acquire common shares of stock. This viewpoint that middle
class Americans did not possess a significant amount of common stocks differed from the
account provided by John Kenneth Galbraith.
After September 3, 1929, James continued, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
experienced unpredictable and dangerous declines as investors sought to sell their shares
of stock.32 That year, October 24 to 29 were the worst days in American economic and
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financial history. Most scholars argue that the fall of the stock market directly contributed
to the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s.33 In the wake of falling market prices
throughout September and October 1929, there were bank failures in London, England, and
the United States. The Dow Jones dropped significantly in terms of points, and stock values
plummeted. On October 24, 1929, the Dow opened at 305.87 but closed at 299.47.34
Moreover, the market lost between $8 to 9 billion in stock valuation on Black Tuesday,
October 29, 1929.35 Weeks before, the Dow had dropped between 2 to 3 percent.36
Americans had been accustomed to some market instability, but nothing like this had
occurred since the Panic of 1873.37 New Dealer Bernard Asbell recalled that “when the
New York Stock Exchange headily opened on September 1, 1929, the aggregate value of all
stocks was some $89 billion. He estimated that stockjobbers had lost 83 cents for every
dollar invested.”38 The impact was devastating.
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The value of stocks declined sharply, and both stockbrokers and ordinary investors
who put money in the Stock Market suffered huge losses.39 Their stocks became nearly
worthless. Further, there was a lack of liquidity as Americans could not cash in their stocks
at their original investment values.

Anyone buying stock in the late 1920s had paid

substantial amounts for what were, by then, overvalued stocks. When Americans decided
to sell their asset-backed paper, they received only a nominal amount from their initial
investments. By late fall 1929, few investors looked to the Stock Market, and the market’s
collapse hurt those who sought to put their hard-earned money into American
corporations. Historian Eric Arnesen argued that in the aftermath of the Crash, Americans
lost billions of dollars, unemployment levels increased, and consumers could not purchase
goods in the marketplace because of the lack of funds.40 For example, economic historian
Gene Smiley reported that corporate profits decreased from $2.8 billion in 1929 to -$2.6
billion in 1930.41 Others contend that by November 1929, the market had lost $100 billion
in private assets.42
Economic historian Michael Bernstein examined consumer consumption habits to
address the Great Crash of 1929 and the reasons that recovery only occurred gradually
throughout the 1930s. He observed that initially, the decade of the 1920s experienced a
major economic boom after the minor recession from 1920 to 1922, only to witness
changes in buying and purchasing habits of consumers. This affected the financial markets
as the national economy became more secularized and industrialized. He further asserted
39
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that the economic recovery occurred once the Second World War started, because there
were increased amounts of consumption to support the global war effort.
Additionally, Bernstein argued that the United States during the Hoover and
Roosevelt administrations failed to address the economic crisis, because of high
unemployment that affected productivity negatively and recovery only began with the
emergence of warfare in 1939.43 He asserted that labor costs had to remain low to prevent
the growth in the prices of consumer goods. Bernstein also mentioned that as consumers
became more affluent during the 1920s, because of higher income levels in a more
secularized marketplace, they began to purchase more durable goods for their homes, and
retail and durable goods became cheaper and had lower demand levels.44 This affected the
national economy detrimentally as Americans witnessed less growth during the latter
years of the 1920s. If there had been newer retail products in the marketplace, then
American corporations would have been able to generate more revenue for their
merchandise, and the Great Crash and Depression that followed could have been averted.
In an effort to stabilize the Dow, on October 24, Richard Whitney, vice president of
the Stock Exchange and member of J.P. Morgan, went to the Wall Street.45 He purchased
between 10,000 to 25,000 shares of United States Steel for $205.00 per share.46 So, how
did the two most powerful automotive companies: Ford Motor Company and General
Motors Corporation fare during the economic crisis? Ford Motor Company and General
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Motors Corporation were mainly unaffected by the Stock Market Crash.

Ford Motor

Company was a corporate proprietorship and did not maintain publically traded stock,
while General Motors Corporation did experience a slight reduction in the prices for
common and preferred stock47. Sales volumes for General Motors common and preferred
stocks did plummet but the company’s profitability was sound during the period.48
On October 24, however, the Dow closed at 299.47, still down 1.78 percent, while
12,895,000 stocks had changed hands. Normally, Wall Street was accustomed to volumes
at the one to two million exchanges per day. This day was unprecedented. So why did it
happen? What caused the Dow to move into this volatile range? What explanations have
been given about this economic event in American history?
Business columnist Maury Klein offered many suggestions to explain the situation.
He argued that the Federal Reserve branch of New York and Washington D. C. should bear
some of the responsibility for the 1929 crisis, because of their cheap money policies in the
mid-to-late 1920s. The Federal Reserve continued to lower interest rates during the
decade, which resulted inexpensive loans to consumers. Some then used this money to
speculate in the stock market. Klein confirmed that Federal Reserve Board member Adolph
47
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Miller mentioned that the institution’s cheap money policies toward American banks
caused much of the economic instability.49 In his memoirs, Herbert Hoover assigned some
of the blame for the Great Crash of 1929 to the Federal Reserve System. He argued that,
before 1928, the Federal Reserve System was responsible for the emergence of cheap
money policies that promoted the revitalization of European economies and currencies.50
In 1925, Governor of the Federal Reserve Branch of New York Benjamin Strong expanded
its open market operations, and lowered interest rates at the behest of Montagu Norman,
head of the Bank of England, Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, and Charles Rist of the
Bank of France.51 This policy immediately aided Europe, but it had a long-term negative
impact on the United States. Domestically, easily available credit had fueled the stock
market bubble.
As president, Herbert Hoover stated that he had confronted Federal Reserve
officials about their cheap credit policies; but he was overruled by them. At the same time,
Hoover asserted that the economic crisis might not have occurred without the coming of
the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles. It was his contention that the Stock
Market Crash and the Great Depression started in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America
first and then spread to the United States. Thus, the United States was not completely
responsible for the coming of the Great Depression.

It was an international crisis.

Economists Galbraith, Fisher, and Keynes contended that stock market speculation was one
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of the causes, but Wall Street throughout the 1920s was within a healthy economic range.52
Economist Paul Samuelson argued that the Great Crash of 1929 did not display any visible
causes.

Many investors did not see it coming.

Moreover, Samuelson asserted that

throughout American History, economists and policymakers had been able to predict a
majority of the recessions or depressions in this country, but there were some events that
caught them by surprise.53 These unexpected economic events, such as the Great Crash of
1929, were severe when they did occur.
In a report by the National Bureau of Economic Research, scholars argued that
Bolivia, Australia, Germany, Brazil, India and Bulgaria had entered their depressions before
the Stock Market crashed in the United States.54 The economies of China, Russia, Central
Asia, and Central Africa further had begun to show weakness before the United States’
economy.55 Thus, Hoover argued that the Stock Market Crash was a global, not domestic
event. The crises started throughout the globe and that the United States was not isolated
nor was it the lone nation to experience this economic instability. This global event was
not within his control.
Irving Fisher, a member of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, contended that the Federal
Reserve did make a terrible mistake regarding its monetary policies, but Federal Reserve
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economists were not responsible for the crisis.56 He believed that, before the fall of 1929,
both economic growth and Wall Street’s gains had been legitimate. The American economy
had become more internationalized with consumers from around the globe participating in
the stock market. By contrast, Federal Reserve Vice-Governor of the Washington, D.C.,
Board Paul Warburg stressed that the Fed was responsible, because it restricted public
credit and raised interest rates after the death of Benjamin Strong, even as Americans and
global citizens had participated in establishing an asset bubble. Wild speculation may have
been the cause.57 Before the Crash occurred, Warburg believed that speculation in the
United States could contribute to a depression. His warnings went unheeded.
International incidents, especially in Europe, contributed to investor uncertainty
and, indirectly, to the Wall Street Crash in 1929. Remember, the United States had become
an immense creditor nation with large gold reserves.

The Stock Market Crash, thus,

affected nations throughout the globe and strong gold reserves in the United States coupled
with the use of metallic standards, furthered depressed the international market.
In the absence of a world banking system, financial leaders and economists still
acted on a national basis. George Harrison, successor to Benjamin Strong as the Governor
of the Federal Reserve Branch in New York, increased interest rates after November 1928
in response to global developments. Harrison’s now controversial move is the subject of
much scholarly and political debate. Economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
56
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agree that if the Federal Reserve had not raised interest rates and, instead, had increased
the money supply in the private sector through cheap money policies, then the economic
depression might have been averted. Before 1928, after all, New York Federal Reserve
Governor Benjamin Strong had provided cheap loans to the Bank of England, which was
working to revitalize the British economy and appreciate the pound sterling.58 This move
was calculated to stave off the ensuing global economic downturn. Moreover, Friedman
and Schwartz point out, while Benjamin Strong was alive, the competitive relationship
between the Board in Washington, D. C., and New York was balanced.59 Disputes over
monetary policy came to the surface under his successor George Harrison.

These

discussions had a negative impact on the actions of the Federal Reserve System. The
decision-making process regarding monetary policy for the Federal Reserve System was
hampered, because of disputes between the New York Branch and Washington, D.C.60
Each branch had a difficult time maintaining a universal and uniform economic strategy.
The conflict between the different Federal Reserve boards exacerbated the economic crisis.
Both the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D. C., and New York were concerned
over stock speculation on the Wall Street exchange, but their strategy to control this
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problem was not unified. Hence, Harrison convinced the Board in Washington, D.C., to
increase discount rates and curtail cheap money policies in an effort to curtail speculation.
As this occurred, there was significant disagreement among other Fed officials. From the
Crash of 1929 to the Banking crisis of the early 1930s, Harrison petitioned the Board in
Washington, D. C., to raise interest rates. American policymakers at the Board would not
listen to his arguments.61 Harrison believed in the use of direct pressure to compel the
private sector to end speculation, but his approach was not agreed upon by the Board and
the other member banks. Both sides of the debate vacillated.62
Economists Friedman and Schwartz have argued that the Federal Reserve could not
make sound monetary policy and that, because of its lack of leadership, the money supply
among member banks declined.63 This failure had a negative impact upon corporate and
private banks, which then could not extend domestic loans to combat insolvency and
improve unemployment levels during the stock market decline.64 Moreover, they argued
that there was a profound lack of liquidity or available cash in circulation in the private
sector. The Federal Reserve refused to purchase corporate securities. This may have
increased the ability of multinational corporations to further invest in the economy and
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increase employment levels and conditions in the private sector. Political and economic
historians such as Anne Mayhew, on the other hand, contend that Friedman and Schwartz
failed to make the case that the Federal Reserve’s monetary contraction was the principal
cause of the economic crisis.

Mayhew points out that high-powered money, which

consisted of deposits in private bank accounts was in abundance in the late 1920s and the
Great Depression of the 1930s.65 According to Mayhew, bank concerns may have been
muted during the 1920s, especially if banks were able to prevent the withdrawal of funds
from private accounts.
One reason why the Federal Reserve did not increase the money supply available to
private banks after the stock market crash of 1929 was that, initially, the Reserve Board
examined the banking conditions of Chicago and New York to determine its monetary
stance. When Mayhew re-examined the data, she discovered that, throughout much of the
early 1930s, banks in both states had sound reserves. They did not require more monetary
resources, but they continued to weather the financial storm, despite difficult economic
conditions. Thus, the Federal Reserve System did not perceive that there was a present or
evident need for action. Scholars have argued that, when the Federal Reserve purchased
corporate and foreign securities, the global economy prospered. Bank borrowing normally
decreased when the central bank acquired asset-backed paper or securities.66 The Federal
Reserve may have been able to increase the outflow of public credit to the national
economy through purchases of government securities and corporate bonds, not necessarily
through just fiscal policies. Economist David Wheelock contended that private banks were
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reluctant to borrow from the Federal Reserve System and viewed this agency as the lender
of last resort. There could have been other financial mechanisms that could have assisted
private banks infuse cash into their institutions if needed.67
One problem that central banks face is that, during booms, private banks were
willing to lend more money, while if there is a downturn, then monetary contraction
became the norm. The Federal Reserve may have been reluctant to provide loans to
corporate banks, because they have viewed the national economy as one in which there
was a slowdown.68 Moreover, restricting public credit disenabled the outflow of gold.
Hoover was determined to prevent substantial losses of gold reserves, which could have
increased the federal deficit.
Economic historian Peter Temin offered a perspective that contrasts with the
arguments put forth by Friedman and Schwartz and confirms the theories presented by
Anne Mayhew.69 Temin argued that the money supply did not decline at the end of 1930,
as Friedman and Schwartz had specified. Temin contended that, despite the number of
bank failures, the national economy returned to normalcy at the end of 1930. Friedman
and Schwartz, in his opinion, were incorrect. From the Crash of 1929 to the Banking Crisis
of the early 1930s, there was an increase in the amount of credit (money stock) in the
private sector, which could have prevented the economic downturn. On the other hand,
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Temin argued that Herbert Hoover was a monetary deflationist, because he believed in the
use of a metallic standard, which normally depressed prices. This may have been the
reason that he restricted the outflow of gold from the United States and for the decrease in
the amount of available credit (money stock) in the country.70 Deflation implied that public
credit was reduced and the use of a metallic standard, causing the appreciation of the
currency and the depression of consumer prices.71
There is one problem with Temin’s argument.

Cheap money policies had

contributed to the economic downturn. If the Fed had increased the money supply further
in the private sector, then consumers might have purchased more stocks or used the
money stock to support their earlier margin purchases of stock. The American middle class
may neither have spent the money to bolster consumer demand nor deposited their
monetary resources into banks.

Instead they spent it on the acquisition of already

overpriced stocks. During the early years of the economic crisis, Americans lost valuable
financial assets, and their savings were reduced to nominal amounts.72 Many middle class
investors had made intelligent decisions in their stock acquisitions, but the crash caught
many off-guard. They did not expect this crisis nor were they prepared for it. But
Economic historian Harold Bierman, Jr., argued that the economic indicators were present,
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such as the risky increase in stock prices.73 Herbert Hoover attempted to warn Wall Street
and the Federal Reserve and banking system to no avail. Policymakers, economists and
stockbrokers immediately blamed the crisis on speculators who acquired large amounts of
common stocks and supposedly made poor investment decisions.74
Maintaining global metallic standards have been one of the sources of economic
stagnation that contributed to the crash in 1929, but so too was the belief that a balanced
federal budget should trump other policy priorities. Herbert Hoover, throughout his public
career, believed that government intervention in the national economy was, at best, a
cumbersome approach toward solving private sector woes.

The Federal Reserve’s

approach was neither a coherent nor a sufficient response to the crisis.

Moreover,

President Hoover, once called the “Great Engineer,” prevented the federal government
from playing an active role in mitigating the crisis after 1929.75 Many in the financial
world, including Hoover, believed government actions should be limited.

Further, a

metallic standard based upon the sale and acquisition of gold in the public sector, they
believed, put the United States on the path toward economic recovery. Critic and historian
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., quipped that Hoover felt that gold “was a metal enshrined in human
instincts for over 10,000 years and he did not mean to abandon it.”76 His rock-solid belief
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in the gold standard did not persuade various European nations, including major trading
partner, Great Britain, from renouncing their use of a metallic standard.77
Patricia Clavin, among others, has confirmed that the gold standard contributed to
the market crash in 1929 that gradually transformed into a deep international depression
during the 1930s.78 The United States and Europe could not establish an exchange rate
policy that all nations could agree upon, because of its use of metallic standards. Clavin
further argued that each country developed their own policy rules for the maintenance of
their metallic standards. Each metallic standard used among the Westernized countries
was distinct, so efforts to change their monetary policies had to be negotiated. By 1930,
most nations tended to use deflationary policies and a contraction of their domestic money
supply to prevent massive outflows of gold through the use of import tariffs and other
economic measures.79
Finally, Clavin stressed that once nations removed their currency from a metallic
standard, and expanded their money supply, their economies improved. Any hope of
maintaining a gold or other metallic standard required global economic agreement. Each
nation could not have policies that were differentiated from their international
counterparties if the systems were to function properly. Without global metallic standards,
creditor nations such as the United States were regarded as lenders of last resort. The
abandonment of metallic monetary standards and the use of floating exchange rates
created economic tensions in the United States. Nations such as France, the Netherlands,
77
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Belgium, and Switzerland sought to sell their holdings of American banknotes for gold.
These nations were convinced that the United States would discontinue its gold standard in
similar ways as Great Britain and Germany.80
Prominent historian William Leuchtenburg argued that Hoover was ideologically
committed to maintaining the United States on a gold standard, even at the cost of a
deflated national economy and high unemployment levels.81 In response to his critics,
Hoover contended that gold stabilized the prices for manufactured goods. In his opinion,
this conservative move eventually increased consumer demand and thus regenerated the
economy. Still, as Leuchtenberg and others have argued, Hoover’s limited government
actions, coupled with his insistence on balanced federal budget, put the government on the
path toward temporary solvency. But it did not answer larger structural problems nor did
it put food in the mouths of the unemployed and impoverished. Rutgers historian Elliot
Rosen concurred with Schlesinger and Leuchtenburg in arguing that Hoover sought to
maintain the gold standard.82 He convinced Great Britain, which had abandoned the gold
standard, to reestablish its global economic and fiscal role. Again, scholars such as Kristie
M. Engemann of the St. Louis Federal Reserve branch and others have argued that many
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foreign nations were concerned that once Great Britain left the gold standard, the United
States would follow in its footsteps.83
Another international problem that Hoover faced was that Germany, which still
owed massive war reparations and became deeply in debt to American banks, was
undergoing severe economic instability. In 1930 to 1931, Hoover was uncertain that the
German government would be able to pay its reparations as stipulated under the Treaty of
Versailles. The Postwar Reparations Commission had estimated that German reparations
amounted to about 132 billion gold marks.84 France received about fifty-two percent of the
reparations while their British counterparts were to gather about twenty-two percent in
reparations payments. 85
Moreover, German multinational corporations began, after the war, to borrow
heavily through loans from the United States. It appeared likely that Germany would
default on its domestic and foreign loans. Both the Dawes plan of 1924 under the Coolidge
administration and the Young plan of 1929, devised under Hoover, were designed to solve
the reparations crisis in Europe, but the crisis had not been resolved following their
enactment.86 Prominent banks in the United States loaned to German local governments
and corporations between 50 to 75 percent of the monetary resources for the expansion of
their national economy. J.P. Morgan provided Germany with between $100 to 200 million
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in loans for postwar revitalization efforts.87 American companies such as Chase and
Guaranty Trust further had invested two billion dollars in German infrastructure. It was
unclear if these loans could be re-paid.88 The private and public sectors in Germany were
devastated, and policymakers had to devise sound solutions to manage this economic issue.
Postwar loans were important, because the United States was determined to
reconstruct Europe and to ensure that its allies (especially Great Britain and France) had
the wherewithal to pay off their massive wartime debts. Hoover realized that, if Europe
was to be saved, bailing out Germany had to take priority. On the one hand, German
reparations had to be addressed.89 From a foreign policy standpoint, the government
worried about Communism; and they were determined to use Germany as a bastion against
the newly emergent Soviet Russia and its radical political ideology.90 Hoover and his
predecessor thus faced a financial and political dilemma. They had to address the issue of
German reparations. They also understood the issues of European reconstruction and war
debts were interlinked. The Hoover administration was especially concerned with France,
because he was certain that France had a vested interest in promoting a docile German
nation. In turn, France was worried that Germany would rearm and return to a militarized
state.
The Laval administration was determined to use its political and economic powers
to prevent any new forms of German aggression. The question that policymakers had to
ask themselves was whether Germany could pay its reparations, even if they were reduced.
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Owen D. Young, a corporate executive and the architect of the Young plan of 1929,
contended that Germany could not pay its reparations. Western allies had to renegotiate
some of the financial stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.91 Young’s stance, however, did
not move the French or British governments to renegotiate, but the German default on its
reparations payments caused both France and Great Britain to experience much economic
instability.
From 1929 to 1932, as the crisis in Germany, and secondarily in France and the
Great Britain, accelerated, many Western centralized banks and government treasuries
prevented the outflow of gold. Gold was hoarded, and beggar-thy-neighbor policies came
to the surface.92 Historian Elliot Rosen noted that over twenty-one nations curtailed the
use of the gold standard and barred or limited gold exports.93

Great Britain was a

dominant political actor in this new fiscal and monetary strategy.94 Germany and Italy also
established foreign exchange constraints, and countries with nominal economic resources
propagated moratoriums on intergovernmental debts and credit for businesses in the
private sector.95
In the face of this crisis, the Federal Reserve Branch in New York and the Board in
Washington, D.C., were determined to prohibit the exportation of gold to foreign countries.
Their moves led to a major contraction of international credit in an effort to prevent gold
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outflows. It also deepened the banking crisis in the years from 1929 to 1933.96 Moreover,
after the summer of 1931, there were multiple major bank failures, such as the closing of
Credit-Anstalt, a powerful bank in Austria.97 Overseas trade in Austria and Germany
became problematic, due to loan defaults; and unemployment levels in both countries
increased drastically.98
Hoover responded that it was important to target the reparations issue, because
restoring the German economy and the economic balance within Europe was the only way
to restore confidence in the global economic system. His response did not consist of solely
global strategies but domestic policies as well. Hoover sought not just to bolster European
stability through the Young plan and limit intergovernmental loans. He was inclined to
sustain the gold standard, balance the federal budget, and use his executive powers to
avoid the collapse of state and national banks and maintain domestic economic solvency.
Thus, he sought to restore confidence in the developed nations of the world.99
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In terms of his direct policies, Hoover issued a moratorium on reparations payments
and intergovernmental loans in the early 1930s, so that Germany was not responsible for
reparations payments for one full year.100 This step was important, because the United
States was one of Germany’s major creditors. American banks held billions of dollars in
German securities and loans. If Germany was to fail, then the United States and its
economic security would be in peril. Most New York banks held German securities, and
Wall Street had vested interests in making sure that the German government and private
sector remained solvent.

In an effort to promote global peace, Hoover hoped that the

moratorium would encourage domestic political forces in Germany and Austria to limit
military spending.101
The moratorium eliminated German reparations payments for one year, but neither
Hoover nor his European allies believed that the overall debt should be cancelled.102 Most
European nations agreed to the principles behind the moratorium, but France was
dissatisfied with this development. France had been using the reparations payments to
revitalize their national economy after World War I. But the Laval administration argued
that the United States failed to contact them about the proposal in a timely manner. France
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temporarily backed off, but its disappointment was exacerbated when Hoover threatened
to negotiate the proposal without French approval. French public officials continued to be
concerned about German military might, which limited their willingness to sign on to the
U.S. plan.103
Some scholars now argue that Hoover’s moratorium may not have been a step in the
right direction.

In making this temporary easement of the reparations payments,

European and American policymakers missed a great opportunity to make fundamental
changes in the global system.104 The main problems were the crisis of the expansion of the
public credit, the decrease in farm prices globally, and a general loss of confidence in public
and private banking.105 Policymakers might have attacked the issue of liquidity or readyavailable cash and in turn strengthen public and private credit. Available assets were
illiquid so that the money supply could be expanded. As the market crisis continued, the
issue was not the enormity of debts, but how to pay for these debts with readily-available
cash.106
The road to domestic economic solvency in the United States was difficult at best,
but trying to coordinate global developments and pushing to move the economy forward
was nearly impossible. Before issuing the moratorium on reparations payments, President
Hoover was reluctant to offer Germany and Austria any financial concessions. Two global
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conferences to discuss the issue further were held—the Lausanne conference of 1932 and
the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933. The results of these conferences
were disastrous.107 In both conferences, Americans and their European counterparts held
talks about the gold and silver standards, disarmament and collective security issues, tariff
limits and reductions, and reforming the Treaty of Versailles.108 They did not, however,
agree on an economic plan of action.

Still, international hostility and competition

remained.
At the beginning stages of the Great Depression, gold started to flow slowly in and
out of the United States and Western European countries.109 At the same time, many
nations such as Canada, Argentina, and Uruguay were forced off a metallic standard
because of gold flight. Liquidity and massive loan defaults and bank failures remained
problems,110 and they caused massive deflation in the Western World. Unemployment
levels increased dramatically in both Europe and in the Americas. Many nations remained
economically insolvent. Banks in the United States, as elsewhere, suffered from economic
instability, and many began to fail. Hoover tried to put on a brave face, but banks were
forced to liquidate their assets. These actions further contributed to the declining values of
stocks and severely weakened investment.
In 1931, 2,290 banks excluding mortgage companies that also faced some financial
hardships, had closed their doors in the United States alone.111 And in the three years after
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1929, approximately five thousand banks were no longer in business.

There was a

decrease of money in circulation, the dismantling of metallic standards in Europe, an
appreciation of the dollar and a decline in prices for consumer goods. Trade gradually
came to a halt. People during this period began to hoard cash. They stored it in their
homes, rather than banks, because they did not trust bankers or policymakers.112 They felt
threatened by the economic collapse and did not know who they could count on for
financial support and relief.
The global credit crisis forced the hand of the Hoover administration. Something
had to be done to improve liquidity and to encourage re-investment in the stagnant
economy.113 First, Hoover solicited some private funds and established the National Credit
Corporation (NCC) on October 13, 1931.114 He called for a meeting at Secretary of the
Treasury Mellon’s apartment with corporate executives such as Thomas W. Lamont, George
Whitney of J.P. Morgan, Albert H. Wiggins of Chase National Bank, Charles E. Mitchell,
chairman of National City Bank, William C. President, president of Guarantee Trust
Company of New York and others. Hoover’s proposal for a private credit corporation did
not go over well. A majority of the participants sought federal action and a government
response to the Banking Crisis and Great Depression. 115
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Still, the National Credit Corporation went forward. The NCC was to be managed by
the domestic corporate executives and insurance leaders.116

It was a private sector

organization that loaned money to American banks, but private banks did not approve of
the lending policies of the NCC, which required them to use their most liquid assets as
collateral.117 With assets of about one half billion dollars, the NCC accepted asset-backed
paper as collateral for redevelopment loans designed to re-invigorate the economy.118
Small banks and businesses could not participate, because the NCC required member banks
to provide it with two percent of their assets as collateral.

Hoover suggested that, if

necessary, he would re-establish the War Finance Corporation, an idea promoted by
Washington, D.C., Federal Reserve Board Governor Eugene Meyer.

He believed that

modeling a new initiative on the WFC, which had served business well during the World
War I, could now be a solution to the looming crisis.119 The difficulties ahead would open
the door for Meyer’s solution.120
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From the beginning, NCC was a disaster in the making. Small banks were excluded
from participation, and the process to obtain new loans was “slow and cumbersome.”121
The organization was so ineffective that, by January 1932, only fifty-five million dollars, or
a little better than ten percent of its funds, had been disbursed to various parties. The
failure of the NCC paved the way for the creation of a government agency with far greater
assets and available federal funds to promote liquidity among American banks.122
On January 22, 1932, Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC) to handle the credit crisis.123

The Senate had approved the bill 63 to 8 while the

House supported the bill 335 to 55.124

When the law was passed, a fiduciary trust (a

sinking fund) containing two billion dollars was established to finance its operations,
provide business loans, and promote job creation in the private sector.125 The RFC began
to disburse funds on February 2, 1932.126

Hoover had resisted as long as possible

establishing a new government agency that worked with public funds; but the national
economy was in economic shambles. He did not have a choice. Eugene Meyer became the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation‘s first chairman, and he was quick to hire George
121
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Franklin to serve as the general counsel for this agency.127 As President of this agency,
Hoover selected Charles Dawes, who had served previously as Vice-President under Calvin
Coolidge and had been a stalwart opponent of government intervention.128 Members of the
RFC board consisted of the following individuals: Senate Democratic leader Joe Robinson,
Speaker of the House John Nance Garner, Arkansas executive Harvey C. Couch, and Jesse H.
Jones of Texas. The Treasury Department loaned funds to the RFC, and the proceeds were
allocated to domestic banks and corporations. These efforts were supposed to increase the
money supply in the private sector and improve employment levels, because the loans
were to be allocated to hire Americans. In addition, funding for the RFC did not just come
from American taxpayers, but from the sale of bonds and the emergence of a fiduciary
trust.129
In the beginning, the RFC instilled confidence in ordinary people, but their hopes
and aspirations were quickly dashed. In June 1932, Charles Dawes resigned from his post
as the President of the RFC.130 It was revealed to the public that he secured a loan from the
RFC in the amount of ninety million dollars. Dawes returned to Chicago and continued to
serve the banking community in Illinois. In the wake of this revelation, American voters
began to feel that the RFC benefited the wealthy as a rubberstamp for their chosen policies.
They thought that the RFC was “relief for the rich.” As Franklin Ebersole reported, “even in
Chicago financial district, cynical lawyers chortled that RFC stood for Relief for Charlie.”131
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In later years, the RFC barred its members of the board of directors from obtaining loans,
because it was considered a conflict of interest,132 as it had been for Dawes.
Large banks welcomed the RFC, because they could secure loans from a reliable and
business-friendly institution. In addition, corporations in the private sector could obtain
RFC funding for their business operations and new investments.133 RFC funds enabled
large banks to increase their expenditures, because there were more banknotes in
circulation. By the early 1930s, there was a liquidity problem in the United States and the
rest of the world. Henry B. Steagall, Democratic House Representative from Alabama and
Chairman of the Banking and Currency committee, argued that the RFC was an absolute
necessity because of the lack of funds in the private sector.
The passage of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act was a watershed event
in American history, because it was one of the first instances in which the federal
government infused cash into the private sector.134 The media, such as the St. Louis PostDispatch, policymakers, and many ordinary Americans, felt that this was uncharted
territory, because of its governmental intervention in peacetime. As Jordan Schwarz wrote,
“Representative Homer C. Parker of Georgia branded the RFC the most decided step toward
communism any civilized government has ever taken with the possible exception of
Russia.”135 Other observers argued that the RFC arrived too little too late. American banks
and corporations received an infusion of cash to support their business operations.136 They
spent nearly all of their monetary resources on balancing their financial records.
132
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Corporations did not hire new workers.137

High unemployment remained a serious

problem.
Some scholars such as James L. Butkiewicz argue that the RFC was somewhat
successful. Hoover’s efforts should be applauded, because of the plenitude of loans that
were initiated under this institution to banks, railroads and utilities.138 From the period of
August 1932 to January 1933, Butkiewicz showed that over 3,300 businesses enhanced
their private credit from the RFC.139 The RFC may have assisted banks overcome the
liquidity crisis, but did the formation of the RFC enable the elite classes to prosper at the
expense of the lower and middle classes? In fact, Hoover believed in internationalism and
government cooperation but not in individual relief.140

Here, he preferred self-help.

Private charities were promoted. The federal role in this crisis was based upon improving
the financial operations of businesses so that American corporations could hire more
workers. If ordinary Americans turned to the government for relief, then this countered his
arguments for the maintenance of rugged individualism and social mobility based upon
hard work and dedication.141
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By July 1932, Congress acted further to stem the Great Depression with the passage
of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act. This new law increased the borrowing
power of the RFC and enabled it to assist states and corporations that required new
liquidity.142 It came to the aid of local governments seeking to provide some form of relief
during the growing economic crisis. During the Interregnum, President-Elect Franklin
Roosevelt contended that, even though the RFC financed the operations of banks,
corporations and state agencies, it did not necessarily promote an expanded economy with
national growth. In a letter to Felix Frankfurter, Roosevelt wrote that
We do not believe that loans to corporations by such bodies as the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation even if financed by inflationary money necessarily tend to
quicken activity. The test here is whether they are used to finance the output of new
capital goods. If they are merely used to enable corporations to liquefy their assets
they may have little or no effort in reviving activity.143
RFC loans may have stabilized some American businesses, but private corporations did not
necessarily expand their business operations or rush to enlarge their payrolls.
Corporations may have had positive balance sheets, but they did not necessarily reduce
unemployment. Moreover, under the Hoover administration, the RFC may have been
increasingly reluctant to provide corporations with new loans. The Great Depression was
also called the Great Contraction, because of the overall lack of American financial liquidity
or money in circulation.144 New credit did not filter into the American economy on a
regular basis,145 and even the new RFC did not extend credit quickly enough or in sufficient
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numbers to make an impact over the short-term. Private banks continued to be reluctant
to provide domestic businesses with loans, no matter their industrial and financial plans
even though this would have provided corporations with private relief, not public. Hoover
believed that the public sector should not play a dynamic role in strengthening private
corporations.

The absence of liquidity in the private sector prevented banks from

establishing more loans to American industries.146
Some scholars contend that the United States and Great Britain sought to revitalize
the national economies in Europe and the rest of the world.147 The only problem that they
faced was domestic opposition. Each nation had its own ideas about the global economy.
They argued among themselves, because they also had national interests and security
concerns that prevented economic compromise. The United States, which was a nation
with strong gold reserves and a strong competitive advantage, sought to keep open its
borders to free trade and competition. Other nations saw it differently. Moreover, the
United States did not believe that overt or excessive government regulations were the
answers to economic strife.

The Hoover administration was determined to limit

government action in the private sector to corporate and bank support.
One reason for the decline of the RFC after the Crash of 1929 was that the United
States’ government and banks did have gold reserves, but they were unwilling to increase
credit for fear of decreasing their gold stocks. Federal Reserve chairman Eugene Meyers
and Treasury Secretary Ogden Mills were reluctant to hold auctions for the acquisition of
government securities, because they did not want to increase private credit. The Federal
Reserve, instead, increased interest rates to diminish the money stock in the private sector
146
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and avoid an outflow of gold. Elliot A. Rosen pointed out that between the summer of 1929
and March of 1933, “monetary currency and demand deposits fell by 28 percent, while
industrial output declined by some 50 percent.”148 By 1928, the United States had spent
over 500 million dollars in gold to finance its foreign bond purchases and stock market
acquisitions.149
The Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression were devastating events in
American and global history. The United States and its American citizens suffered gravely,
because of the lack of job growth and the problems with deflation. Americans, overall,
were subjected to poor economic conditions. They sought government support from the
Hoover administration.

Hoover, however, believed in self-help although the national

economy could no longer support a system of laissez-faire and paternalistic financial
practices. Corporations did not have the wherewithal to support the average citizen and
life for ordinary Americans became uncertain.
These events occurred on the presidential watch of Herbert Hoover, and he
attempted to resolve the crises by initiating proposals that had an international scope. The
statistics listed throughout this chapter illustrate that the United States was indeed in an
economic downturn. But the statistics do not mention where the crises first occurred. Was
it an American or global problem or both? Did the economic crisis occur in the United
States and then spread to other countries? Hoover based much of his domestic actions in
light of the international causes of the Great Depression and that had consequences for how
the economic crisis played out and was addressed in the United States. In the 1930s,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt contended that Hoover was mistaken to argue that the
148
149
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crises occurred in the global system first. Roosevelt believed that the crises had to be
resolved in the United States first before policymakers sought to address a myriad of issues
in foreign nations. It is difficult to assign responsibility regarding why the Great Crash
occurred.
Hoover probably blamed the Federal Reserve System and his international allies
throughout Europe that used cheap money policies to revitalize their national economies
while Roosevelt blamed Hoover for his conservative approaches to monetary and fiscal
policies. The policies that these presidents pursued were completely opposite in the sense
that Hoover was a fiscal conservative while Roosevelt was a liberal progressive. Both
political leaders sought to undo the policies of their opposition parties, in the sense that
Hoover even strove to prevent the subsequent enactment of New Deal laws. Roosevelt, on
the other hand, attempted to argue that the Great Crash of 1929 was an American
occurrence that required domestic solutions, and that the Hoover administration was
responsible not so much for causing as for refusing to address national and global crisis.
Scholars must look to the domestic and international policies of the Hoover
administration and how they shaped the political agenda for Franklin Delano Roosevelt
once he assumed the Oval office. In contrast to his preferences for a non-interventionist
government, Hoover did create the Reconstruction Finance Corporation that was intended
to promote economic growth in the private sector, but he was determined to not become
involved in mitigating the economic crisis through direct measures. Hoover preferred in
the use of the invisible hand of the market where policymakers examined public sector
growth, balanced their federal budgets and did not develop proactive responses to private
sector woes.

114

One question that must be asked is whether the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
served as an impetus for the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.150 Both the NIRA
and the RFC were designed to target the private sector, but the RFC was established to
extend public credit to the private sector. The NIRA was implemented to use centralized
planning to reform the industrial sectors of the national economy. Both reforms worked to
improve economic conditions, but their methodologies were inherently distinct. Hoover
could not bring himself to devise private sector reforms while Roosevelt excelled by using
liberal economic ideologies to target industrial stagnation. What this means is that both
Hoover and Roosevelt maintained a set of different public policies that moved the nation
forward in profound and distinct ways. Roosevelt’s policies were not a continuation of
Hoover’s conservative ideology. The Roosevelt administration moved in different political
circles, and this meant that economic change came to the forefront in distinct ways. In the
chapters that follow, we will attempt to chart the new economic methods of Roosevelt and
how he departed from the public policies of the Hoover administration.
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CHAPTER 4: HERBERT HOOVER, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND TEHIR ECONOMIC
VISIONS

Long before the Great Crash of 1929, Herbert Hoover wrote and published an
intriguing book entitled American Individualism in 1922. This book affirmed Hoover’s
belief in American competitiveness in the global economy and endorsed free competition in
the trade sectors.1 Further, Hoover’s economic and social philosophy was not the foreign
conception of Individualism practiced in Europe but an American Individualism in which
social mobility was supposed to enable all citizens improve upon their living conditions.2
Service and responsibility became the main characteristics of Hoover’s dominant
philosophy. Democracy enabled this economic wheel to turn as monarchs, aristocrats or
members of the elite classes were not the only individuals that improved upon their social
stations of life. Hoover’s faith in the Horatio Alger economic success story applied to all
citizens in the United States and distinguished Americans from their European
counterparts.3 This principle of American Individualism shaped Hoover’s political beliefs
and served as the economic foundation for his policies as president.4
What is American Individualism? This chapter seeks to address and describe this
important concept and to enumerate the uses of individualism in the policies and political
choices of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It itemizes the principles that
1

David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 46; Ronald William Gordon Mackay, “America 1933 and the Industrial Recovery
Act,” The Australian Quarterly 5, no. 19 (September 1933): 32.
2
Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 32.
3
Herbert Hoover, American Individualism, 24, 48; David W. Houck, “FDR’s Commonwealth Club Address:
Redefining Individualism, Adjudicating Greatness,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 266. In Houck’s
opinion, only certain individuals benefited from the Horatio Alger dream of self-improvement. All Americans could
not experience this dream, so he differs from traditional interpretations of Individualism.
4
“Herbert Hoover’s Book,” Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1923.

116

shaped American Individualism in the United States and how this idea led citizens to strive
for the American dream. By 1929, however, the dreams enabled by a belief in American
Individualism were no longer realized. This individualist philosophy could not serve as a
mechanism for promoting social and financial growth among citizens in the United States
when the supposedly self-regulating market collapsed. Thus, American Individualism still
affected the political debate in the United States and how Americans, especially corporate
executives and Republican policymakers, conducted themselves in political and economic
environments even during the crisis of authority in the Great Depression.
This chapter will touch upon some of Hoover’s experiences and philosophical
stances, and his use of American Individualism as commerce secretary and president until
1933. It will, further, examine the devastating midterm elections of 1930 in which the
Republican party lost many seats in Congress, because of disillusionment with American
Individualism and how this theory no longer applied to American economic and social
conditions. Lastly, it will address the political styles of Roosevelt and Hoover during the
Presidential election of 1932. The Presidential race was hotly contested, and Hoover was
fighting for his political life and legacy. Roosevelt won the election, but the presidencies of
both men reflected the contradictory bent of American public culture. This chapter will
illustrate the failure of American Individualism to address the problems of deprivation and
insolvency among ordinary citizens.5 This principle no longer worked in defining American
economic, political and social culture, and hampered American efforts at maintaining its
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power in the global system.6 Its failure also created the political context in which Roosevelt
became president.
When and where does the term Individualism originate? Initially, “Individualism”
was an European concept that came into existence as a political philosophy before the 19th
century.7

The term was developed from the European Enlightenment and the French

Revolution in the late 18th century. European Individualism, or the belief in an autonomous
social identity, was a controversial term. Its destructive force, some believed, threatened
communal obedience, duty, and the system of law. Its emergence in philosophy also
marked the age of capitalism.
In the United States, the uses of individualism were forms of capitalist
libertarianism that reflected race, gender, and class.8 Nevertheless, the term promoted
democratic values that underlay the American dream.9 The strong beliefs in private
property were cemented into the political, social and economic landscape long before the
twentieth century, but Hoover believed that this concept of property rights was only one of
the tenets of American Individualism as it evolved following the American Revolution.10
American Individualism was supposedly a concept that pertained to all citizens
regardless of class. Moreover, it differed from old World Individualism as practiced in
Europe, because in the United States, less emphasis was placed upon the development of
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monarchical values, autocracy, and privilege.11 Society, in the United States, produced its
own intellectuals that came from the masses, not just the elite or upper classes. Every
person or more realistically, man benefited from equality of opportunity, liberty, and
justice.12 According to Hoover, democracy enabled all citizens, regardless of their origins
or social backgrounds, to achieve in an equal setting. But achieving the American dream
became difficult at times depending upon race, gender, and ethnicity. Citizens could not
always acquire more than their modest means, even if they believed in the principles of
American Individualism. Despite inequality among citizens, Individualism had been longstanding in the United States, especially since the American Revolution.
In his Democracy in America, Tocqueville emphasized that Americans possessed the
individual freedom and liberty to achieve in a system of laissez-faire economics.13 To
believe in “American Individualism,” according to Tocqueville, was to have fortitude,
courage, and confidence and to strive for the American dream, whatever it happened to be.
Moreover, a person had to believe in the American spirit and contend that their goals could
be accomplished.14 Tocqueville continued that since men in the United States believed in
equality, freedom, democracy and individualism that they all stood on equal footing with
other American citizens. With equality, men were not above others, but were placed “side
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by side.”15 For Hoover, equality of opportunity was an important factor in his views on
American Individualism.16 American Individualism encouraged social mobility and that a
person could improve his economic station in life depending upon his educational
background, professional experiences and hard work. Hoover believed that American
Individualism distinguished the United States from the rest of the world.
According to critics, only a select group of American citizens, mainly dominant
protestant white males, believed that Individualism implied that “man is his own master.”17
Opponents contended that it did not apply to all citizens, regardless of their socioeconomic
background, race, or gender. As an ideology, it emerged, because American governmental
structures were democratic in origin, and equality of opportunity became the ideal for the
first few centuries.18 In fact, it did not apply to all; but as an ideology, it masked the
assumptions behind it.
American individualism had a strong root in voluntarism, and proponents of its
philosophy saw limited use for federal programs to stimulate growth in the private
sector.19 Small government, decentralization of the federal government, and federalism
governed policy initiatives in the United States.20 Many presidents, including Hoover’s
predecessor, Warren Harding, believed that American citizens and policymakers should not
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expect too much from the federal government.21 Intervention in state affairs was not
promoted, nor could it serve as an adequate solution to national economic problems.22 In
his book, The Interregnum of Despair, Jordan A. Schwarz argued that the president was
thought to play the role of preacher and policeman while Congress devised solutions to the
problems of generating revenue and appropriations. Herbert Hoover, who served as the
Commerce secretary under Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, was somewhat
conflicted when it came to that belief. He believed in voluntarism but used public works
projects to stimulate the national economy. Thus, Hoover sought indirect forms of relief for
Americans and longstanding corporations, but he did not believe in extending more than
limited and-in some cases-public works to ordinary citizens.
Historian Elliot A. Rosen has questioned whether Hoover’s individualism required
intense competition, because of Hoover’s belief in equality and the absence of class war, or
social stratification.23 Hoover endorsed the idea that Americans did not want to emulate its
European counterparts. He was determined to avoid their political and economic moves to
either nationalization or collectivism.24 Americans, in Hoover’s opinion, were distinct from
their European allies. As a proponent of capitalism and a system of laissez-faire, Hoover
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sought to push Americans toward economic success.25 Government had a limited role in
that process. He saw little value in centralized planning strategies, and he argued that such
policies went too far in regulating the national economy. He held the belief that the private
market was self-regulating and could reform itself, which was the key reason that Hoover
argued that the Great Crash of 1929 was merely an economic correction in the corporate
marketplace.26 In Hoover’s opinion, it was a short-term economic collapse, but the Great
Crash of 1929 deepened the economic crisis that he faced. It was not just a rudimentary
economic crisis, but served as a warning that American Individualism no longer held a
prominent place in American culture.27

Moreover, instead of direct intervention to

mitigate the economic crisis, Hoover experimented with using industrial associations and
mutual aid societies to address financial and social problems.
Hoover adopted the principles of American Individualism during his academic
pursuits at Stanford University and throughout his early career as a mining engineer.28 As
a food administrator during the Great War, he began to develop his ideas about the public
and private sectors.29 His wartime service reinforced his “romantic viewpoint” about
voluntarism and the roles of individual professionals who became members of the
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government system.30 During and after the Great War, historian Kendrick A. Clements
argued that Hoover served as the U.S. Food Administrator, chairman of the U.S. Grain
Corporation, head of the Sugar Equalization, and chairman of the Commission for Relief in
Belgium.31 President Woodrow Wilson even asked Hoover to serve as the head of the
American Relief Administration in 1918, because he was so successful in his endeavors. In
Herbert Hoover, Vernon Kellogg argued that Hoover was a great organizer of resources that
he received from American non-governmental organizations such as the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the New York Chamber of
Commerce and the Cardinal Gibbons Fund.32 All of these charitable groups from the United
States were instrumental in Hoover’s relief initiatives.
Voluntarism and professionalism were embodied in Hoover’s ideal citizen, and this
ideal man was perfect for the political arena. It was the tireless professional and volunteer
who worked in government in order to serve American citizens that was Hoover’s ideal.
His volunteer, of course, did not receive wages or compensation for his role in the public
sector, because the volunteer had to be wealthy in his own right. For Hoover, the volunteer
professional provided his services, because of his belief in American Individualism.33 Thus,
the private citizen emerged in a place of prominence in the public sector and worked with a
30
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political mandate to govern. Moreover, Hoover did not believe that government agencies
should be highly centralized. He trumpeted the individual spirit, even early on when he
worked as a mining engineer. He held on to these beliefs tightly, and they served as a
mechanism for his government service, even before his presidency.34
Once Hoover returned from continental Europe in the early 1920s, he was
convinced that economic liberties were dependent upon what he called spiritual and
intellectual freedom. Hoover contended that all peoples needed to sustain their economic
freedom and that it must not come at the expense of maintaining intellectual equality. As
he wrote, “equality of opportunity is the right of every American—rich or poor, foreign or
native born, irrespective of faith or color. It is the right of every individual to attain their
position in life to which his ability and character entitle him. By its maintenance, we will
alone hold open the door of opportunity to every new generation, to every boy and girl.”35
Hoover continued that:
Business is practical, but it is founded upon faith—faith among our people in the
integrity of business men, and faith that it will receive fair play from the
government. It is the duty of government to maintain that faith. Our whole business
system would break down in a day if there was not a high sense of moral
responsibility in our business world.36
Hoover believed that ordinary citizens should have faith in American political institutions;
and he prized the American businessman in his efforts to bring about economic, political
and social change in the United States. But businessmen must have faith in themselves or
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they will not have the capacity to make the appropriate changes to American institutions
and the national economy.
Hoover’s ideal citizen-volunteer was the ultimate professional, and he used his
intellectual framework, and economic and political know-how to provide common sense
solutions to the American people.37 Government officials, he argued, were professionals
who worked for the bureaucracy; but the government was decentralized so that
policymakers exercised considerable control over political and economic transactions.38
The skills that Hoover developed as a Food administrator, he used to again and again as
Commerce Secretary and as President. From this perspective, Hoover believed that an
extensive administration was unnecessary in most cases. In his acceptance speech in 1928
for the Republican Presidential Nomination, Hoover declared, under his political party’s
leadership, that limited government with a budgeted budget had been the federal
government’s primary goals along with the elimination of poverty in the United States.39
Hoover’s belief in voluntarism was witnessed in all of his public policy as Commerce
Secretary and President.

He favored Chambers of Commerce and trade associations,

because they helped the lower-to-middle classes get back on their economic feet through
the creation of jobs in the private sector. Hoover believed in using indirect methods to
strengthen the national economy through relief for American businesses who, in turn, put
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people back to work. He asserted that enlightened corporate executives at large American
firms “represented a fusion of altruism and self-interest.”40 Moreover, he argued that:
Voluntarism would result in the elimination of waste, the furtherance of
individualism, the promise of economic expansion, and the avoidance of the cancer
of socialism which had proven a ghastly failure in Russia.41
With Hoover, American Individualism, coupled with a metallic monetary standard
could serve as the basis for economic growth and expansion. He believed that the only way
to balance the federal budget and bring prosperity back to the private sector was through
the maintenance of a gold standard and a strong dollar.42 With a dollar supported by
coinage or specie, American corporate executives increased their employment numbers
and hired more citizens. Hoover was called the Great Engineer for that very reason.
Hoover believed in informing public opinion, but he was not the best communicator.
He did not give a lot of interviews, and he did not discuss his policies as commerce
secretary or president with the press. He was inward and serious, and he did not possess a
fierce sense of humor. After his experiences as Food administrator in Europe, his thoughts
and mentality became somewhat personal and subdued, and this shaped his political
policies regarding the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s.43
Moreover, historian Elliot A. Rosen has argued, because Hoover’s focus was on big
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business, his policies promoted the status-quo. Businesses were to be reformed but not
regulated.44
Businesses received more financial assistance under Hoover, and this relief was
intended to help ordinary Americans indirectly. For Hoover, financial assistance had to be
hierarchical. Ordinary citizens would benefit but only from government support for the
economy generally. Hoover’s belief in American Individualism shaped his views and led
him to see supporting the business community as the primary means by which to help
ordinary Americans.45 He believed in upward mobility for the working class, but improving
one’s station in life was to be more gradual and less direct.46 According to historian Elliot
Rosen, Hoover did not want to change society from its roots, but he sought to promote
business interests so that working Americans could get off the “dole” and work as members
of the labor force.47
Hoover’s promotion of American Individualism was a failed attempt to create public
policies that were in line with an older vision of government.48

His Individualist

philosophy did not function to resolve national and global economic crises, and this failure
was reflected in the Midterm elections of 1930. Scholars contend that due to Hoover and
his Republican colleagues’ conservative beliefs, a global economic downturn, a lack of
presidential popularity and profound disapproval of his policies, November 4, 1930, was a
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disaster for the Republican party.49 But this was normally the case with midterm elections
in the United States. If there was an economic collapse, a new influx of young, female or
African American voters, or if the president lacked political charisma, then the incumbent
party did not fare well in the midterm elections.50 The Midterm elections always meant
losses for the incumbent party, but in 1930, the Republican party lost big.
Moreover, in The Future of American Politics, Samuel Lubell argued that Democratic
values such as the use of strong fiscal policies and expanded government versus
Republican ideals of limited government and deflation have been staples of American
governmental policies since the match-up between Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential election.51 If the federal government interfered too
much in the private sector, then the American people began to espouse more Republican
values. But Herbert Hoover during the 1930 midterm elections may have experienced
some backlash from his aggressive monetary policies to bring in revenue for the public
sector, the absence of social programs at the federal level, and his emphasis upon a balance
federal budget during a period of economic collapse.

49

Donald A. Ritchie, Electing FDR, 58-59; Martin L. Fausold, The Presidency of Herbert C. Hoover, 100; Edgar Eugene
Robinson and Vaughn Davis Bornet, Herbert Hoover, 48, 143, 166.Alan I. Abramowitz et al., “The President’s Party
in the Midterm Elections: Going From Bad to Worse,” American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 (August 1986):
562, 571-572, 574; The President’s New Conference, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Volume 2:
Herbert Hoover, November 7, 1930, Herbert Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West
Branch, IA. This conference was important, because it was Hoover’s first meeting with the press following the
midterm elections of 1930. Democrats from the election contests had won 18 of the 32 gubernatorial races, 22 of
the 36 senatorial seats and 216 out of the 431 seats for the House of Representatives; Special, “Republicans Lay
Defeat to Slump,” New York Times, November 6, 1930.
50
Vermont Royster, “Thinking Things Over,” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1982. This article compares the
midterm elections of Roosevelt, Truman, Reagan and others to confirm that during the midterm elections, the
president’s party normally does not pick up new seats in Congress. The opposition party typically gained new
seats; Louis H. Bean, “Midterm Spell May be Broken,” Washington Post, February 4, 1962. One point that Bean
made was that during only one in 26 midterm elections has the incumbent party picked up seats in Congress since
1856 and remained in the majority; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1965), ix, 80.
51
Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics, 4-5.

128

On November 4, 1930, many Congressional seats were open during these electionday contests, and the Republicans failed to capture key legislative seats. The Republican
party was still popular and influential in the South, but Michigan, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania were the only places in which the Republican party held preeminence in the
Northeast and Middle Western regions of the United States.52 In Illinois, Republicans lost
five House seats, and they only won 49.6 percent of the state votes compared with 56.9
percent in 1928. Democratic Senatorial candidate from Illinois James Hamilton Lewis
defeated Republican Ruth Hanna McCormick by 700,000 votes. In Indiana, Republicans
only received 47.2 percent of the vote, and Democrats controlled that state by a margin of 9
to 4; in 1928, the margin had been 10 to 3 in favor of Republicans. In Ohio, Republican
Representatives for the House had lost six seats. The 1930 midterm elections illustrates
the effects of a party realignment in which many urban, working class ethnic Americans
voted for the first time.53 These new citizens voted for the Democratic party and they have
laid the groundwork for FDR’s election victory.
Moreover, in 1930, there were thirteen new Senators in Congress while eleven of
them were seated as Democrats.54 In the House of Representatives, Democrats picked up
forty-nine new seats.55

It was a bad year for Republicans and Hoover had lost his

presidential mandate among Congressional lawmakers and the American people. Congress
was in the hands of the Democrats, and they were not supplanted easily.56 Hoover had to
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negotiate with a House and Senate housed with more Democrats who did not have his
perspectives or interests at heart.
Although Republicans lost several seats in the 1930 Congressional elections, the
Republican party, also, did not fully support the president. In the past, Hoover had been
viewed as one of their brethren or comrade-in-arms,57 but the Hoover administration and
the Republican Senators did not get along well. Hoover’s cabinet remained loyal. In his last
two years in office, Hoover faced significant opposition from his own party. Herbert
Hoover believed that Republican Senate Leader James E. Watson of Indiana lacked
Republican loyalty and respect for the party. Hoover sought to supplant him with David A.
Reed, Republican Senator from Pennsylvania; but he could not generate support within
Congress. Watson did not view Hoover as a legitimate or serious politician, and he would
not follow Hoover’s directions or public policies.58 Following the mid-term elections,
Watson proposed a compromise with Democrats in Congress so that bi-partisanship would
be the order of the day.59 This act was useful to Republicans and Democrats in Congress,
because Republicans were not evenly matched in legislative seats.
Later in 1931 and early 1932, Hoover worked independently to turn the national
economy around. He did not want to incur congressional interference to his plans to
prevent the spread of the Depression. Hoover was able to push the debt moratorium, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and Glass-Steagall act or the Banking act of 1933
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through Congress with Democratic assistance.

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of

St. Louis, Julia Maues argued that the Glass-Steagall act had been developed by Senator
Carter Glass, Democrat from Virginia and Representative Henry Steagall, Democrat from
Alabama.60 The bill had been passed during the last days of the Hoover administration, but
it was signed into law by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The sales tax bill, that would have
balanced the federal budget, tariff alterations, and public works projects were not enacted,
because of the emerging controversies and disagreements surrounding those proposals.61
In contrast to Hoover’s public personality, Roosevelt’s character and political
identity were rooted in his on-the-job experience. He was a masterful politician. Unlike
Hoover, Roosevelt became a public official early on in his life, and he used his professional
experience to emerge as a dominant political leader in the United States.

In 1910,

Roosevelt, at 28 years of age, became the State Senator for Duchess County, New York.62
Throughout his time as state senator, he chaired and controlled the Forest, Fish and Game
Committee. He attempted to establish public policies that encouraged economic growth
and environmental conservation in New York State.63

He attempted to sanction the

economic behavior of New York City’s chief company executives and policymakers.
Roosevelt also distinguished himself from the actions of New York City’s Tammany Hall
machine.64 As a progressive conservationist, FDR fought to protect the New York State’s
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environmental conditions. He promoted the interests of farmers. He wanted to establish
low-interest loans for farmers, protect farmlands, and assist with the marketing of primary
goods.65
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, Roosevelt began to argue that “American
Individualism” as voiced by his opponents did not share a dynamic place in the United
States. Sometimes the needs of the many had to be promoted over those of the individual.
Roosevelt argued that, throughout history, there had been a struggle between the
individual versus the community.66 During Roosevelt’s first Inaugural Address as governor
of New York State in 1928,67 he stressed that our civilization would not survive unless each
citizen fulfilled their societal responsibilities in the United States and the global system.
Our standards of living improved, because of the sacrifices of everyday American citizens
and their foreign counterparts.68
Roosevelt did not endorse “rugged individualism,” because it led to intense
competition in the private sector.69 He only supported this way of life and approach if
there were equal opportunities for all Americans and economic exploitation was nonexistent.70 American Individualism was a practice and method that was supposed to
benefit all Americans, especially when the private sector failed to answer the needs of its
citizens.71 In his opinion, this situation enabled the federal government to step in and aid
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working class Americans. He felt that the modern form of “rugged individualism” was a
detriment to the national economy, and that the traditional approach associated with
American Individualism had been lost.72 In addition, he believed that this had been the
central reason for economic deprivation, destitution and collapse in the United States. 73
From this speech, historians believed that Roosevelt was liberal and progressive.
He believed in reforming society through government action. He argued for social justice
and contended that, only through responsible government, could the needs of citizens
come to the forefront.74

Additionally, Roosevelt believed that it was through the

completion of our public policy initiatives that made countries in the global system great.75
Working hard and using government assistance only when necessary paved the way for
dynamic and widespread economic growth.
Roosevelt continued to serve as a politician; after his ordeal with polio in 1921 and
he worked for the peoples’ interests in New York State. 76 In 1928, he won the Governor’s
seat in New York State, while attempting to complete his private efforts at recovery and
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rehabilitation.77 As Governor of New York State, Roosevelt listened to his constituents. He
understood by 1929 that the American economy was in a shambles, but he hesitated to
bring about reforms. He believed, as did many, that recovery was in sight. He realized that
this was incorrect and he acted quickly to provide financial support for his constituents, as
the depression deepened.
After the collapse of the Bank of the United States in December 1930, FDR called for
more stringent regulation of state chartered banks. He established a regional committee
for the establishment of unemployment compensation and retirement insurance.

He

developed social programs, such as the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration to
provide financial assistance to New York residents so that they could purchase consumer
essentials from the private sector and maintain a high standard of living.78 This agency was
established in New York State on October 1, 1931 and had a sinking fund of twenty million
dollars to provide assistance to the unemployed.79 Roosevelt, as governor, accomplished a
series of programs to help the unemployed, such as the enactment of sweeping legislation
that established unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, work hours stipulations and
limits, and public works projects that promoted job growth.80
Because of Roosevelt’s popularity in New York State, he went up against Alfred
Smith, the former New York governor, for the Democratic nomination for president in
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1932. Roosevelt understood that the road would be difficult and full of political hurdles.
The main obstacles that Roosevelt faced in his battle with Alfred Smith were the issues of
Catholicism, Prohibition but most importantly, the Great Depression. Roosevelt had both
the experience and intellectual know-how to handle Smith without much difficulty. The
same policies that he used as governor of New York State, he applied to his presidential
campaign. In the end, Roosevelt won the Democratic nomination for President in 1932.81
On July 2, he announced at the Democratic convention in Chicago, Illinois, a New
Deal for all Americans.82 Roosevelt pledged to help “the forgotten man,” who was suffering
from the negative effects of the Great Depression.83 This speech was important, because
Roosevelt was not speaking for the American people, he was speaking with them. He
understood that times were difficult but he believed that Americans could pull through
these difficulties with some assistance from the federal government. This political stance
set Roosevelt apart from previous candidates because he was not trying to speak over the
heads of ordinary Americans.
During his campaign, FDR established his Brains Trust, which consisted of scholars
that supported him intellectually and developed his public agenda for the presidency.84 In
his group were Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and Adolf Berle from Columbia
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University, Harvard and other Ivy League institutions.85

This group of scholars was

Roosevelt’s informal cabinet that provided him with all sorts of ideas about social and
economic policy. He used these intellectuals to devise political strategies, write campaign
and presidential speeches, and establish programs that could assist the American people.86
Moreover, all of them came from prestigious universities and had a proven track record as
scholars in their own right.
It was during this period that Roosevelt began to battle Hoover and the emphasis
that he placed upon American Individualism. Determined to avoid the mistakes of his
Democratic predecessor, Roosevelt turned outward. He used more public efforts to combat
the economic crisis. His Brains Trust, like Hoover, saw the virtue of cooperation, planning,
and long-term solutions, but government intervention in both individual welfare and the
market was to become central to the New Deal.
Roosevelt did not forget that ordinary Americans had provided him with the legal
authorization to serve as governor in New York State.87 He realized that with the political
and economic support of “the forgotten men”, he could change social conditions in the
United States.88 Roosevelt and the Brains Trust developed an extensive public agenda that
included unemployment compensation and retirement insurance, agricultural regulation
and conservation efforts, a balanced budget, strong currency and the voiding of prohibition
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laws.89 When Roosevelt accepted the presidential nomination for the Democratic party, he
asserted that he would create a New Deal for his national constituents. This period had
been tough for all Americans, but he envisioned an American people who would be “called
to arms in a war against economic despair.”90
Former Harvard professor and administrator, Stephen Kemp Bailey points out that
sometimes, politicians make pledges that they cannot carry out. Americans probably
wondered if Roosevelt could deliver, because of the enormity of the Stock Market Crash in
1929 and Great Depression, but he had a strong mind. He used his experiences and
achievements as a New York governor and applied them to the presidential campaign. In
the beginning, he may have favored a balanced budget approach to the public sector but he
realized that the national economy was in shambles. He had to act proactively to resolve
the crisis and get Americans back on their economic footing. Roosevelt’s pledges appealed
to the American people, because he argued for economic justice for all of his constituents.
The principles behind American Individualism in its focus on economic freedom and the
power of entrepreneurship no longer functioned in the United States.91 A new path had to
be taken.92 As a progressive reformer, Roosevelt sought to establish a national economy
that was a mixture between a laissez-faire approach and highly centralized government
planning and regulation.93
In 1932, many Democrats praised Roosevelt’s political, social and economic
qualities. They believed that he was the right person for the presidency. An active
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participant in the political arena, FDR would not just stand by and watch the national
economy and ordinary American citizens fail or fall by the wayside. He was determined to
act and to act now to improve economic conditions. When Roosevelt began to serve as the
governor of New York State, in 1929, the Democratic party watched him closely to discover
how he responded to economic, political or social crises.94 Viewed as a dynamic leader, he
had a sound temperament and sought proactively to address the crisis. Senators William J.
Harris of Georgia, Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina, William H. King of Utah, Alben Barkley
of Kentucky, Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee and Robert Bulkley of Ohio, all believed that
Roosevelt could win the presidential election of 1932. The political stage had been set. The
political battle would be between New York State Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
the Presidential incumbent Herbert Hoover.
The presidential campaign of 1932 between Hoover and Roosevelt illustrated the
political impasse between both candidates and a segment of the country. Both candidates
had worked together in prior administrations, and they understood each other’s political
attributes, but this campaign became bitter and grave. Both felt that American lives were
at stake and they maintained different political approaches and ideologies. Thus, Hoover
continued to use the principle of American Individualism to promote his metallic standard
and dollar appreciation in the private sector as a solution to the crisis during the
Presidential Election of 1932, and Roosevelt promoted government action more strongly.95
Hoover believed that a strong dollar and a metallic standard were fundamental toward
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maintaining a thriving national economy.96 The absence of a metallic standard, in his
opinion, hampered the economic recovery.
Communications professor, Martin Carcasson argued that Hoover during the
campaign gave many presidential campaign speeches about American Individualism and
his Republican ideals. Hoover ran his campaign with the goal of explaining to the voters
how the Great Depression started. He argued that tight credit and a metallic standard were
important sources for distress but also provided strength.

Hoover urged that

internationalism and interdependence were key sources of the economic crisis as well.97
Hoover realized that he was vulnerable to attack, because of the economic principles that
he espoused, and the performance of the failing economy. He knew that some voters
blamed him and said that he was responsible for the Great Depression.98 Even worse, he
was blamed for doing nothing to mitigate troubling economic conditions.99 Hoover argued
that he supported indirect relief, but this was not good enough for his opponent. Roosevelt
attacked him from all fronts, angles and viewpoints. In July 1932, Mrs. Hoover attempted
to defend her husband’s good name. She argued that Herbert Hoover became president
because he wanted to help the American people. He was determined to do his duty. He
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believed in helping what she described as the “little people,” which was similar to how
Roosevelt envisioned the common man.100
Radio was used extensively during the presidential campaign of 1932. It enabled
ordinary citizens to establish political connections with the candidates, and elected
policymakers.101 Broadcast radio stations strove to provide the candidates and their rivals
with air time to enumerate their political agendas, policies and other initiatives. In Fireside
Politics, Douglas B. Craig argued that David Sarnoff, who served as General Manager of RCA,
wanted to make the radio a household tool similar to a record player or a piano.102 By the
Great Crash of 1929, this goal had been reached. Between 1929 and 1936, there were
approximately six hundred radio stations in the United States and Americans became more
willing to use this medium to receive information about political, social and economic
events.103
By 1932, over 12 million American households could tune in and listen to the
political news, and speeches.104 For the 1932 presidential campaign, NBC broadcast both
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Republican and Democratic conventions and covered 46 hours combined of speeches, and
political statements. This exclusive coverage cost NBC $596,000 in advertising and caused
the cancellation of 37 programs that would have generated substantial revenue for the
company.105 Most Americans listened to the presidential debates and speeches through the
use of this modern technology. They listened to the campaign messages of Hoover and
Roosevelt.
In broadcast speeches, Roosevelt attacked Hoover from the standpoint that the
Great Depression was a domestic crisis that occurred originally in the United States and
spread to other countries. This stance enabled Roosevelt to maintain that the economic
crisis occurred, because of Hoover’s misdirection and poor policymaking skills.

In a

campaign speech on August 20, 1932, Roosevelt asserted that:
The records of the civilized nations of the world prove two facts: first, that the
economic structure of other nations was affected by our own tide of speculation and
the curtailment of our lending helped to bring on their distress; second, that the
bubble burst first in the land of its origin—the United States.106
In campaign speeches from July to October 1932, Roosevelt went on the attack
against Hoover’s tariff policies.107 Roosevelt contended that tariffs brought about the Great
Depression, because they forced European nations off the gold standard that required them
to ship gold to the United States in payment for their imports. Hoover’s argument for
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nominal government intervention did include strong tariffs.108 Instead, Hoover sought to
financially augment banks, railroads and multinational corporations and promote public
works projects.109 Hoover continued to preach that the government dole caused economic
hardship, because it reduced public confidence that everyday Americans can pull
themselves up and become viable citizens.
Hoover’s campaign was hurt by the fact that he was not a proficient public speaker.
He lacked sound oratorical skills, and it hampered his public image.110 Americans felt that
he was shy and inarticulate with an explosive personality.111 He did not instill confidence
into the American consciousness. Martin Carcasson has contended further that Hoover did
not believe that speechmaking was an essential tool for communicating with the general
public.112 This stance proved detrimental to his campaign, because with the use of the
radio, the American people could listen to his speeches and realize that he was not the best
spokesperson for the country during the economic crisis. Hoover went from embodying
the image of the golden boy that specialized in global relief to a politician that could not
resolve the Depression. The Great Crash had damaged his image only to be compounded
by a presidential election that did not enumerate his positive administrative qualities.
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Hoover could not recover from the long-standing Depression that hurt most Americans and
caused the national economy to become a shambles.
In his speeches, Roosevelt incorporated common sense ideas into his public policy
stances. His speechmaking was an art form that he attempted to utilize for the benefit of
the American people. Moreover, when he spoke to the American people, he seemed to
sympathize with their problems and devise solutions for their betterment. He promised
Americans a New Deal that would resolve the industrial and economic crisis in which the
United States found itself mired.113 Communications historian Martin Carcasson argued
that “Hoover faced a campaign in 1932 in which he was blamed by many for the worst
depression in history, vilified by most of the country as incompetent, uncaring, and
reactionary, and overmatched in rhetorical skills.”114
From the perspective of some historians like Amity Shlaes, he seemed to have the
interests of the people in mind, but he felt that ordinary citizens did not understand
complex political issues. They required political direction. However, Hoover’s emphasis on
internationalism came to the surface during a period when lower-to-middle class citizens
were suffering from unemployment, deprivation, and destitution. They did not want to
hear from Hoover that the Great Depression was about global concerns.115 They wanted to
know what Hoover would do for the American people. Hoover insisted on a more global
approach to policymaking, which alienated those voters who thought about America first.
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By examining the campaign speeches of Hoover and Roosevelt, scholars and lay
persons can see the differences in their oratorical approaches. On September 29, 1932, for
example, Roosevelt accused Hoover of becoming a big spender and without common sense
solutions to mitigate the Great Depression in a campaign speech in Sioux City, Iowa.
Roosevelt argued that Hoover had spent large amounts of money to resolve this economic
crisis, but that none of his solutions worked. The national and global economic systems
were broken and needed fixing.

Tax payer resources had been wasted, but Hoover

continued to spend away to rectify the situation. Roosevelt stated that:
I accuse the present administration of being the greatest spending administration in
peace times in all our history. It is an administration that has piled bureau on
bureau, commission on commission, and has failed to anticipate the dire needs and
the reduced earning power of the people. 116
Roosevelt understood in this speech, both the poignant need for action and that
expanding the bureaucracy alone was not the appropriate solution.117 Roosevelt argued
that Hoover did not resolve the economic crisis. Tax payer dollars were not used carefully.
Hoover had spent taxpayers’ money during peace time for solutions that favored business
projects over individual welfare.118 Roosevelt accused Hoover of driving the National debt
higher and creating a massive federal deficit. Hoover’s own preference for a balanced
budget could only be fulfilled if he increased the tax base and taxation rates.119 Because
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Hoover sought to balance the federal budget, he viewed any efforts to the contrary as a
problem. Hoover felt that balancing the budget was a step in the right direction, because it
meant that the federal government was solvent and was using taxpayer dollars in the
appropriate manner.
As the campaign dragged on, Roosevelt continued to pound away at Hoover’s belief
in American Individualism and his belief that the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression
were global problems, not domestic. He argued that Hoover was assigning the blame for
the Great Depression to his European and global counterparts,120 and was not taking
responsibility for what had really happened. But could Roosevelt blame Hoover for causing
the Great Depression?

Herbert Hoover would have fought against this assertion

vehemently.
In a speech, on October 19, 1932, Roosevelt asserted that the American people did
not seek to blame foreign governments. But the question became…was Hoover blaming
foreign countries for American problems? The American people were looking for results
and answers to their economic problems. They desired action and Hoover failed to comply
with their everyday needs. Did Hoover blame others, because he did not have sound
resolutions to the Great Depression? Roosevelt stated that:
No, we need not look abroad for scapegoats. We had ventured into the economic
stratosphere—which is a long way up—on the wings of President Hoover’s novel,
radical, and unorthodox economic theories of 1928, the complete collapse of which
brought the real crash in 1931.121

120
121

Edgar Eugene Robinson and Vaughn Davis Bornet, Herbert Hoover, 250.
Timothy Walch & Dwight M. Miller, eds. Herbert Hoover & Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 56.

145

The heart of Roosevelt’s argument was that Hoover, his economic outlook, and his policies
had contributed to these economic problems.
Hoover fought back with a vengeance. He asserted that he did not want to enter a
blame game, but he wanted to inform the American people of the facts regarding these
major events. He argued that he had accomplished a great deal for the American people.
He had negotiated various agreements with foreign countries, and many American
businesses were economically solvent, because of his foreign and domestic policies.
Hoover stressed that:
He (Roosevelt) ignores the fact that today real wages in the United States are higher
than at any other depression period, higher in purchasing power than in any other
country in the world. And above all, he dismisses the healing effect of that great
agreement by which this country has been kept free from industrial strife and class
conflicts.122
Following the Great Crash of 1929, Hoover said that he had appealed to the nation’s
governors including Roosevelt, and corporate executives from American industrial sectors
for answers to these crises.123 He sought to prevent the governors in the United States
from reducing or limiting wages or employment levels and to have them support public
construction programs.124

But his work with his fellow policymakers and corporate

executives was to no avail.
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Hoover, further, argued that Roosevelt did not possess much foreign policy
experiences. Roosevelt had ignored and disregarded the German moratorium, and the
creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with two billion dollars in assets to
benefit the American people. Hoover went on the attack to defend his policies and fight for
reelection. Hoover believed that Roosevelt and his progressive principles were eroding the
tenets of American Individualism.125 He contended in respond to Roosevelt’s campaign
that American civilization was under attack from liberal and progressive politicians like
Roosevelt and his Democratic allies.
In his books, and in his campaign speeches, Hoover emphasized the principles of
voluntarism and self-help. He promoted equal opportunity for all American workers. In
contrast, Roosevelt sought to help Americans who could not help themselves.126 This is
where Hoover differed from Roosevelt. Hoover did not want to allocate funds to the
private sector for families so that citizens could get on the “dole.” Roosevelt argued
publically that sometimes Americans needed help, if they were destitute, due to no fault of
their own. Hoover lost some public strength, but he would not stop giving his message that
the Great Depression was a global issue that required global solutions. On the last day of
the campaign, Hoover gave five speeches in California before he settled into his home on
Stanford University to await the election results.127
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On November 8, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt won 22.8 million votes versus 15.8
million for Herbert Hoover.128 Roosevelt had won 472 electoral votes while Hoover
gathered 59 electoral votes.129 Hoover had lost the Presidential Election of 1932. Franklin
Delano Roosevelt celebrated, because he had won the Presidential Election of 1932 and had
convinced the American people that they should place their confidence in him.130 Scholars
contend that the Presidential Election results from 1932 signaled a resounding defeat for
the Republican party.131 It was their worst defeat in American history.
This presidential campaign had been bitter, but the American people had spoken.132
As a lame-duck, Hoover understood that his job would not end until March 4, 1933, but his
ability to act was limited.

On the evening of November 8, 1932, Hoover contacted

Roosevelt, and congratulated him on a hard-fought and difficult presidential campaign.133
Hoover now recognized that he had to work with Roosevelt in the remaining months of his
presidency. He knew that the transfer and transition of presidential power would be
difficult.
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Great Britain and France had been following the presidential election as well. They
were determined to resolve their economic problems and wanted to negotiate with Hoover
and Roosevelt in an effort to make a smooth transition between both administrations. The
British and French governments were aware of the importance of this presidential election,
and they wanted to have Hoover and Roosevelt excuse or renegotiate their foreign debts.
Thus, Roosevelt had to make some tough decisions, but he could wait out the British and
French governments. Roosevelt thought that it would be best to select his cabinet and
work on building stable coalitions so that his administration could implement policies once
he assumed the presidency.
In conclusion, following the Presidential Election of 1932 Hoover and Roosevelt
remained at an impasse. Both politicians continued to disagree, and Hoover did not
espouse the New Deal policies of Roosevelt. Hoover felt that Roosevelt would take the
United States along a difficult path and the Americans would suffer from Roosevelt’s
decision-making processes.134 Even in the mid-to-late 1930s, Hoover continued to argue
against the New Deal. The presidential election of 1932 was still in his heart and soul. He
would not forget his defeat and would not admit that he had caused the Great Depression.
The presidential campaign of 1932 benefited Roosevelt immensely, because of his
strategic planning and powerful speechmaking abilities. Hoover, who began his career in
global relief especially in Belgium, was a powerful politician and engineer but the Stock
Market Crash and Great Depression proved to be his undoing. Roosevelt, on the other
134
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hand, started as a state senator from New York State only to emerge as a dynamic speaker
and prolific policymaker as governor and president.

He surrounded himself with

individuals that enhanced his communication and administrative skills, and his networking
abilities proved to be formidable. But could Roosevelt deliver? This became an interesting
question for which American people had to ponder during an economic crisis that seemed
to be unending.
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Chapter 5: Hoover, The Economic Crisis and the Interregnum of 1932-1933

In his book, The F.D.R. Memoirs, Bernard Asbell painted a devastating picture of the
early stages of the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933. Using various sources (letters,
memoirs, memos), he argued that these years represented a turning point in American
history because of FDR’s presidential election victory. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt
had secured the Presidency on November 8, 1932, most Americans believed that he would
lead the nation in a positive direction. As Iowa State professor emeritus George McJimsey
wrote, “Roosevelt carried every state south and west of Pennsylvania and received 57
percent of the popular vote; the electoral vote was 472 to 59.”1 The electoral shift brought
the Democratic party to power, as Americans attempted to reconstruct their financial and
social lives and improve their prospects. The years between 1929 and 1933, however,
were difficult for American citizens, even as President Hoover and the President-Elect
Roosevelt sought to discover solutions to the economic crises and mitigate citizen
concerns.
Historian Jordan A. Schwarz has argued that Herbert Hoover had established a
reputation as a man who handled economic crises, but the Great Depression proved to be
his undoing.2 Why did Hoover fail? Hoover’s prior experiences as Food Administrator gave
many Americans confidence that he could address the concerns of ordinary people. In
response to the Depression, however, Hoover’s philosophy de-emphasized addressing
poverty. Instead, he sought indirect aid for the unemployed. By the second year of his
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Presidency, many felt that Hoover was in the employ of big business, not ordinary
American citizens. Jordan A. Schwarz argues, that Hoover during the initial stages of the
Great Depression was not “a do-nothing President,” but neither was the president suited
for the modern welfare state.3 Hoover did not repudiate the gold standard or the principles
of American Individualism and limited government. He held fast to these traditional beliefs
even though they no longer worked. Thus, Hoover held numerous conferences to address
the economic situation of 1929-1930 and discussed issues with voluntary or private
charities; but he did not commit the federal government to financial or material relief. He
saw federal intervention as “pork barrel” politics and did not want to promote a centralized
planning system or an expanded federal government.4 Because he did not directly address
the concerns of ordinary citizens, Hoover could not earn the confidence of the American
people; and he lost the Presidential Election of 1932 by a landslide.
This chapter will describe the period of Hoover’s administration and the months
between the 1932 election and FDR’s Presidential Inauguration. U.S. citizens struggled
immensely to make sense of this economic crisis while policymakers fought to develop
sound economic and fiscal strategies to resolve high unemployment. First, we will discuss
social conditions in the Midwest and along the eastern seaboard, as Americans attempted
to make ends meet during the first years of the Depression. Second, we will examine the
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banking crises of the early 1930s as a context for exploring the political environment and
the conflict of ideas between Hoover and the incoming President Roosevelt. I also examine
how the bank crisis affected Detroit and the responses from Henry Ford, James Couzens,
and Alfred P. Sloan Jr, and their reaction to the growing crisis.

I will discuss the

relationship between Hoover and Roosevelt before the Inauguration of March 4, 1933. This
changing of the guard was important, because it meant that Americans witnessed a
peaceful transfer of power during a difficult and conflict-filled period in United States’
history.
During the autumn months of 1932, Fortune magazine estimated that 34 million
men, women, and children were members of families that had full-time income.5 Between
thirteen and seventeen million Americans were unemployed in the United States during the
same time period.6 Asbell specifies that this figure did not include farmers, because the
numbers would have been higher. Production in the manufacturing sector had been
reduced by fifty percent; and fourteen million Americans remained unemployed during the
winter of 1932 and 1933.7
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Some Americans had experienced unemployment and poverty in the late 1920s, but
the Crash in 1929 made the situation more serious.

The decade of the 1920s had

experienced deflation, but ordinary citizens handled these problems with precision.8 The
Great Depression intensified the crisis conditions. In major urban centers in the United
States, homeless people established shantytowns, because families had lost their homes.9
Others, in an effort to avoid starvation, searched and scavenged for food. They examined
garbage cans in order to find food that had been thrown away.10
In Chicago during the early months of the Great Depression, principals told teachers
to ask their students if they had eaten, before they punished student behavior.11 After
1931, Chicago teachers like educators in other cities had not received their wages for
months; but they still felt obligated to feed hungry children in their classes.12 Former
Australian lawyer and politician Ronald William Gordon Mackay reported that 14,000
Chicago teachers had not been paid for over nine months.13 They did not have sufficient
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monetary resources, but this did not matter. In 1933, one quarter of Chicago residents
were receiving federal, state and local assistance, such as food and clothing. During the
summer months, Chicago superintendents asked the Federal government to step in to
ensure that no child was hungry during the summer when school was in recess. In New
York, teachers had many of the similar experiences. Feeding hungry children became the
calling of teachers. Public school teachers contributed $260,000 in a given month, so that
students could be fed on school grounds.14 Even as teachers fed students, the federal
government did not step in to relieve this crisis before 1933. Providing relief was the
responsibility of the private sector, not policymakers. New York residents, who were lucky
enough to be employed, donated one percent of their salaries, so that police officers could
purchase food to feed their families.

This money did not come from high-ranking

government officials, but from low-ranking public servants from New York neighborhoods
who just wanted to help.15
With the emergence of the Great Depression, many Americans suffered from
economic deprivation. Unemployment levels increased and many American corporations
began to cut work hours and lower wages among pre-existing employees. Hiring came to a
halt. Those workers with seniority were overworked while those who were unemployed
could not find new jobs.

Wages also declined.

For example, Ford Motor Company

increased wages to seven dollars per day for hourly workers in 1929, but by 1931, this
figure was cut to six dollars per day.16 Wages at Ford Motor did not rebound until 1935.
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Workers earned less and worked longer hours, and employers faced with declining
consumer demand worried about profits and the costs of production, as they worked to
strengthen their balance sheets.17

There were no guarantees that Americans would or

could purchase cars. Despite this decline, corporate executives often felt that improved
wages were not the answers to economic decay. Most Americans were not accustomed to
federal intervention,18 and corporate executives did not want the federal government to
tell them how to run business operations. Self-help organizations such as the Allen County
Unemployment Association (ACUA) formed, instead, to provide relief to ordinary citizens.19
During the Great Depression, state and local authorities continued to fund public
schools, but the resources had to come from somewhere. Students could not be left
behind.20 Some young people continued to receive training in post-secondary educational
facilities, because they were unemployed after high school graduation.21 Children who
might have left early continued to attend school during the crisis, in part, because there
were few jobs. Graduation rates began to increase for elementary and secondary schools.22
Colleges and universities also began to have budgeting problems. Institutions of higher
learning decided to decrease the wages of faculty, and curtail promotions.23 They did not
replace retired faculty members from 1930 to 1934, because of declining enrollment and
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nominal state support.24 Colleges and universities struggled to decrease their expenditures
because of funding issues. One thousand, three hundred and eighteen educational facilities
were closed in Georgia; and, in Akron, Ohio, teachers had unpaid wages of $330,000.25
State and local authorities, also, did not have the money to pay the salaries for public
workers.
An example that illustrates the deepening financial crisis was the closing of public
schools in Iowa. In Iowa, farmers paid taxes on their lands, which contributed to funding
schools. During the Great Depression, farmers stopped paying taxes, because the prices of
farm goods decreased exponentially causing farmers to lose money. Ninety-five percent of
remaining farm income was utilized for paying taxes, and when this system collapsed,
junior colleges and universities were closed.26 Farmers suffered from declining farm
income and their children lost the capacity to attend schools, because of a decreasing tax
base. Total farm income in the United States declined from $12 billion in 1929 to $5
billion.27 Equally significant, the average farm family that produced cash crops and other
agricultural goods earned about $273 annually in 1929.28
During the early Depression, Americans spent a majority of their time just
attempting to make ends meet.29 They continued to mend their clothing and did not
purchase new outerwear or apparel.30 Children ate less substantial meals. Some men were
no longer the sole breadwinners for their families while their women and children looked
24
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for work. In The Hungry Years, Tom H. Watkins argued that some Americans became apple
vendors on a full-time basis.31 But Census Bureau viewed apple sellers as employed fulltime, because they generated revenue from the sale of primary goods.32 When selling
apples did not work, some citizens committed acts of violence or other criminal activities to
avoid starvation and deprivation. Increased violence and theft occurred in many cities in
February 1933.
In Detroit, residents who suffered from high unemployment levels targeted grocery
stores, and stole food for themselves and their families. Many did not believe that their acts
were unjustified. According to the Census Bureau, 13.3 percent of the workforce, or 76,018
workers, had been unemployed in Detroit.33 Detroit had one of the highest unemployment
rates among larger cities in the United States during the 1930s. Asbell argued that, before
Roosevelt’s inauguration, there were many hunger riots in which mobs formed and citizens
attempted to press for social and economic change.34 They pressured the federal, state and
local authorities to act on their behalf, and to improve social conditions in Detroit and other
major cities.
Other examples of desperation occurred. In Iowa, unemployed residents who had
worked for the utility companies stole gas and electrical power. In difficult financial
situations, they were trying to keep their families warm and nurtured. Coal miners who
had lost their jobs used stolen coal, so that they could heat their homes and keep their
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children warm in the cold winter months. Moreover, in Minnesota, Iowa and Nebraska,
farmers got together and inhibited the sale of foreclosed farms.35 They were enormously
successful, even though farmers had lost their lands because of tax liens. Asbell cites the
case of the John Hanzel farm in Pennsylvania. His lands were auctioned off to the highest
bidder. But bidders were very clever and crafty. They decided to only sell the property for
a nominal amount. Thus, local farmers purchased the property for a few dollars during the
auction, and Hanzel was persuaded to accept this property back in the form of a rental
contract.36 Lastly, if there was an oversupply of some crops, then farmers destroyed
produce and livestock in an effort to increase the demand and price of those goods.37 Most
farmers during the Great Depression could not make ends meet. They used different
strategies, such as the destruction of crops or auctions, to turn difficult economic
conditions around.
In an effort to address poverty, some citizens established private charities and
foundations. In New York State, a Committee on Unemployment and Relief for Chemists and
Chemical Engineers was created.38 Members of this organization had, in the past, been
gainfully employed but some had become destitute. They had worked for high-scale
corporations; but now slept in railway cars. Another group, The Association of Unemployed
College Alumni, was established in New York City. It consisted of university graduates from
35
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schools such as Harvard and Columbia. Many of them had become dependent upon
government assistance and had been unemployed for a long period of time even though
they had earned college diplomas. Many also relied on relatives for financial support,
because most college graduates, that lived along the eastern seaboard, encountered some
difficulty finding employment.39
Private charities began to play a dynamic role in relieving the American low-andmiddle income classes from economic insolvency. McJimsey stated that, as early as 1930,
private charities began to raise money during their fundraising campaigns to assist with
relief programs.

The state public sector began to provide residents with financial

assistance. New York City, to use only one example, increased its relief expenditures, from
$13.6 million in 1930 to $79 million in 1932.”40 Although Hoover and other conservatives
believed in private efforts to address the crisis, the public sector had the resources to
contribute to everyday Americans. Only state and local institutions stepped in prior to
1933; but they could not keep pace with demand, because of the declining tax revenue.
Americans had been paying taxes to finance relief programs, but as unemployment rose
and the money dried up, residents could not fall back on institutions that they had financed
years earlier. McJimsey confirmed that the situation had become so dismal and dire that
relief workers could not provide financial and material assistance to families, unless they
had exhausted all of their sources of income. Private and public relief programs both were
poorly funded. This may have been the reason for the lack of local and state assistance to
families in need. Most citizens, however, did not believe in using private or public charities
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until they were completely destitute, without shelter and employment.41 The number of
families that turned to state and local relief is all the more telling, since many saw charity
as humiliating.
As domestic conditions deteriorated, there was a bank crisis in the United States and
worldwide that President Hoover had to address.

Approximately, twenty-two states

established bank holidays, and the various governors closed down all of their banks.42
Detroit, in 1933, as Amos Kiewe pointed out, faced difficult economic conditions, poverty,
and a bank crisis affected the city.43 Hoover, faced with these conditions, was uncertain as
to what type of response was satisfactory. He discussed the situation with Secretary of
Commerce, Roy D. Chapin, and Treasury Undersecretary, Arthur A. Ballantine.44 They were
sent to Detroit in February of 1933 to have a meeting with Henry Ford at his Fairlane
residence. They understood that Henry Ford had the capital and industrial know-how.
They believed that Henry Ford could provide the banks with capital and other financial
resources if needed.
Both policymakers tried to secure a loan of $7.5 million from Ford Motor Company
for the Detroit Union Guardian Trust Company and the Detroit Bankers Group.45 Just prior
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to this, Detroit Union Guardian Trust Company had secured two loans from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation but the bank remained economically insolvent, and
the RFC had other banks to address.46 This loan would have revitalized these banks. Ford
Motor Company owned and operated both banks while James Couzens was the founder of
Highland Park State Bank and Bank of Detroit. Both of the latter two banks had merged
into one and became the Guardian Union National Bank of Commerce.47 The Federal
government wanted to enlist economic support from Ford Motor Company, which had
been performing fairly well during this crisis.
Henry Ford poured many millions of dollars into his banks, but the Detroit Union
Guardian Trust company owed about 14 million dollars to its creditors in late 1932. It had
no more than six million dollars in convertible assets against deposit liabilities and
borrowings of approximately twenty million dollars, a shortage of at least fourteen million
dollars.48 In January 1933, the RFC started the application process for the trust company
in an effort to approve a 65 million dollar loan, but the bank only had 37 million dollars in
collateral. The loan was not approved. At this time, President Herbert Hoover sought to
obtain the financial support of Henry Ford and James Couzens. Neither Henry Ford nor
Senator James Couzens of Michigan thought that the crisis could be abated. They refused to
extend their assistance to prevent the bank from failing. Henry Ford stated vehemently to
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federal policymakers Arthur A. Ballantine and Roy D. Chapin that neither he nor James
Couzens could not resolve this banking crisis singlehandedly.49
Henry Ford contributed to the banks’ instability, because he threatened to withdraw
his funds if the bank executives did not open for business. This was a legitimate threat.
Henry Ford had 7.5 million dollars in the trust company, 32 million dollars in the Guardian
National Bank of Commerce, and 20 million dollars in the First National Bank of Detroit.50
If Henry Ford withdrew his funds from all three banks, then the banks would lose millions
of dollars in capital and liquid assets. It was even more important, because during the
banking crisis, liquidity was problematic, and banknotes and gold were in short supply. In
order to prevent Ford from carrying out his threat, F. Gloyd Awalt, who served as acting
Comptroller of the Currency, declared a bank holiday.51

Michigan Governor William

Comstock on February 14, 1933, also instituted a ten day statewide bank holiday.52
The role of Henry Ford in the bank crisis of 1933 has continued to attract attention.
Clarence J. Huddleston, who was aligned with James Couzens and Henry Ford during the
Great Depression, provided readers with some insight about their roles regarding the
banking crisis in an interview on February 12, 1968.53 Detroit Union Guardian Trust
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Company was a Ford Bank. Ford Motor Company played a dynamic role in the daily
operations of this bank, but why did Ford choose not to provide the bank with financing
during the crisis if this was the case? Moreover, was Henry Ford a stockholder in this bank,
because Huddleston affirmed that Ford and Couzens owned other banks such as Highland
Park State Bank.54 Initially, Henry Ford had been a stockholder at Highland Park State
Bank, but Huddleston stated that Henry Ford got out immediately and Couzens stayed on to
conduct its public business.
Although Henry Ford and his Ford Motor Company suffered from the slow effects of
the Bank Crisis and the Great Depression, Henry Ford attempted to maintain wages and
work hours for all of his employees regardless of the crisis. Moreover, the Model A, which
was the second mass-produced car offered by the company, was reduced in price in an
effort to make it more affordable.55 Henry and Edsel Ford believed that it was important to
reduce the prices of their vehicles, not their quality or value. They were determined to
offer a low-priced vehicle that was competitive with the other American cars. Henry and
Edsel Ford were adamant that work shifts were not to be reduced nor should workers be
subjected to massive lay-offs. Ford Motor Company, in an effort to make his vehicles more
affordable, established a payment plan that enabled Americans to pay for their cars over
time or gradually. General Motors already had instituted a similar program, but Edsel Ford
thought that this plan would work wonders toward eliminating the Great Depression.56
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During the Great Depression, Ford Motor Company started out paying its workers
between five to seven dollars per day.57 Clearly, this promoted social mobility during a
period of economic distress; at the same time, the company also cut its workforce.
Employment at Ford Motor Company dropped dramatically during the beginning of the
1930s. In March 1929, the number of employed workers at Ford was 122,680 but this
statistic declined to 100,500 by December 1929.58
On March 7, 1932, Communist organizers headed by John Schmies and Albert Goetz
in Detroit held a rally called the Ford Hunger March59. Between three to five thousand
demonstrators walked from downtown Detroit to the Rouge plant in Dearborn, and they
had a long list of demands.60 Most notably, they stressed that all laid-off employees should
be rehired. They demanded fifty percent of their full wages, a seven hour day without a
decrease in their take-home pay; and they wanted to eliminate the speed-up of the
assembly line. Per shift, demonstrators suggested that workers should receive two fifteen
minute breaks, an end to racial discrimination in hiring, and an end to foreclosures on the
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homes of former Ford employees’ property.61 Lastly, they wanted to curtail the use of the
security forces at Ford Motor Company.

The march was a watershed in American

industrial history, because workers fought for social change and mobility. But the event
turned violent and deadly. Five men, including Joe York, Joe Russell, Joe DeBlasio, Coleman
Leny and Curtis Williams were killed by Dearborn and Detroit police as well the Ford
Security guards that were involved in suppressing the demonstration.62 Days afterward,
more than seventy thousand former Ford employees participated in the funeral march to
celebrate the lives of the fallen, and Joe Rushing, Chairman of the Young Communist League
and others demanded punishment for those responsible for the violence.63
Many former Ford employees and Communist sympathizers felt that Hoover and
Roosevelt had let them down.

Other unemployed Americans were determined and

continued to lobby for the Workers Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill H.R. 7598.
This act would have provided financial compensation equal to the average weekly wages
and give families ten dollars per dependent each week. But the Ford Hunger March
somewhat damaged the international status of the Ford family, because of the use of
security forces at the Rouge to quiet labor discontent. Many Americans suffered from the
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Great Depression but Ford Motor Company took some necessary steps to alleviate the
worst effects of the economic crisis. Henry and Edsel Ford traveled to Washington, D.C.,
along with other American industrial leaders to confer with President Herbert Hoover and
discuss ways to end the Great Depression. They were not successful, because of conflicting
viewpoints, but some applauded these corporate executives for making any effort to
discuss the issues of manufacturing in the United States and the plight of the American
worker.
In Detroit, General Motors experienced financial and industrial decline with the
Great Crash of 1929 and the onset of Great Depression. It had to close some plants and
lower its corporate stock values.64 At that time, Sloan had been president for over five
years. He had the intellectual know-how to produce vehicles that improved upon GM’s
market-share and earn a substantial profit from car sales.65 Sloan eventually built an
automotive empire at General Motors Corporation. He was noted as an industrial icon, who
had worked his way into the higher echelons of the company and served as president and
chairman from 1923 to 1956.66 Sloan incorporated some aspects of Fordism to reform
GM’s industrial capacity, such as the use of interchangeable parts. General Motors had just
surpassed Ford Motor Company in 1927 in terms of market-share.67 Its Chevy line up won
the favor of American consumers. The Chevy was an inexpensive vehicle, but it had solid
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features that appealed to ordinary Americans who looked to acquire a new standard of
living for their families.
Despite his success at GM, Sloan did not predict the Great Crash of 1929, as historian
David Farber argues. Both Sloan and his company were unprepared for the economic
event. Sloan did not sell any of his personal stock holdings in GM nor any of his other
companies before or after the crisis.68 Farber writes that Sloan’s reactions to the crisis
were not recorded, and scholars do not know or understand his motivations regarding Wall
Street during this period. Those who had a greater stake in Wall Street experienced a sharp
decline in disposable income, and their standards of living were hampered for the short
term. Whether Sloan had personal losses because of the Great Crash of 1929 is unknown.69
After 1929, Sloan began to examine sales projections and other key indicators to
determine market demand. He did not want to experience the same corporate failure as
William Durant did, in 1920, when he was forced to resign, because of his stock market
speculations. By contrast, Sloan has been described by many as a calculated risk taker. He
ensured that he did his research, and the data drove his decision-making.70 While Ford
handled the Stock Market crisis by reducing his car prices so that sales volumes increased,
Sloan knew that increased sales did not always mean profitability. The data told GM
executives where to place their money.
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produced too many vehicles that the market could not absorb. Sales were down.71 While
sales were disheartening to Sloan,72 small automotive companies fared worse than GM and
Ford Motor Company. They could not compete with these two economic giants, and they
were forced from the automobile market by the crisis. By 1929, the Big Three already
controlled more than 75 percent of the industry’s market-share.73 The Great Depression
further consolidated car companies, and Big Three became dominant in years after the
Great Crash. Only twelve other smaller firms remained in the market by the end of the
1930s, and they slowly lost ground.74
By the early 1930s, GM sales were increasingly strong and rebounding.
Policymakers on Capitol Hill attempted to increase excise gasoline taxation to improve
upon its revenue base and tap into the resources of automobile owners. Much of GM’s
workforce had been laid-off because of the economic downturn.75 During this period, the
tax bases in many states had declined.

Additional revenue was needed to sponsor

increased government expenditures. Sloan had been a member of the National Automobile
Chamber of Commerce (NACC), and he served on the taxation committee.76 Sloan opposed
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increases in gasoline taxes.

He felt that the federal government was penalizing the

automotive industry for performing fairly well in the private sector. Edsel Ford, who
served as president of the Lincoln division, was against the tax bill. He did not join Sloan
and other industry leaders in fighting the tax bill. Consequently, Congress approved the
Revenue Act in early 1932.77 This new act was proposed to generate revenue to finance the
construction of new roads and streets, and employ road crews. The federal government
earned one cent in taxation for every gallon of gasoline that consumers purchased.78
Scholars have remained divided about the impact of the new act. Did it led to highway
construction and better road conditions or higher employment? This issue has not been
examined thoroughly to decide the effectiveness of this law.
In speeches throughout 1932, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. argued that there was a lack of
confidence among American consumers since the crash. The Bank Crisis of 1931-1933 also
loomed large in public speeches. In a press release dated July 19, 1932, Sloan asserted that
production figures for GM were down. Prices for GM vehicles and other industry products
had decreased before 1934 as there was an oversupply of automobiles and a slower
market.79 Sloan argued that tax cuts were the answer for all Americans, because it would
put more disposable income in their pockets. Sloan’s proposition that tax cuts were
necessary in 1932 has resonance among conservative policymakers in more contemporary
Michigan money and improve upon their balance sheets. Consolidation would lead to centralization of many local
government entities.
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times, but it was economic orthodoxy in 1932. In the 1930s, policymakers and corporate
executives in American industries argued for a reduction in the tax rate, because they
argued that it created more jobs in the private sector. But what about social programs and
public expenditures? If Americans could not work, then should they receive financial
support from the public sector? During Hoover’s presidency, public assistance was not the
dominant practice in the United States.80
Along with Detroit and other Midwestern cities, New York, the financial haven for
Wall Street, experienced similar financial difficulties. The Bank of the United States, which
had over $200 million in deposits and other monetary assets, collapsed; and the New York
clearing houses would not step in to increase its liquidity.81 Hoover, in his memoirs,
contended that the American banking system already was weakened by the late 1920s.
There were too many banks in the United States and many did not belong to the Federal
Reserve System. Only about one-third belonged to the Federal Reserve. As Hoover wrote,
“in 1929, there were about 25,000 commercial banks, trust companies and savings banks
entrusted with the people’s deposits. Of the commercial banks, 7,500 were national banks
and 14,300 state banks.”82 These banks lacked sufficient monetary resources to conduct
their day-to-day operations. Hoover argued that “more than 3,500 had less than $100,000
capital and of these, some 1,500 had less than $25,000 capital.”83 There was not enough
capital held in banks for depositors. For that reason, after the Crash of 1929, citizens had a
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strong inclination to hoard cash. They did not believe that their assets were safe and
secure in private banks.84
The Federal government’s approach toward resolving this bank crisis under Hoover
was not sufficient. Members of the Hoover administration, such as Treasury Secretary
Mellon, believed that the federal government should not become involved or try to create
fixes to the national economy. Mellon believed that the only way to save the banks was to
let them collapse.85 Further, Mellon believed the crisis would purge and eliminate the
“rottenness” from the national economy. He was, however, countered by Undersecretary of
the Treasury Mills, Governor Young of the Reserve Board, Secretary of Commerce Lamont,
and Agriculture Secretary Hyde. Along with President Hoover, these men believed that the
Federal government should act to resolve the crisis. Even so, the Federal government acted
only indirectly. It did not provide relief to everyday citizens under Hoover, but rather it
sought to strengthen financial and commercial institutions in an effort to promote job
growth. In his memoirs, Hoover defended his choices for defined indirect versus direct
relief. He stated that:
At the outset, I must clarify a distinction between direct relief and indirect relief.
Direct relief means relief given directly to individuals or families through charitable,
local, county, municipal or state action. Indirect relief comprises Federal and state
public works, together with stimulation of private construction, the spreading of
work, restriction of immigration, government financial measures to support private
employment and actin in the foreign field.86
Hoover added that indirect relief consisted of federally-funded public works projects, such
as construction work. He called one form of indirect relief non-productive public works,
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which consisted of roads, buildings, and harbor modifications. The second form of indirect
relief was “productive works” that were financed by the public and private sectors. Private
businesses, for example, received government loans to begin the hiring process at their
firms and improve upon employment. Still due to the extent of the crisis, Hoover sent aid
in the form of 85,000,000 bushels of wheat and 500,000 bales of cotton to the Red Cross for
distribution to deprived families during the Bank Crisis of the early 1930s.87
In his memoirs, Hoover recalled that he contacted the nation’s governors and
mayors to ask them to expand upon their public works programs. Thus, Hoover did act;
but many citizens viewed him coldly, because he did not provide the direct relief or support
to the low-to-middle classes. Rather, Hoover held conferences in Washington, D.C., with
labor leaders and private relief organizations from throughout the country.88 In line with
his belief in cooperative labor relations, he sought to eliminate strikes, to sustain wages,
and to get employers to provide relief to their workers and work-sharing. His policies
supported relief, financed by the private sector, not by federal institutions.

Hoover

promoted instead local and state relief. Control over federal funds for relief was to be
transferred to state and local entities.

The question that policymakers had to ask

themselves was whether the federal government should allocate resources directly to the
low-to-middle classes rather than local and state governments? Hoover felt that local and
state institutions had better information about its residents and understood their needs.
However, Hoover argued that individual and family relief was not the issue, but the
organization of resources and assistance was the subject of discussion among American
policymakers. Thus, Hoover decided that federal institutions should be called upon for
87
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assistance only after exhausting all of the resources from local and state entities. The states
and its various cities understood the needs of its citizens.89
As Hoover fought to address the economic crisis with domestic and international
policies, ordinary Americans looked for stronger leadership from the office of the
presidency. Some scholars argue that Hoover did not fill this void, and Americans began to
look toward Governor Roosevelt of New York State, the Democratic party candidate, as the
answers to their prayers. On November 8, 1932, Roosevelt won the presidency in a
landslide victory over Hoover. Roosevelt did not, however, assume the Office of the
Presidency until March 4, 1933.90 In the interim, Hoover was determined to obtain the
assistance and advice of Roosevelt.

Hoover sought to bring Roosevelt up-to-date on

domestic and foreign policy issues. He was determined to provide Roosevelt with the
necessary slant on the major concerns to promote a smooth transition of power. However,
Hoover realized that Roosevelt’s time was limited. Roosevelt was still the Governor for the
State of New York and had to fulfill his duties until March 4, 1933. Moreover, Hoover knew
that Roosevelt had public opinion on his side, because of his overwhelming electoral
victory in the 1932 Presidential Election. Roosevelt carried the popular vote as well. But
he worried about aligning himself closely with the Hoover administration.
After the Presidential Election of 1932, Hoover sought to assist Great Britain with its
economic woes.91 Great Britain wanted to remain financially solvent, but it did not want to
return to a metallic standard. In November 1932, Hoover received notification from
89
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debtors in Europe that foreign policymakers sought to defer their loan payments until
December 15, 1932.92 Hoover telegrammed Roosevelt to see if he wanted to become a part
of the policymaking discussions.93 In order to simplify this debt crisis, Hoover sought to tie
the British debt resolution to a re-establishment of a metallic standard in that country.94
Roosevelt issued a statement that concluded that each debtor nation should be examined
individually, because each nation was distinct and could not be treated the same.95
Roosevelt’s statement was unsettling to Hoover, who sought linkages among the European
debtor nations. He saw Roosevelt’s distancing as a problem. On two occasions only
Roosevelt’s team decided to make visits to the White House to confer with Hoover.
By this time, Hoover sought to have Roosevelt make a link between the maintenance
of a metallic standard and debt payment from Europe.96 In response, Roosevelt argued that
metallic standards and the debt crisis in Europe should not be linked.97 Hoover conflicted
with Roosevelt’s approach to economic policy, because he argued that the European crisis
92
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created economic instability at home. Thus, two meetings were scheduled for November
22, 1932 and January 20, 1933 to discuss the economic situation in Europe.98 Economist
Raymond Moley and Norman Davis, who served as a delegate of the Geneva Disarmament
Conference, along with Roosevelt met with Hoover on both occasions. They refused to
cater to Hoover’s demands to link foreign and domestic economic policies. Hoover further
wanted Roosevelt to assist him in the establishment of a special delegation.99 He had an
inclination to press Roosevelt to choose individuals who could negotiate with European
nations, especially Great Britain, who wanted its debts excused.100 Both Hoover and
Roosevelt were internationalists, but President-Elect Roosevelt sought to examine
domestic conditions and propagate national, not foreign policies.
In the interregnum, according to Amos Kiewe, Hoover sought to prevent Roosevelt
from abandoning a metallic standard and devaluing the greenback, because it increased
domestic prices for primary and manufactured goods.101 Hoover further gave high priority
to monetary policy and exchange rates, because they served as the life-blood for his
economic and fiscal strategies internationally.102
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between the President and President-Elect was most heated.103

Hoover wanted to

maintain a metallic standard, while Roosevelt sought to eliminate gold as the principal
medium of exchange and legal tender.104 Hoover believed that a return to a metallic
standard in Europe could occur if Great Britain and France paid their debts.105 He believed
that a metallic standard contributed to sound monetary and fiscal policies. Roosevelt took
a different approach. He did not link debt repayment with a metallic standard, but he
sought to establish domestic policies that put America first.
After the first meeting on November 22, 1932, Roosevelt issued a public statement.
Although Hoover was aware of the statement, he also issued a press release announcing
that the meeting had taken place.106 In Roosevelt’s message, he thanked Hoover and his
staff for their hospitality and kindness; but he disagreed with Hoover on the steps that
should have been taken regarding foreign debts. Roosevelt believed that a creditor nation
should make the effort to maintain regular contact with its debtors. Both Hoover and
Roosevelt were convinced that the Western European countries were intent upon paying
their debts, and that nothing should deter them from accomplishing this goal.107 However,
Roosevelt felt that Congress could not impede him from establishing relations and signing
103
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financial treaties with other nations, including those who defaulted on loan payments.
Thus, Roosevelt asserted publically that:
No action by the Congress has limited or can limit the constitutionality of the
President to carry on diplomatic contacts or conversations with foreign
governments. The advantage of this method of maintaining contacts with foreign
governments is that any one of the debtor nations may at any time bring to the
attention of the government of the United States new conditions and facts affecting
any phase of its indebtedness. It is equally true that existing debt agreements are
unalterable saved by Congressional action.108
Roosevelt and Hoover accepted treaties. Once treaties have been negotiated and signed,
they could not be altered without Congressional approval. In the context of the ongoing
crisis, Great Britain and France wanted to change some of the provisions of their loans. But
these provisions first had to be approved by their own governing bodies. In contrast to
Hoover, Roosevelt had a sophisticated understanding of the political dynamics.
In terms of establishing his impact on foreign policy as President-Elect, Roosevelt
would not comply or act further. He argued that he would not become president until
March 4, 1933.109 His status allowed him political cover to refuse to endorse Hoover’s
policies. Hoover defended the maintenance of a metallic standard and the importance of
balancing the budget as essential for economic independence.110 This political impasse
proved difficult to resolve and led them to endorse different policies.
In February of 1933, just a month before FDR’s inauguration, the bank situation
grew worse. Large quantities of gold and greenbacks had been withdrawn from banks in
the United States.111 As historian Amos Kiewe asserted, “the Federal Reserve Branch in
108
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New York saw its gold reserves reaching the low level of nearly 22 percent. On February
24, 1933, William Woodin, the Treasury Secretary-Elect, was clearly worried over the run
on the banks.”112 Hoover responded differently to this economic crisis. He attempted to
use his political power to convince the incoming president Roosevelt to change his public
stance and endorse preexisting policies. Roosevelt did not want to espouse Hoover’s
insistence on maintaining gold standard and appeared uncertain about how to handle the
European debt crisis and the German moratorium. This caused him to select members of
his cabinet that could advise him on foreign policy such as Cordell Hull who became his
Secretary of State.
On February 27, 1933, Roosevelt sent Woodin to confer with President Hoover and
Secretary of the Treasury Mills.113 At this time, Roosevelt had refused to issue a policy
statement. It became Woodin’s job to listen to the discussions and to suggest policy
solutions. Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan believed that Roosevelt’s approach was not
enough. He urged the president-elect to do more and issue a statement. Roosevelt finally
did in March 1933. Roosevelt stated publicly that, once in office, he would cut the budget
by 25 percent, balance the federal budget and cut government expenditures as
president.114 Hoover sent Mills another memo on March 1, 1933, in an effort to have him
persuade Roosevelt to issue more public statements about the bank crisis, but only if
Roosevelt supported Hoover’s policies. Hoover did not want the national economy to
destabilize, but he was concerned about Roosevelt’s aims. This political and economic
impasse between Hoover and Roosevelt was not resolved. Roosevelt also did not want to
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lose creditability by becoming a spokesperson for Republican policies with which he did
not agree and which failed to achieve their end.115
Until inauguration day, Hoover and Roosevelt continued to correspond, but there
was no consensus on foreign economic policy between both individuals. Europe still faced
dire economic circumstances. Roosevelt would not become involved and he focused on
selecting his cabinet. He wanted an administrative team in place that could address the
growing bank crisis and other American economic emergencies once in office.
Roosevelt worked toward a smooth transition of Presidential and administrative power.
He felt that it was necessary to select a team that would enhance his policymaking
decisions and augment his political agenda. In terms of Roosevelt’s cabinet, the PresidentElect sought to establish links with both liberal and conservative Democrats and also
progressive Republicans. He appointed both Democrats and Republicans to serve in his
cabinet. He further sought to select individuals who were respectable and had garnered
some support among colleagues. As historian George McJimsey writes, for Secretary of
Agriculture, he chose Henry A. Wallace, who was a key figure that specialized in
agricultural economic policy.116 Despite his Republican background, Wallace examined but
did not support the farm policies of Hoover, even though Wallace’s father had had sound
political connections and had served in the Harding and Coolidge administrations.
Roosevelt was familiar with his politics and felt that Wallace would make sound political
decisions and support his farm policies.
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More importantly, Roosevelt made an unprecedented move by selecting a colleague
that he worked with during his years as Governor of New York State: Frances Perkins.117
Perkins became the Secretary of Labor, which was an increasingly important
administrative position, especially during the crisis of unemployment.

Perkins was

instrumental in the creation and implementation of the NIRA in May and June of 1933. She
became the first female to serve as a member of a presidential cabinet.118 Mary Dewson,
who served as the Chairwoman of the Democratic Woman’s Committee persuaded
Roosevelt and supported the decision to make this crucial selection.119 Perkins came highly
qualified and she had worked with Roosevelt in New York as an Industrial Commissioner,
so he understood her credentials.120
Similarly, Roosevelt selected Senator Carter Glass of Virginia to become the
Secretary of the Treasury in an effort to satisfy Bernard Baruch, a member of Roosevelt’s
Brains Trust.

Baruch was conservative, and the selection of Glass appeased the

conservative section of the Democratic party. Glass was a proponent of bank reforms and
the gold standard. He agreed to take the position only if Roosevelt promised to remain on
the gold standard. This selection proved unworkable, because Roosevelt would not commit
117
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himself toward remaining on any metallic standard. Roosevelt chose, instead, William H.
Woodin who had substantial knowledge and experience with international commerce and
the railroad sector. Woodin was committed to Roosevelt, and Roosevelt felt reassured that
Woodin would not let him down. This also satisfied conservative Democrats, because
Woodin had been a Republican businessman and served as president of American Car and
Foundry Company.121 He also supported Roosevelt as Governor and during his Presidential
campaign in 1932.
Roosevelt chose Cordell Hull, who served as a United States Senator from
Tennessee, as his Secretary of the State.122 Hull had considerable foreign policy experience,
and sound political and diplomatic background.

Roosevelt felt his appointment was

necessary to achieve his foreign policy goals.123 Further, Hull believed in transparency and
accountability at the State Department.124

United States Senator Claude Swanson of

Virginia became his Secretary of the Navy. This selection really benefited the Roosevelt
administration because, as Swanson left the Senate to become Secretary of the Navy,
Senator Key Pittman of Nevada became the Chair of the Foreign Relations committee. This
selection enabled Roosevelt to work on foreign policy and to avoid the policy mistakes of
the Hoover administration.
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For the Departments of the Interior and Justice, Roosevelt had been determined to
select progressive Republicans, but they were difficult positions to fill. For the Interior,
Roosevelt was inclined toward Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico. Roosevelt wanted
Cutting, as George McJimsey writes, because:
Cutting had supported Roosevelt in the election, had a long and consistent
progressive voting record, shared Roosevelt’s Groton and Harvard background, and
was his fourth cousin. The senator had sponsored public works legislation, and
Roosevelt intended to give the Interior authority over public works projects.125
Cutting, however, refused to accept the position, and so did Roosevelt’s next choice, Senator
Hiram Johnson of California; but Johnson recommended Harold Ickes, because he had
supported Theodore Roosevelt’s “Third-party bid in 1912.”126 Ickes had considerable
knowledge of administrative budgeting and practiced financial frugality in government.
Next, Roosevelt selected the head of the Justice department. For Attorney General,
he considered many individuals as possible candidates. Philip LaFollette, who had served
as a Governor of Wisconsin, was an obvious choice. He was the son of Robert M. LaFollette,
a Governor, Senator and progressive candidate for the presidency. Roosevelt felt, however,
that he had to reward the Democratic United States Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana
with the position. Walsh had worked under the Harding administration, served as a
member of Roosevelt’s Presidential campaign and had worked at the Chicago Democratic
convention. Walsh passed away before Inauguration Day. Thus, Roosevelt appointed
Homer S. Cummings Attorney General. The Commerce position went to Daniel Roper of
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California; George Dern of Utah became the Secretary of War, and James A. Farley became
the Postmaster General.

Roosevelt made cabinet selections that displayed his

bipartisanship and confidence. He was determined to avoid the mistakes of the Hoover
administration and felt that his cabinet could advise him on domestic and foreign policies
necessary to turn the country around.

Similarly, Roosevelt’s Brains Trust played an

important part in decision-making. He realized that he needed them and his cabinet
members to devise sound policy measures.
While Roosevelt assembled his cabinet selections, he continued to correspond with
Hoover. Their relationship had become very cold. On March 3, 1933, Herbert Hoover
performed one of his last presidential acts when he had a news conference with the
media.127 He thanked them for their support and service. He believed that they had
attempted to keep the American people informed about his public policies and presidential
policy agendas. He admitted that he did not always agree with the tactics that the media
used in order to bring political news to the forefront, but he believed that their efforts had
benefited the American people. During this public meeting, Hoover wanted to tell them
that he appreciated their service.128
By Inauguration Day, however, Hoover and Roosevelt were not speaking to one
another. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his wife Eleanor made it to the White House at 11
am on March 4, 1933.129 They did speak with the Hoovers, but the conversation was
basically polite. There was enormous tension between Roosevelt and Hoover. They both
127
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had their own policy aims, and they seemed to move in opposite directions. Hoover felt
that Roosevelt was taking the American people down the wrong path, but there was
nothing that he could do. Roosevelt sought to avoid the mistakes of his predecessor. He
believed that Hoover had forgotten about ordinary Americans. It was too late for Hoover
and Roosevelt to change their political framework. “After the swearing-in ceremony,
Roosevelt gave his first presidential speech to the American people.”130 He began his
inaugural address by assuring his audience that the “nation will endure as it has endured,
will revive and prosper.” In his first assertion, Roosevelt confirmed that “the only thing we
have to fear is fear itself.”
In his Inauguration speech, Roosevelt asserted that the United States had
experienced much turmoil; but it would endure as it had done throughout its history.131 As
Cordell Hull recalled, Roosevelt realized that high unemployment levels were problematic
and that he would be foolish to not recognize the difficult times that this country was
witnessing.132 Citizens had lost confidence in federal, state, and local authorities, and
Roosevelt sought to change their political and economic outlook. In a break with tradition,
Roosevelt believed that traditional forms of monetary policy that American and foreign
bankers practiced, misused public credit.

Massive foreign loans, not stock market

speculation, were the reasons for the emergence of the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great
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Depression.133 He believed that the only way to restore confidence in American financial
institutions and businesses in the public and private sectors was to get people back to
work. Wages had to be augmented, and work hours shortened.134 The purchasing power
of Americans had to be increased, so that the national economy became consumer based or
oriented. Stretching American purchasing power also enabled consumers to acquire more
manufactured goods, because their banknotes had more value in the national economy.
Further, cut-throat competition among multinational corporations had to be curtailed,
because as the prices of manufactured goods decreased, wages and benefits were
weakened and workers suffered.135
Roosevelt’s election victory and Inauguration were watersheds in American history
as well as a turning point in contemporary politics. Roosevelt believed in his New Deal for
all Americans. Roosevelt would not commit himself to a metallic standard. He sought to
inflate the greenback, but he did so because he felt that this would strengthen foreign trade.
Roosevelt sought to work with foreign governments, but he would not commit himself to
Hoover’s policies as a President-Elect. Moreover, Roosevelt believed in a substantial
amount of government planning and intervention for the national economy. By contrast,
Hoover argued for self-help and self-reliance. While Hoover did not evolve his social
policies as the Depression kicked into high gear, Roosevelt focused on ordinary Americans
and was determined to fight for their financial, social and political rights.
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CHAPTER 6: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE DEVELOPMENT AND
PASSAGE OF THE AAA AND THE NIRA DUIRNG THE ONE HUNDRED DAYS

In March of 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed the Oval Office, and he was
prepared for the crisis that befell him. The national economy was in turmoil, and the
industrial sectors of the United States experienced stagnant growth.1 Roosevelt remained
optimistic. He realized that American citizens should not fear for the future but must
embrace it.

As indicated earlier, the nation faced difficult economic and industrial

conditions. But could Roosevelt deliver? Could he turn the nation’s economic troubles
around for the betterment of American and global citizens? Many citizens who had become
destitute, because of the Crash of 1929 and experienced deprivation looked to the new
president for answers. It did not take long for Roosevelt to respond, and he responded in a
positive way. Throughout Roosevelt’s first One Hundred Days, he was a man with a
purpose.2 He handled the Bank Crisis and passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the
National Industrial Recovery Act. This chapter seeks to examine these important laws and
illustrate how they transformed the United States into a powerful nation.
The chapter will analyze two specific laws: the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the
National Industrial Recovery Act. I will discuss at length the components of both laws and
how they altered the American landscape. This chapter will not examine the congressional
hearings that paved the way for both laws, but will argue that each act was devised to
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address an economic emergency in the farm and industrial sectors in the United States.3
Neither law was perfect, but they were unprecedented in their approach to address the
complex problems of a modern capitalist economy.
Americans lacked confidence in the political process as the bank crisis loomed
following the Great Crash of 1929. Roosevelt understood that he had to provide Americans
with answers to their financial problems, and resolving the bank crisis was the first step in
that direction.4 This led Roosevelt to speak early on to the American people and let them
know that he had not forgotten about the common man.

President Franklin Delano

Roosevelt gave his famous radio address on March 12, 1933, at 10 pm.5 He explained that
the bank crisis started, because of a lack of confidence in the financial sector and the
absence of liquidity.6 These fears of bank failures led ordinary Americans to withdraw gold
and currency from banks and secure it in their homes.7 Roosevelt contended that many
governors had established bank holidays, but it had become necessary to issue a national
bank holiday so that the liquidity of banks, in terms of their reserve requirements, could be
tested and the public reassured.8 Roosevelt argued that there was bipartisan support for
the bank holiday. Once it ended, there would be business as usual at all American banks.
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Moreover, Roosevelt asserted that this extraordinary measure was a necessary step to put
American banks on sound financial ground.
With this in mind, Congress enacted new two laws, the Emergency Banking Act and
the Bank Conservation Act, to give Federal Reserve banks and their counterparts the
opportunity to issue currency after the acceptance of collateral and other financial assets
from consumers and to reopen banks throughout the United States.9 State and national
banks would reopen after the Federal government conducted stress tests to determine
their assets and other monetary resources.10 As part of the process, the modern dollar
came into existence. With these new laws, the dollar became legal tender in the United
States and in global system. Roosevelt continued to stress that banks would reopen
following the bank holiday, but all banks would not open for business at the same time. He
wanted to ensure that when the banks opened, they would be economically solvent. Some
banks reopened in a later period, after they had been reorganized and more stress tests
had been performed.11 If Americans were still uncertain about the bank situation in the
United States, then they could withdraw their currency or gold: and banks would have the
financial capacity to meet their needs. Roosevelt stressed that banks would be ready
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following the bank holiday and that Americans should be reassured that their hard-earned
money would be safe, whatever decision that they made.12
Additionally, on March 10, 1933, Roosevelt issued executive order 6073, which
enabled banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System and independent
institutions to re-open and conduct business transactions.13 The executive order allowed
banks to open for business, but corporate bank officials could not conduct transactions that
allowed gold to change hands. Banks no longer had the capacity to trade gold or exchange
dollars for gold.14 This shift was an important step toward the devaluation of the dollar,
because the United States no longer used the gold standard under which specie could flow
in and out of the country on a regular basis based upon the volume of banknotes in
circulation.15 Paper currency and gold were no longer linked, and members of U.S. banks
had to operate under these new conditions. Further, the Federal Reserve System was given
a greater role as a bank regulator, and American banks had to follow the stipulations of the
executive order, which was enforced by the Federal Reserve System.16
With his executive orders, first fireside chat, and other communications, Roosevelt
reassured the American people that the Great Depression could be handled.17 Public
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confidence in the Presidency was restored.18

Citizens began to write Roosevelt to offer

their support and sometimes to question his political motivations.

The Franklin D.

Roosevelt Presidential library preserved some 15 million letters from constituents and
millions more are on file at the National Archives.19 These letters provide some measure of
the president’s effectiveness at getting his message across about the New Deal. Many
Americans were listening to the President give speeches via the radio. At the beginning of
Roosevelt‘s Presidency, 62 percent of households had a radio: and this number increased
to 90 percent by the end of his Presidency. With technology, Roosevelt spoke to Americans
in their living rooms and provided them with useful information about public policy
initiatives.20
Roosevelt’s first fireside chat comforted Americans regarding the bank crisis. Runs
on banks persuaded many Americans to have assets at home for tough times. Viola
Hazelberger from Minneapolis, Minnesota, wrote that, after hearing Roosevelt’s address on
the radio, she decided not to withdraw her funds from the bank.21 Roosevelt had earned
her confidence even though she was not certain that her money was still safe in the bank.
In addition, she mentioned that, as a high school student, she was concerned with the
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national economy, because she expected to join the ranks of workers.

Like other

Americans, she found the president’s message reassuring.22
For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, ordinary Americans believed that their
money was safer in their hands and not anyone else’s.23 Given the instability of banks, this
was not unreasonable.

There was a lack of trust and confidence in bankers and

policymakers. By the 1920s, many Americans had turned to banks to save and manage
their assets. The banking crisis of the 1930s, however, seemed to confirm their earlier
fears. The changing political and economic environment of the emerging New Deal altered
these perceptions.24 Political columnist Jonathan Alter contended that, after March 10,
1933, thousands of ordinary Americans had returned their banknotes and specie to banks.
More than 300 million dollars in gold and gold certificates were now deposited in banks for
safekeeping.25 Frances I. Hundley, from Brooklyn, New York, wrote to President Roosevelt
on March 21, 1933.26 He mentioned that everyday Americans were with Roosevelt and his
political and economic reforms, but the struggle to have his ideas placed on the policy
agenda would be difficult. Other elected officials may not necessarily agree with him, and
there would be many struggles ahead. Hundley wrote that Roosevelt should be able to
weather this political storm, because of the enormous support of the American people.27
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Political leaders, such as the Justice of the New York Supreme Court Frank J. Cregg,
also addressed letters to President Roosevelt. In an effort to hear Roosevelt’s views about
the Bank Crisis and the Great Depression, Justice Cregg mentioned that he happened to
listen to Roosevelt’s fire fireside chat to the American people. He and his colleagues
wondered if Roosevelt would be able to instill confidence in the American people,
especially after the Crash. Cregg remained unsure as to what the American response to
Roosevelt would be, but he was satisfied with the speech, which he viewed as masterful,
worthwhile, and insightful. Cregg asked whether the President would “make good” on his
political and economic claims or would he disappoint the American people? In the past, he
wrote, Americans had listened to their presidents and found that the people’s interests
were not always taken into consideration.

Roosevelt’s speech had mesmerized the

American people, because they had been unaccustomed to a president who spoke directly
to them and not over their heads. Cregg affirmed that, after the speech, he and his
colleagues argued that “we were saved!”28 Roosevelt had convinced them that he would
lead them out of the crisis.
Many corporate executives and professionals from the business community were
satisfied with Roosevelt and his plans toward ending the bank crisis. Some business
executives even wrote to Roosevelt to congratulate him on his bank holiday speech. For
example, J.E. Fehsenfeld from Indianapolis wrote to Roosevelt on March 15, 1933.29 He
called Roosevelt’s bank policy “constructive,” and he felt that the speech built up the
28
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confidence of the American people. Fehsenfeld expressed his personal gratitude for the
President’s actions. He now believed that the nation was on the right track for political and
economic success. The fireside chat changed the psychological response to the crisis,
because Roosevelt incorporated tangible plans written or expressed in a language that
citizens could understand.

Public opinion was restored through the successful and

masterful oratorical skills of Roosevelt. Similarly, on March 14, 1933, K.R. Kingsbury, who
was president of Standard Oil Company of California, expressed his gratitude to the
President. He respected the ways in which Roosevelt had handled the Bank Crisis and the
economic crisis. He had been concerned, initially, regarding Roosevelt, because he was not
sure if he would be able to earn the confidence of the American people. But FDR’s speech
was in step with American views and sentiments. Kingsbury was now comforted and was
sure that Roosevelt had sound political solutions to this national and global economic
crisis. 30
As part of Roosevelt’s plan, the 1933 Emergency Bank Act helped to resolve the
bank crisis, because it added two billion in currency to the private sector.31 Historian Eric
Rauchway has argued that this move ended American dependence on a metallic standard in
terms of gold and silver bars and coinage until 1934. The Emergency Bank Act raised the
prices for manufactured and primary goods, and stabilized wages for lower-to-middle class
Americans. Rauchway argued that the Act established a more systematic and reliable
method toward regulating greenbacks. Although the United States did not maintain a gold
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or silver standard from March 1933 to January 1934, the dollar was still an
internationalized currency, and sustained considerable economic weight and value.32
Once the banking crisis had been handled, the Roosevelt administration began to
work on the farm communities and enact reforms to the agricultural sector. Before the
emergence of the AAA, farm policies in the United States struggled to return to normalcy
following the end of the Great War in 1918. In 1929, Chester Davis, a contemporary
commentator, wrote, that “Washington, D.C., offered farmers the McNary-Haugen bill, the
Agricultural Marketing Act33 and the Federal Farm Board.”34 The McNary-Haugen bill was
devised to stabilize farm prices, so that they could reach parity with pre-war levels. This
act promoted more export-led growth in the farming sector through the use of import
tariffs to prevent dumping and other foreign trade problems.35 President Calvin Coolidge,
however, vetoed the bill each time that the measure appeared on his desk. He felt that the
bill would raise the prices for farm goods, causing a decrease in domestic consumption.36
The bill did not pass Congress and receive the President’s signature until 1927.37 The
Agricultural Marketing Act of June 15, 1929, was established to provide farmers with the
financial capacity to determine the prices of their primary goods through the creation of a
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Federal Farm Board headed by Alexander Legge.38 Farmers were given more control over
prices, and price supports were established in cases when the surpluses of primary goods
increased at an exponential rate.39
These two policies enabled farmers to obtain new loans and use cooperative
associations to market their agricultural goods. Although these measures were not wholly
satisfactory, they were important steps. Farmers began to view the government as a means
to maintaining fair prices for their crops. These economic measures failed, however,
because farmers received no guarantees that, if they planted smaller amounts of crops,
then they would receive adequate compensation in terms of improved prices and subsidies.
Farmers wanted to produce agricultural goods; they did not want to curtail the production
process. The Board was designed to reduce the agricultural surplus, but the system
became unworkable. Farmers were not given reassurances, and they became disenchanted
with the system. 40
Before Henry A. Wallace became the Agriculture Secretary under Roosevelt, he
espoused the views of the Montana Farm economist Milburn L. Wilson.

Both men

recommended cuts to farm production and the emergence of a processing tax for the
purposes of paying farmers who produced a limited supply of crops.41 These principles,
which were later incorporated into the AAA, were not new when Roosevelt came to office.
They had been discussed since the late 1920s. Historian Gilbert Fite contends, however,
that the most significant principle of the AAA was the acreage reduction contracts that paid
38
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farmers to produce smaller amounts of primary goods.42 Production was to balance
consumption or to reach parity between the two variables.
At the beginning of the farm debates and discussions from 1932 to 1933, Agriculture
Secretaries William M. Jardine and Arthur M. Hyde attempted to persuade farmers to cut
crop production, but they failed miserably. Farmers actually increased production to the
detriment of the agricultural industry. Farm prices were not sustained. Rather, they
dropped in value.
deprivation.

Because of these practices, some farmers faced bankruptcy and

They could not make ends meet, because the increased acreage under

production caused the prices of their goods to decrease exponentially.43
As the AAA was debated in Congress, many farmers expressed their complete
confidence in the Agriculture Secretary Wallace. His father, Henry C. Wallace, had been
well-respected in his role as Agriculture Secretary during the 1920s. Henry A. Wallace
hoped to follow in his father’s footsteps. Initially, farmers were vocal in declaring their
support for both Wallaces. They were determined to cut the production of American crops
to stabilize prices. Fite quoted, “a North Dakota farmer wrote that he thought that the
production of cotton, corn, and wheat should be reduced 50 percent, and that the president
should have the power to obtain the supplies or goods necessary to make the plan work.”44
Some farmers, however, did not favor parity prices. They wanted the prices for
their crops to be determined on a cost-of-production basis. The Farmers’ Union, the Farm
Holiday Association and the Missouri Farmers’ Association expressed their dissenting
views. These three organizations disagreed with Wallace, but they understood that some
42
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legislation was necessary to regulate and support the farming industry. Wallace, however,
did garner the support of Milo Reno of the Farm Holiday Association and William A. Hirth,
head of the Missouri Farmers Association.45
At the Senate Agriculture Committee, Wallace advocated the proposed parity price
plan and the acreage reduction policy, while president of the Farmers’ Union Simpson
expressed his support for the cost-of-production plan.46 Simpson had enormous support
from farmers as well, because his plan was easy to understand and promoted economic
justice for farmers. Thus, farmers asserted that:
Producers of food and fiber should not be expected to take less than what it cost to
produce a commodity. Farmers’ Union officials recommended that the plan be put
in effect by having the federal government license buyers of agricultural products
and making it illegal to pay less than the established minimum price. As a method of
raising farm prices, this seemed like the epitome of simplicity and directness.47
Because of the seriousness of these two proposals, Wallace and Roosevelt were
flooded with letters from American farmers. Some farmers expressed support for both
approaches in their letters, while others were more militant in their demands for economic
justice and fair pricing for their commodities. Members of the Farmers’ Union and the
Farm Holiday Association believed that the members of the Roosevelt administration were
making decisions that benefited the farming industry. By 1933, 203,000 farmers and their
families were met with crisis conditions, because the prices for commodities such as cotton
and wheat had declined precipitously. Farmers faced desperate conditions as a bundle of
cotton was worth five cents, while wheat was valued at twenty-five cents a bushel,
45

R.L. Duffus, “Future of the AAA is Now in Balance,” New York Times, April 7, 1935; “What the Average Farmer As
the New Deal Develops,” New York Times, October 29, 1933; William Hirth, “What the Farmer is Thinking,” New
York Times, September 4, 1932. Hirth argued that farmers needed an increase in purchasing power and that
overproduction was the cause of their plight. Under-consumption was the reason for the instability in the
agriculture sector; Louis LaCoss, “Pendergast Faces Revolt in Primary,” New York Times, January 12, 1936.
46
Oklahoma Historical Society, “Agricultural Adjustment Act,” Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History & Culture,
http://www.digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/a/ag002.html. (accessed September 23, 2013).
47
Gilbert Fite, “Farmer Opinion and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933,” 660.

198

especially in Oklahoma.48 Farmers began to look toward the White House and Congress for
direction, and they found that this new president listened to their concerns.
One problem that threatened farmers was that, if they did not produce surplus
crops, then domestic consumption habits were affected negatively.49 If farmers did not
produce, would Americans living in the major cities suffer from deprivation? Would retail
store shelves remain empty? Would commodities become too expensive, because of a lack
of supply?50 Moreover, controlling production worried farmers, because they did not have
the capacity to regulate the weather or produce the right conditions.51 American farmers
argued that they needed God on their side to make sound farm and weather predictions,
and create a viable farm policy for the United States.52 Nothing in the farming industry was
crafted in stone. At the same time, as Fite reports, a “Texas farmer wrote that destruction
of crops was contrary to nature and common sense; it was illogical, absurd and
ridiculous.”53
Another problem with getting farmers to support the AAA was its unequal reach.
Farmers argued that only large land owners had the financial resources to let their lands lie
fallow and generate a profit from producing less. Farmers did not generate the same
amount of money from crop sales, but the size and scope of production mattered. Farmers
were different and maintained distinct farming techniques. Variations in crop, region,
48
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acreage, and technique meant income levels for farmers were different. Farmers, who
made less money in crop sales, argued that they needed to produce more crops to improve
upon their economic stations in life. Rich farmers could afford to let some lands lie fallow,
because they possessed more resources. The more property that a farmer had, the less
likely he would lose revenue from selling a smaller amount of crops. Roosevelt and
Wallace may have understood this dilemma and attempted to devise proposals to rectify
the bill’s inequality. But were they successful before the emergence of the AAA? Many
farmers during the Roosevelt administration felt that their economic lives were at stake,
and they wanted to participate in the decision-making process.
During Roosevelt’s first one hundred days, two major pieces of legislation, which
were to change farming communities and industrial sectors in the United States, were
passed. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) were prominent laws that enabled the Roosevelt administration respond to the
severe economic collapse in the United States.54 Although they were temporary measures,
the recovery acts were enacted, because the country faced deteriorating economic
conditions, industrial overproduction of goods55 and falling prices for agricultural and
industrial products. The acts targeted the crippled farm and industrial sectors, and led to
54
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economic modifications during this critical period.56 On the advice of the Brains Trust,
Roosevelt signed the bills into law, because he realized, along with the American public a
government needed to respond to the massive crises.57
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was an important act, because it addressed the
farm crisis that had begun during the Hoover administration. Roosevelt and Secretary of
Agriculture Wallace worked hand-in-hand to put together this bill. When the law was
enacted, it changed the ways in which farmers conducted economic and industrial
transactions. They began to use statistical analysis and technology to improve upon crop
yields, and processing taxes enabled them to determine the prices for farm goods. Farmers
attempted to gain greater control over what they produced. The AAA also established
production quotas for dairy goods, wheat, corn, cotton, hogs, and rice. This elevated the
prices that farmers charged for these items. Increased prices provided farmers with more
revenue in the form of subsidies for limiting the supply of these goods in the open market
place. Further, this allowed farmers to experience a higher income level for cash crops that
were exported overseas.58
With the emergence of the AAA on May 12, 1933, the farming communities began to
experience some economic changes.59 The AAA established the Agricultural Adjustment
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Administration to be headed by George Peek, who was to work closely with Henry A.
Wallace on matters pertaining to the farm communities in the United States.60 In addition,
the law introduced a processing tax that enabled the federal government to increase the
amount of loans given to the general public and raise farm prices.

Fewer crops were

produced on American lands annually.61 The processing tax supplemented the incomes of
farmers and conditions improved gradually as did their purchasing power.62 The AAA was
an important law that regulated the farm industry in which hundreds to thousands of
farmers competed to sell their primary goods.63 It benefited small farmers in the wheat
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and cotton industries in the South, for example, because they reduced their production and
received compensation for the crops that they decided not to produce.64
In May 1933, when the AAA was signed, the farming industry had been experiencing
a twelve year decline in income. Farmers continued to produce primary goods on millions
of acres of land, because this was the only way to supplement their incomes.65 They also
sought to produce more and sell their goods at acceptable prices. Yet the retail industry for
farm goods suffered dramatically from poor sales and falling prices. Falling prices for
agricultural goods also occurred because of new technology. The work of farmers became
somewhat easier since they had automated some of their tasks to assist them with farm
production. The agricultural industry, however, continued to show limited and gradual
improvement.
Was the AAA a successful economic program? The main aspects of the AAA were to
raise the prices of farm goods and the improvement of the lot of farmers. Chester C. Davis
argued that certain provisions of the AAA led to economic growth, but he could not
discount the fact that the devaluation of the dollar and the establishment of farm credit
relief were important factors. Farmers experienced increased purchasing power after the
passage of the AAA in the sense that the prices of primary goods were strengthened. Now
farmers could buy industrial machines necessary for the purpose of making the production
process easier and they were able to improve and make payments on their debts such as
taxes and other fixed charges. New Deal contemporary Chester C. Davis argued that “by
restoring farm prices more nearly to parity, the AAA helped to restore the rural-urban
64
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circulation, enabled a reciprocal interchange to take place once more, and broke the
economic deadlock.”66 This shift enabled crops to make it to store shelves, but the prices of
farm goods increased dramatically. There was, as well, a re-emergence of trade as price
supports for farm goods enabled other industries to improve their prices. All consumer
and farm goods and their prices stabilized. While before the AAA, the national economy
was “individualistic, uncontrolled, and laissez-faire” that era was past. There were more
government regulations and price supports built into the agriculture sector.
The National Industrial Recovery Act was proposed, devised, written and debate in
the same model as the AAA. The AAA had focused on the economic interests of farmers,
while the NIRA sought to establish the financial rules for stimulating the industrial sectors
of the American economy.67 Both laws contributed to the establishment of standards that
assisted with price and wage determination, limited work hours, and production
stipulations.68 The NIRA was written, however, for the purposes of resolving an economic
emergency in the United States and affected countries in the global system.69 It was
devised to target the Great Depression in a two-year span.70
The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, was at the time believed to be
the crowning achievement for the Roosevelt Administration.71
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stimulus for job growth. It promoted price stability through the use of industry codes.72
Workers were to receive better wages, hours and benefits.73 American purchasing power
was to be enhanced, and child labor eliminated from the workplace.74 Corporate leaders
saw considerable promise to the NRA. Marvin N. Olasky argued that even Pierre du Pont, a
member of General Motors Corporation’s Board of Directors, approved wholeheartedly of
the emergence of the National Recovery Administration.75 Many corporate executives were
supportive of this new law, because it clarified their roles in interstate commerce.76 The
law was the first of its kind, since the War Industries Board, to centrally regulate the
industrial sectors.

Many wondered if it targeted effectively economic woes.

Many

Americans were so satisfied with the passage of the NIRA, however, that business owners
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sought licensing privileges inherent to the Blue Eagle seal, because it added economic and
financial legitimacy to their corporate operations.77
Initially, corporate executives were so supportive of the NIRA that General Hugh
Samuel Johnson was hired as the chief administrator for the agency. He prompted over 2.3
million employers to sign the universal and introductory blanket code of fair competition
entitled the President’s Re-employment Agreement or PRA.78 The tentative PRA ended
child labor in the United States, endorsed minimum wages for most Americans, and limited
work hours for employees in American firms.79 Sixteen million out of twenty-five million
American workers were affected by the NIRA and the PRA.

Some corporate executives

worried, however, about the lack of enforcement of the NIRA and the PRA. Concerned that
their employers would violate the law, workers wondered if the corporate executives
would engage in price and production controls, but neglect to hire more workers or
improve the conditions of their current employees.80
When the NIRA was first passed, the Roosevelt administration did not receive much
negative criticism. Many newspapers such as the New York Times, the New York Herald
Tribune, the Chicago Tribune, and the Washington Post did not run or harbor any negative
77
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commentary regarding the NIRA.

It was accepted among the public commentators,

business leaders, and the general public. Many reporters such as Howard Davis of the
Herald Tribune, Walter Lippmann and others did not criticize the new law.81
Some industrial leaders supported the NIRA, because they sought to change the
public images of their firms. It was good for business, especially as the Great Depression
maintained its tight grip on the national economy. Corporate executives understood that
any law that improved employment levels, and gave them some leeway in controlling
market conditions essentially had the support of the American people, especially if it
improved the interstate movement of consumer and producer goods.82 The American
people viewed excessive competition in the private sector as a destructive force. Chamber
of Commerce chairman Julius Barnes told industry leaders in the automobile sector in April
1931 that citizens wanted them to act, because intense competition in the national
economy had caused a series of industrial problems.83 The complex and competitive
nature of the industrial sectors was more than just destructive: it was disheartening.
Competition to sell goods increased dramatically during the Hoover era, and many
American corporations lowered the prices for their manufactured goods because of the
initial overproduction. The industrial sectors were flooded with manufactured goods.
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Since the supply had increased, the market was driven by the consumer who negotiated
with retailers.84
There was broad acceptance of the National Recovery Administration in 1933, and
its suspension of anti-trust laws to promote economic recovery. The public also opposed
yellow-dog contracts, which should have been eliminated with the passage of the NIRA.85
Surprisingly, the National Association of Manufacturers President James Edgerton told
industry leaders and the press that he could accept any initiative that reduced the cut
throat competition in the private sector that had driven down both prices and employment.
After 1932, the new Chamber of Commerce president H.I. Harriman and Robert
Lund of the National Association of Manufacturers had become anti-Hoover and did not
support his public policies.86 Harriman favored Roosevelt so much that he supported a
constitutional amendment that provided Roosevelt with more power to control the private
sector more tightly.87 Like other corporate leaders, he believed that centralized planning
improved economic conditions. He was determined to see that changes were made to the
national economy that promoted a more regulated approach. Industry leaders appeared
no longer fearful of government regulations in the private sector.
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representative declared that Americans overall supported government regulations and
intervention, if it eliminated industrial and worker inequality. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company spokesman P.W. Litchfield and Link-Belt Company spokesman George Torrance
asserted that their company and industrial colleagues favored creating an industrial czar
who scrutinized prices for their commodities, examined wages and benefits for workers,
and established production controls in the sector.88
Industry leaders, further, were supportive of the NIRA and the NRA. Hugh Samuel
Johnson, and his NIRA colleagues—Alvin Brown, Robert Lea, Kenneth Simpson, Arthur D.
Whiteside, and Clarence Williams were pro-business and had been working in the private
sector before they joined part of the Roosevelt administration. Corporate leaders were
ready and prepared for change. They understood that the laissez-faire economic system
that promoted intense competition had to be modified.89 Change was seen to be necessary
for the future and longevity of American corporations. For example, Harvey Firestone
approved of an industry code that eliminated price reductions for his products and
established a method to determine how to tabulate prices for his goods. Higher prices, it
was argued, led to higher wages for employees and reduced purchasing power for
everyday Americans in the consumer-driven national economy.90

The NIRA was so

important to corporations that public relations spokesmen asked school-age children to
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accept pledges from their neighbors to purchase products only with the Blue Eagle Seal.91
These businesses were viewed as legal and approved institutions in the national economy,
and corporate leaders were determined to win the support of their peers, colleagues and
the American people.92
The NIRA had many practical functions. Each corporation within an American
industry and trade unions were supposed to work hand-in-hand to carry out the main
tenets of the NIRA, such as the enforcement of industry codes and the promotion of
collective bargaining.93 Both industry and trade unions were essential in the code-making
process, and they were to seek public recognition for their proposals and industry codes.
President Roosevelt, through executive orders, even had the capacity to create industry
codes if there was indecision or a stalemate among American corporate leaders and trade
unions.94
One of the key premises of the NIRA was to promote economic recovery through
stronger benefits and better wages. The law relied on worker representation, trade unions
or worker representation plans to pressure companies on these issues. Workers were
represented by external individuals or groups from the labor movement on the issues of
wages, benefits, hours and working conditions. Moreover, work-sharing was an essential
part of the NRA, so that the weekly hours of workers were limited; and more could be hired
91
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to increase employment levels. Thirty-five hour weeks were thus one goal of the NRA. It
followed that more people could be hired, and purchasing power improved, despite the
emergence of higher prices, because more people had income. Further, the elimination of
child labor in the American economy meant that more adults were trained and hired as a
part of the labor force.95 Now children spent more time acquiring a decent education and
would not have to work. But did corporations in the United States hired more workers
with the coming of the NIRA? Were wages increased? Hiring more workers increased
production costs, and many businesses did not support this economic approach.96
Policymakers, the media, and everyday citizens viewed the NIRA positively at first,
but its most salient and significant provisions were not immediately apparent.

The

provisions of this important law led to a serious debate in the United States, because many
policymakers assumed that the NIRA was to benefit American workers. Others, however,
saw it largely in industrial terms. NRA regulation would eliminate competition. The most
important stipulations of the NIRA were three titles to the NIRA. It is necessary to
enumerate what they were in order to evaluate NRA effectiveness. Title I dealt with the
industrial recovery and the provisions to bring about economic and industrial change.97
Title II handled an extensive federal infrastructure for public works, such as construction,
transportation, and the development of natural resources.98 Title III examined the financial
aspects of the law. It established a sinking fund or trust with governmental securities or
95
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liberty bonds to pay for the public works operations.
appropriations, such as bonds and taxation.

Title III also dealt with

It enabled policymakers to finance the

responsibilities listed in Tile I and Title II of the NIRA.99
Title I, Section (I) of the NIRA was composed of a statement of purpose and the
scope of the law.

It declared that there existed an economic emergency in which

unemployment levels were elevated and industries were disorganized, affecting interstate
commerce and foreign trade.100 The law aimed to eliminate trade restrictions that affected
interstate commerce and promote the free-flow of global trade. Corporations were to be
given an equal opportunity to succeed and to improve upon their economic situation with
an increase in purchasing power and the emergence of a consumer-based economic
structure.101 The national economy was to become an efficient body capable of using its
resources to promote growth and expansion.102
Section 2(a) established the NRA or the National Recovery Administration under the
jurisdiction of the Executive branch, with the presidency given the ultimate decisionmaking powers for this agency.103 Once the NRA was created, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt selected General Hugh Samuel Johnson to serve as the chief administrator.104

99

“Transcript of National Industrial Recovery Act (1933),” U.S. National Archives & Records Administration,
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?=66&page=transcript. (accessed October 2, 2013).
100
Charles L. Dearing and al., The ABC of the NRA (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1934), 116; James
D. Magee et al., The National Recovery Program (New York: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1933), 6; Oliver P. Field, “The
Constitutional Theory of the National Industrial Recovery Act,” Minnesota Law Review 18, no. 3 (February 1934):
270, 275; “National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,” The Social Welfare History Project,
http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/eras/national-industrial-recovery-act-of-1933/. (accessed April 1, 2013);
Special, “Text of Richberg’s Business Report to Roosevelt,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1934; Louis Rich, “The
New Recovery Act,” New York Times, July 16, 1933.
101
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “The Hundred Days of F.D.R.,” New York Times, April 10, 1983.
102
Bernhard Ostrolenk, “Far-Reaching Scope of the New Deal,” New York Times, June 18, 1933.
103
Charles L. Dearing et al., The ABC of the NRA, 116-117; , Thomas Hopkinson Eliot, Recollections of the New Deal:
When the People Mattered (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 34.
104
Malcolm P. Sharp, “Title I of the National Recovery Act,” The University of Chicago Law Review, 1, no. 2
(November 1933): 324; Donald R. Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law, 99.

212

Deputy administrators were established to handle the discussions of the codes of fair
competition and to negotiate with members of American corporations in various
industries. Normally, members of the NRA boards were individuals from the industrial and
manufacturing sectors,

who

understood the

business operations

of American

corporations.105 They maneuvered in the negotiation process and devised sound industrial
codes of fair competition.
Within Section 2(a), advisory committees were established in an effort to protect
the economic and labor interests of consumers, workers, and corporate executives. At
times, their interests were divergent; but the NRA was designed with the intent to protect
the interests of all parties. Next, staff divisions were created to work with the decisionmaking processes of the chief administrator and deputy administrators.

It was the

responsibility of the staff divisions to provide the chief administrators with the necessary
information to propagate the industrial codes and they worked with industry leaders in the
negotiation process. 106
In addition, Section 2(a) gave the executive branch the power to hire the
appropriate public officials to work within the NRA and coordinate their efforts with local
and state authorities. Policymakers were to be compensated for their services, and their
salaries were to be determined by the president and Congressional members. Section 2(b)
equipped the presidency with the capacity to establish the functions of the NRA. He had
the ability to appoint personnel to the NRA, determine their duties, and delegate the
governmental authority within this agency. All power was vested in the Executive branch
105
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for the purposes of ensuring that the provisions of the NIRA were carried out. Section 2(c)
examined the length of the NIRA. The law was to cease to exist after a two-year period, but
the NIRA could be renewed if the economic and industrial emergencies were not
rectified.107
Section 3(a) established the codes of fair competition.108 The Executive branch had
the capacity to approve codes that did not promote monopolies or hurt small businesses.
The codes were designed to improve wages, limit weekly work hours, and re-establish
domestic consumption.109 Businesses that had acceptable codes were viewed as licensed
entities and received the approval of the federal government to conduct themselves in the
domestic and global economies.110 Corporations were not to establish discriminatory
practices or damage the business operations of small businesses through collusion.111 If
codes of fair competition were approved, then industries were ideally poised to benefit
workers in terms of their welfare, health, and safety. Power was vested in the Executive
branch to prescribe and alter the codes in an effort to benefit and protect “consumers,
competitors, employees, and others.”112
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In The National Recovery Administration, Edward S. Mason argued that code-making
was essentially put into the hands of the central NRA office. It was the chief code-making
agency. The NRA looked after the concerns and needs of the public and private sectors. On
the other hand, Mason contended that the NRA acted in a pro-business manner and sought
to appease corporate executives during the code-making process.113

Mason, further,

asserted that the primary function of the NRA was to reform the industrial sector, but
members of the NRA often compromised with industry leaders in order to accomplish this
task. In terms of reform and recovery, its designers believed, the way to improve upon
industrial conditions was to strengthen wages. It became the main preoccupation of NRA
officials to support the concerns of business leaders. If NRA officials had not compromised
on the various codes of fair competition, then wages would have remained stagnant. Codes
may not have been approved in the first place. Mason attributed wage increases after July
1933 to the compromises that had been made between industry leaders and the NRA
officials in the negotiation process.114 In the code-making process after July 1933, however,
NRA officials spent little time examining the public interest. Industrial recovery was the
focus.
Mason cited a book entitled, NRA and the Trade Practice Problem, in an effort to
support his claims. Leverett S. Lyons had argued that the preparation of the codes of fair
competition and the defining features of the codes as well as the meaning of “unfair
competition” became “distorted” during the negotiation process between the NRA officials
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and corporate executives.115 The process of establishing the codes of fair competition and
determining the public interest was lost. Mason argued that problems with monopoly and
oligopoly also were ignored during the process of creating the codes of fair competition.
Lastly, since the codes of fair competition were voluntary, there was a problem with NRA
enforcement as well as the lack of any enforcement agency for the purposes of adjudging
violations to the codes or collective bargaining provisions.116 Violations of the codes were
civil offenses, but evidence that the codes were ignored was not difficult to come by.
Section 3(b) dealt with the enforcement of the codes of fair competition in the sense
that there should be no violations of these standards. The codes of fair competition were to
avoid affecting negatively interstate commerce and foreign trade. Economic transactions
were to remain fair, and violators had to be sanctioned. Section 3(c) vested enforcement
powers in the federal judiciary if there were deviations from the standards or codes of fair
competition. Section 3(d) provided the president with powers to establish new codes of
fair competition if there was a complaint within a certain industry that had to be addressed
or if an industry failed to create an industry code.117 Codes could be used to better
economic conditions depending upon the types of industry, and these codes were to have
the force of law behind them.118
Section 3(e) was an important provision, because it dealt with the codes and how
they were used in an international setting. If an American corporation had a code of fair
competition to regulate its operations and also conducted business overseas, where foreign
115
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competitors’ operations were a detriment to its code, then the United States’ Tariff
Commission could conduct a federal investigation.119 In specific cases, the policymakers
could allow the import entry to the United States: but the foreign corporation had to pay
extra expenses in an effort to comply with United States’ economic and industrial policy.
Moreover, the Tariff Commission published studies annually that dealt with how goods
were priced domestically and internationally.120

The Roosevelt administration wanted to

ensure that American goods were priced competitively and that domestic prices did not
destroy the relationships that businesses maintained nationwide and internationally.
Lastly, Section 3(f) examined the various penalties for violating the codes of fair
competition.121
For workers, and the labor movement, section 7(a) was one of the most salient
provisions of the NIRA. It established the right to bargain collectively in the United
States.122 It became the necessity of employers to eliminate yellow dog contacts and to
enable employees to seek representation outside of their firms.123 Workers were given the
capacity to organize and to fight for higher wages, limited work hours, and company
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benefits for themselves and their families.124 Pre-existing trade unions now achieved
economic and industrial legitimacy. Moreover, some corporations attempted to promote
the rise of company unions to negotiate reforms with their employees. Company unions
did have support from corporate management but they were wholly different from
employee representatives that were selected by American workers.

Section 7(c)

established even more rights for workers in the sense that the president devised codes of
fair competition to improve the collective bargaining tactics of workers, if the codes did not
exist.125 Pre-existing codes were strengthened, while if codes did not benefit workers, they
were re-established and given weight by the Federal government.
Section 9(a) was somewhat controversial in the sense that it established a czar for
the petroleum industry and increased the tax base.126

During the Senate Finance

committee hearings on the NIRA, there were many witnesses from the oil industry and the
federal government, such as Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, who argued in favor
of an oil czar for regulation purposes.127 Some witnesses, however, contended that the oil
industry was already over-regulated and did not require new rules or stipulations to better
the system. Others affirmed the need for change, because they felt that the oil prices were
too low. Many believed that the domestic oil supply was too extensive and the surplus
artificially depressed prices. If the supply was reduced, then the price and demand for oil
normally increased, and petroleum companies improved upon their profitability, wages,
124
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and benefits. Leaders of the Petroleum industry did not want to increase taxation that
affected their business operations, because it increased oil prices in domestic and foreign
markets. Within the oil industry, anti-trust laws did apply. Holding companies were
barred from establishing monopolies and had to charge a fair and competitive price for oil
to vendors in the petroleum industry. Finally, storage levels for the oil industry were
established, because it affected transportation costs and provided for limited increases in
the final price for oil for domestic consumption purposes.128
Title II, sections 201(a)-204(g) and 205(a)-207(c), dealt with the emergence of the
Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works.129 The Executive branch was vested
with the power to hire and fire personnel, and to create the agency for the purposes of road
and building construction and the preservation of natural resources.130

Congress

appropriated $400,000,000 for public works projects. The agency was supposed to reduce
unemployment rates through the creation of construction projects throughout the
country.131 The Public Works agency supported projects in United States’ territories such
as Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Finally, the NIRA created a sinking
fund or trust, and re-established Liberty bonds to finance its operations. Thus, the public
debt was used along with taxation to pay for the various expenditures of the NRA.132
After the passage of the NIRA on June 16, 1933, many policymakers and analysts
wondered if the measure was the appropriate remedy for the industrial and economic
emergency that had taken place. John Dickinson wrote an article for the Columbia Law
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Review in which he questioned the provisions of the NIRA to discover whether the law was
beneficial to the general populace. He argued that one of the main premises of the law was
to regulate the industrial sector in an effort to promote economic expansion and growth.133
Industrial competition was not eliminated completely from the private sector, but the
system had some labor sanctions in place to improve the living conditions of low-to-middle
class American citizens. It was the competitive nature of corporations that drove wages
down, increased work hours, and eliminated employee benefits. Workers were fighting for
pre-existing jobs during the early stages of the Great Depression, and it contributed to the
undercutting of labor skills and wages.134 Standards of living, thus, declined immensely as
unemployed Americans competed for jobs in the private sector. It was the competitiveness
of the market that inhibited worker development and lowered the price levels for goods
without increasing purchasing power. Dickinson stated that:
The tests of unwholesome competition there indicated are that it is competition
which is unfair, or which interferes with the full utilization of productive capacity;
or decreases purchasing power and thereby restricts the consumption of the
national product, or promotes unemployment or lowers labor standards.135
One problem with the NIRA was that there were few penalties for violating antitrust laws and little enforcement. The use of the codes was voluntary.136 The law, instead,
relied on “interested parties” who might be persuaded to curtail unfair competition and the
market dominance of monopolies. Consequently, workers who depended upon the NIRA
133
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used strikes to push for trade unions and collective bargaining, because of the lack of
enforcement powers inherent in the NRA.137 Lewis L. Lorwin asserted that “the Recovery
Act was primarily a permissive, rather than a mandatory, statute.” Enforcement was
problematic.138 This was particularly true for the collective bargaining provisions of the
act. Scholars such as George W. Robbins argued that the codes of fair competition that had
been devised did not contain provisions that prevented the emergence of unfair trade and
labor practices.139
In Labor and the New Deal, Emanuel Stein, Carl Raushenbush and Lois MacDonald
argued that the NRA believed that it was the duty of industries to sanction the offenders.140
The administration itself was not in charge of the enforcement of the law provisions. The
scholars contend that, in the 1930s, there were few labor laws on the books in the United
States, and federal mediation of labor disputes was fairly at a minimum even during World
War I.141 This hampered the enforcement capacity of policymakers and inhibited the
federal judiciary from policing the NIRA, especially in labor conflicts. If there had been
enormous legal precedence for the regulation of manufacturing sectors and federally
supervised labor elections, then the NIRA industry code sections might not have been
invalidated in 1935.
The problems that the NRA faced were that there was not much legal precedence
that the federal judiciary could follow to enforce this law. Remember, the War Industries
Board had been the first agency to regulate industry during World War I. But during the
137
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interwar period, however, policymakers could not rely on pre-existing laws to enforce the
NRA codes and guidelines. The major difference between the NRA and the WIB, moreover,
was that the WIB was designed to provide American troops with the necessary supplies to
wage war, and had the sanction of defense and security needs. The New Deal state sought
to use “the moral equivalent of war” to sanction the NRA, but the economic crisis was not a
war in the tradition sense.142 Fighting unemployment was seen as patriotism. Lastly, the
emergence of federal court cases that was sought to determine the constitutionality of the
NIRA prevented policymakers from enforcing this law.143
Because the codes were voluntary, if businesses decided to adopt the codes, then
corporate executives were at liberty to improve or neglect to change the lot of their
workers.144

Their business operations might have to change, and it may have been

detrimental to company earnings. Intensive labor competition that had produced long
work hours, insufficient wages, company unions and a lack of employee benefits had to be
addressed. Corporations were sanctioned only punitively by the NRA if their codes were
inadequate or if they violated the health and safety of employees. Labor unions, however,
were more contested ground. Corporations may have been intimidated by the alleged legal
authority of the Executive branch and the NRA, but did not take up union negotiations.145
In The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, labor
leader John L. Lewis argued that trade unionism was promoted by the provisions of the
NIRA, especially Section 7(a).
142
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Emancipation Proclamation, and it was considered as the Magna Carta of labor in terms of
its political weight in the United States and the applicability of the law to industrial
conditions.146 He affirmed that there had been an economic emergency in the United States
that had to be addressed and that Roosevelt’s NIRA was the step in the right direction for
workers. Further, Section 7(a) had been originally a part of the Davis-Kelly, or Coal
Stabilization bill, in which anti-trust laws were nullified in the bituminous coal mining
industry so that mine workers could bargain collectively with their employers.147 Although
the Coal Stabilization bill was never passed, policymakers used that proposal as a model for
the NIRA.148 This gave John L. Lewis an almost proprietary interest in organizing others
under the NRA.
After the passage of the NIRA, Lewis like John Dickinson, contended that the act had
not been enforced nor had the public sector established formal sanctions. Excessive work
hours remained; the codes of fair competition and price and production controls had been
ignored, and wages had not increased.149 Lewis argued that employers were ignoring the
entire Section 7 of the NIRA and did not negotiate with their employees to improve work
conditions and benefits. In addition, he wrote that section 7(a) was a provision that
policymakers assumed corporate executives would follow. It was a voluntary measure, but
it was the moral responsibility of the public and private sectors to adhere to its rules and
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regulations. Refusal to adhere to the provisions of the NIRA was detrimental to the labor
market and to society. Lewis argued that:
Delay in the enforcement of these provisions of the law also leads to controversy,
strikes, and serious dislocations, and to the conclusion among the workers of the
country that cooperation under the Act can be secured only through fighting for
it.150
Moreover, workers had to fight for the enforcement of the provisions of the NIRA,
especially Section 7(a).

Lewis argued that the NIRA did not place any mandatory

obligations on the NRA on employers to follow the spirit and direction of the law. Thus,
there were two competing arguments with the coming of the NIRA. Some policymakers
and scholars argue that section 7(a) was not enforced151 while others contend that the
NIRA was good for American businesses and should be followed.
Similarly, labor economists Lois MacDonald, Gladys L. Palmer and Theresa Wolfson
affirmed that policymakers and corporate executives misunderstood and ignored section
7(a). They mainly promoted the status-quo in terms of enforcement.152 Yellow dog
contracts were technically prohibited as they were under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but the
closed shop was not mandatory.153 The NRA was to establish collective bargaining in the
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workplace, but employees did not have to belong to a trade union or be represented by a
union official.154
The federal government attempted to remain neutral regarding Section 7(a), but
Roosevelt and Johnson may have worried about the impact of collective bargaining, such as
strikes and labor conflict. If policymakers and corporations agreed with the provisions of
the NIRA, Lewis argued, then the incidence of strikes, bottlenecks or other forms of
industrial syndicalism were limited or curtailed completely. General Johnson believed in
the principles behind the NIRA, but he did not agree with workers who promoted strikes to
“force the hands “of corporate executives. Moreover, General Johnson contended that, with
the passage of the NIRA, strikes in the United States decreased and collective bargaining
enabled workers to fight professionally and legitimately for their rights and work
benefits.155 He turned out to be only partially right.
Once the NIRA had been passed, its enforcement became a problem. Many had
questions as to who could bring a case to court if there were some violations of the NIRA
provisions. The question was answered in the sense that it was decided that if anyone’s
rights were infringed upon, then they had the capacity to sue in court for damages.156
However, only individuals, who were “directly and seriously” affected by violations of the
NIRA, could seek remedies in the court of law. For example, if a person’s collective
bargaining rights had been infringed upon, then he or she could sue in court to seek justice.
Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission could sue in court if there were some violations
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of the codes of fair competition or certain types of unfair trade practices came to the
forefront.157
Federal district attorneys also could file a lawsuit against violators of the NIRA.
Before the end of 1933, however, they did not exercise their rights to sue in court. The
Federal Trade Commission and federal district attorneys also could file a lawsuit with the
various Circuit Courts of Appeals. When a suit could be brought to federal court was
somewhat tricky, because initially administrators and policymakers were uncertain if an
individual (s) had to violate the law first to make the lawsuit necessary. Would they have
to incriminate themselves in order to test the constitutionality of the NIRA? In addition,
how grave did the infringement of the law have to be before the federal judiciary
considered that the law had been violated or breached?
Even with all of these criticisms, Lewis and other labor leaders believed that the
National Recovery Administration was the only government agency that could save the
labor market and the economy. The NRA could be modified, and Lewis offered some
suggestions that could be put in place to better the economic environment and promote
more cooperation between workers and management. He argued for “a new definite policy
of guidance of industry to which all codes should be required to conform. In his mindset,
this policy should be broader than that now existing, and should include not only minimum
wage rates and maximum hours, but also definite price and production objectives.”158
In an article published by The American Economic Review, Joseph H. Willits and John
Dickinson contended that times had changed and that the American economy was evolving.
The NIRA was needed to rectify these new economic conditions. Fifty years before, most
157
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farmers produced solely for subsistence purposes while American corporations created
manufactured goods for domestic consumption.159 After the late 1920s, the American
economy had changed into one that was consumer-oriented. People were purchasing
goods in the national markets and required purchasing power that they did not receive
from their firms. Wages had been stagnant and the American worker could not make ends
meet.160 But in some cities such as Chicago, with the NIRA, wages and employment began
to improve.161
The global economy was changing, and the United States experienced the negative
effects of these modifications. Willits and Dickinson elaborated further that:
Those areas of economic activity lying outside the organized system formed what
may be compared to a cushion which operates to absorb much of the shock of the
repercussions within the system. In idle times, labor was absorbed into those
outlying activities and in boom times, the farms and local workshops increased their
output. Today all our economic activity is geared into one system with vastly
increased rigidity and with increased menace to the stability of the system.162
Declining production in the manufacturing sector during the Great Depression was
one sign of changing conditions. Willits and Dickinson argued that, if this issue could be
resolved, then domestic consumption could increase.163 If the supply of American goods
increased, then American citizens could afford to purchase more products in the national
economy. Lastly, both Willits and Dickinson affirmed that:
the proper regulation of competitive practices, especially practices relating to secret
prices, price discrimination, discounts, and other types of discrimination, will do
much towards eliminating forces and tendencies which in normal times, as in times
159
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of depression, tend to drag down and depress industry, lower the price of raw
materials, and drive down labor standards.164
Arthur Robert Burns in the Political Science Quarterly concurred with Willits and
Dickinson that one reason for the emergence of the Great Depression was that there was
some corporate competition in which American workers were paid nominal wages.165
These monopoly-determined wages reduced their spending power and prevented
increases in consumer consumption. Burns believed that corporate executives understood
this issue and felt that with controls on production, higher prices became the norm in the
American marketplace. However, this idea is somewhat contradictive, because controlling
prices of American goods lowered their worth, while producing less raised prices.
By contrast, the Roosevelt administration contended that competitive economics no
longer worked in the United States and that increasing wages and hiring more workers
were the only ways to strengthen the national economy.166 Increasing wages for workers
augmented consumption levels, and it enabled the national economy to become consumeroriented or based.167 The NRA was designed to address this practice of maintaining low
wages and prices. It did not want American corporations to produce below cost. One
hundred and twenty-five codes approved by the NRA maintained provisions that
prohibited establishing prices below the cost of production.168 One half of the codes of fair
competition that had been approved contained stipulations that sustained minimum
164
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pricing standards. It was important for businesses to set their prices and maintain their
profitability. It enabled them to move forward and achieve economic success. American
corporations within each industry obtained codes for pricing purposes, but uniform pricing
did not occur. The prices for consumer goods differed, but efforts had to be made to
improve the financial status of these corporations.169
There were about 180 codes that contained provisions regarding open price
policies. Arthur Burns implied that American products were not to be sold below the cost
provided by the seller. All pricing in these codes had to be listed, and “discounts and
special charges” had to become transparent. Transparency was an important part of these
codes. All American corporations were to reveal the selling prices for their products and
changes to those prices had to be listed as well. As Burns wrote that “in 72 of these 80
codes it is provided that a firm notifying a change of price may not change its actual price
until the lapse of a period varying from twenty-four hours to twenty days after the notice of
the change has been lodged.”170 Once modifications had been made to the codes in terms of
the wholesale or retail prices, this information had to be circulated among corporations;
and the public had to be made aware of those changes as well. Notification of price changes
was important, because it was supposed to prevent price cutting policies that had become
the mainstay of the national economy before the New Deal.
Thus, Burns argued that there was an “increase in output and payroll accompanied
by an increase in prices with the major rise again occurring between March and July 1933
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when wholesale prices rose 15 percent. By December 1933, the increase was still only 18
percent over the level in March 1933.”171 In addition, after the passage of the NIRA,
American businesses became profitable again. In 1933, 1,475 corporations specializing in
manufacturing and commerce garnered more than 660 million dollars while, in 1932, they
had only earned 97 million dollars.172 But could these improvements in the national
economy be attributed to the emergence of the NIRA and the various codes of fair
competition?
Did the NIRA work for corporate executives and American workers? Did they
benefit from this important law? In 1936, Ruth Reticker contended that six months after
the law had been passed, 190 industries that consisted of 12.25 million employees were
brought under the industry codes that had been approved by President Roosevelt and
industry leaders from the various manufacturing sectors in the United States.173
Additionally, in 1934, 200 codes had been postulated that affected 10 million more
American workers.174 Three hundred and four codes addressed weekly work hours, and a
majority of them recommended that employees work only for six out of the seven days per
week. Most of the codes stipulated that employees were to work only an eight hour day
and forty hours per week.

This further limited weekly work days to five, because

employees were working eight hour shifts. However, 33 codes allowed employees to work
each week for an unlimited amount of time. Over three million workers were affected by
the thirty-three codes and it lessened the unemployment figures. Overtime hours and pay
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were spelled out in fifty-two codes.175 After working a forty hour week, employees were
entitled to receive overtime pay, if they decided to work some additional hours. White
collar workers were treated a little differently. Seventeen codes allowed white collar
workers to labor for forty hours per week. Some of the finance codes allowed white collar
workers to labor for more than forty hours per week.
A majority of the codes offered minimum wage standards with wage differentials.
Differentials enabled employers to pay workers at different rates based upon seniority or
other human resources statistics. Over fourteen percent of workers were covered by codes
that offered wages that were listed at forty cents per hour. Some workers, such as women,
apprentices, office boys and girls, the handicapped and junior employees were exempt
from minimum wage standards. One hundred and thirty-seven codes allowed employees
to pay female employees less for jobs that were “light and repetitive.” Equal pay clauses
were incorporated in all but four codes, because if women were employed and performed
similar work as their male counterparts, then they were to be paid equally for their labor.
In terms of apprentices, they were paid less than male workers with seniority. Two
hundred and nine codes addressed this issue, and they were paid eighty percent of the
minimum wage for all other American workers.
In 1933, President Roosevelt signed into law the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
the National Industrial Recovery Act. Both laws were enacted to handle an economic
emergency in the United States. But were the laws enforceable? Did business leaders
follow the guidelines and stipulations of both laws? Even with a lack of enforcement
powers inherent in the National Recovery Administration, hundreds of industrial codes had
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been established. Millions of American workers were affected by the provisions of both
laws. Moreover, the NIRA was a step in the right direction for American workers and was
the central method for reforming the American industrial sectors, while the AAA improved
the lot of farmers in the United States. Scholars and policymakers may never know if the
NIRA benefited American workers, because the law was declared unconstitutional in 1935.
The AAA had a different ending.
Although the AAA was voided in January of 1936, the law was reworked and
reenacted. Throughout contemporary American history, the AAA has been renewed on
many different occasions and continues to help farmers thrive in an otherwise competitive
environment.

Another question that requires a response is whether there were any

alternatives to the NIRA and the AAA that could have been more enforceable in the United
States. Americans may never know but with the passage of the AAA and NIRA, Americans
became accustomed to an expanded federal government that worked to improve upon the
financial conditions of workers in the private sector. Workers in the United States could
now count on the federal government to step in during periods of political, economic or
social instability. This new precedent has been continued and Americans on a daily basis
have learned to write to their policymakers to have their interests and issues brought to
the forefront and addressed in a positive way. Roosevelt started this political innovation,
because he spoke directly to the American people and these steps have been continued by
U.S.

policymakers

into

the

present.
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CHAPTER 7: CREATING THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION AND THE CODES
OF FAIR COMPETITION: THE PETROLEUM AND AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRIES

The National Recovery Administration was an agency that worked with businesses
to regulate the national economy and establish industrial reforms. As an Executive branch
agency, it had national jurisdiction to devise business solutions. The NRA and code-making
moved hand-in-hand in the 1930s.

It became the responsibility of the NRA and its

representatives from American industrial sectors1 to establish the codes of fair
competition. The NRA negotiated with American corporate executives from the industries,
and they were supposed to work together to create fair codes to target wages and the
prices of commodities that could be used industry-wide.2 There were criticisms of the
NIRA, such as the overregulation of business sectors and the use of codes, but it was the
first step toward economic growth and transparency among the private and public sectors
in the United States.3 Whether or not the NRA and the code authorities improved economic
conditions, the law was targeted to address an economic emergency that was complex and
difficult to resolve. In the following pages, I examine the organizational structure of the
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NRA and discover how the different provisions of the law and the National Recovery
Administration created the codes of fair competition. I discuss the origins of the petroleum
and automobile codes and the debates among policymakers and corporate leaders during
these processes. The chapter illustrates how the Roosevelt administration attempted to
maneuver in two key industrial sectors of the national economy in an effort to improve
workers’ benefits, wages, and conditions as well as to address the economic crisis.
Although policymakers were not always successful, Roosevelt thought that the emergence
of the NRA fair codes of competition was a step in the right direction to promote more
stability in the labor markets and in industry.
With the enactment of the NIRA on June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt made it his
responsibility to establish Executive branch agencies for the propagation of the codes of
fair competition.4 In The ABC of the NRA, Charles L. Dearing and others, argued that the
NRA was without precedence.5 There had never been any governmental agencies quite like
it. But the NRA supporters maintained that it was the agency’s purpose to produce and
enforce codes, but there were other responsibilities that were just as important, such as the
NRA’s re-employment agenda.
First of all, Roosevelt created the office of the NRA administrator, whose
responsibilities consisted of selecting its government employees at the lower levels of the
NRA, holding preliminary hearings and negotiations, and performing day-to-day
supervision.6 In December, 30, 1933, Roosevelt gave the chief administrator the power to
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approve codes, with the exception of essential industries, and to approve all changes to the
existing codes.7 A Special Industrial Recovery Board was established.8 It included as its
members the Secretary of Commerce, who served as the chairman; the Attorney General;
the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Labor; the
Director of the Budget; the Administrator for Industrial Recovery, and the Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission.9 This organization was abolished in December 1933.
After the National Recovery Administration was created, the chief administrator to
the NRA, General Hugh Samuel Johnson, established different industry advisory boards and
sub-divisions that specialized in the technical aspects within the industries.10 These subagencies were responsible for making the codes and sanctioning the behavior of
corporations that violated the codes.

Within each division, there were deputy

administrators who were always in contact with the chief administrator. They had the
responsibility to use their contacts with the chief administrator to negotiate with industry
leaders.11
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Former New Deal policymaker Charles L. Dearing argued that two NRA entities that
proved to have staying power were the Legal Division and the Research and Planning
Division. The Legal Division examined newly devised codes to ensure that they were in
compliance with federal, state, and local regulations. The Research and Planning Division
had duties that required cooperation with the Legal Division.12 It worked with industry
leaders to gather information about industries in the United States. This information was
used in devising the numerous codes that affected the private sector. The Research and
Planning Division was headed by Dr. Alexander Sachs, who convinced Roosevelt that a
division should be established to handle financial, economic, and industrial reports
necessary for recovery.13 Both divisions provided lots of legal and government advice to
the upper echelon of the NRA. They did not just provide technical assistance, but most of
the information about the codes and industries came from these two NRA entities.
Within the NRA, there were three advisory boards: the Industrial Advisory Board,
the Labor Advisory Board and the Consumers’ Advisory Board.14 The Industrial Advisory
Board included members who were selected by the Commerce Secretary, whose
membership was subject to rotation.15 This board was to express the interests of the
business community but also labor unions.16 Members of this board were appointed to
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ensure that, during the code negotiation process, business interests were promoted and
placed at the forefront. Moreover, this entity was responsible for selecting appointees who
served in negotiations during the decision-making process. Initially, members of the
Industrial Advisory Board earned tenure and other job security benefits. Over time, these
appointments were rotated, providing all of its members with opportunities to implement
policy. Members were employed at will. They were subject to firing if they did not serve
professionally in their roles with the federal government. Moreover, if the codes of fair
competition were not devised and improved in a timely manner, then their actions were
subjected to scrutiny.17
The Labor Advisory Board had its members selected by the Labor Secretary. They
handled the labor policy during the code-negotiating process.18 Dr. Leo Wolman was the
chief administrator of this board.19 Wolman had been an educator and labor analyst for
more than twenty-five years. He had been employed as an union representative and
worked for many federal governmental agencies such as the National Bureau of Economic
Research and the Social Science Research Council. He worked with laborers to ensure that
wages, benefits, and working conditions were satisfactory, and that the interests of the
Special, “Roosevelt Bans Board’s Labor Clause Definition, Los Angeles Times, September 16, 1933. With the
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American worker were promoted.20 This board worked with labor unions to compile
information about the labor situation in American firms and used this data to create the
industry codes.21 Its members were present at the NRA hearings, and they made sure that
workers’ rights were brought to the attention of the chief administrator. The interests of
workers such as wages, benefits, and working conditions, they argued, must be protected.22
The last entity was the Consumers’ Advisory Board.23 Members to this board were
appointed by the chief administrator and President Roosevelt.24 This board handled price
stability issues for American consumers during the hearings, and made sure that their
interests were recognized.25 It was not connected to any particular government agency.26
It maintained the interests of the public and made sure that each code did not contain any
20
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special breaks or privileges. Some scholars argued that this entity was feeble and lacked
enforcement powers.27
Members of these three boards were not paid by the NRA to conduct hearings and
negotiate in the code-making meetings. Board members did not meet routinely. All work
efforts were completed in committees, and members prepared the data that was used in
the creation of industry codes.28 Within each board, moreover, there existed a formal office
and a staff of researchers that worked directly within the NRA. They maintained regular
work hours within the NRA, and they served as resident members for this agency. They
worked with special advisors and visiting staff during the negotiation process.
The NRA worked with other government agencies indirectly, such as the National
Labor Board, the Central Statistical Board, and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.
Most significantly, the National Labor Board, through its actions, played a prominent role in
the propagation of codes of fair competition. Senator Robert E. Wagner served as the
chairman of the labor board.29 Established in August 1933, it settled disputes that arose
with the emergence of the President’s Re-employment Agreement and in conjunction with
the National Recovery Administration.30 After December 1933, the NLB’s powers were
expanded to include the dispute resolution that proved necessary, due to unfair codes, or
issues of workers’ rights. The NLB was the last line of defense for workers, because the
27

Frederick J. Schlink, “Safeguarding the Consumer’s Interest an Essential Element in National Recovery,” Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 172 (March 1934): 115-116.
28
Special Report, “Reply of the Recovery Administration to the Criticisms by the Darrow Board,” New York Times,
May 21, 1934. Although the committees worked together, there were some criticisms in how the negotiations
functioned. Were the witnesses or evidence biased, and were all parties given an opportunity to testify?
29
Chicago Tribune Press Service, “Hutchins Heads National Labor Board in Chicago,” Chicago Daily Tribune,
October 20, 1933.
30
Charles L. Dearing et al., The ABC of the NRA, 52; Robert L. Lund, “Labor Organizing by the Congress and
Lawmaking by the Labor Board,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 178 (March 1935):
100, 102; Charles J. Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 25-26.

239

agency made sure that all avenues had been extinguished before it took cases involving
labor disputes. This agency could only sanction offenders by removing their Blue Eagle
designation.31
The codes of competition were central to the operation of the NRA. The codemaking process moved from the establishment of ideas and tentative proposals to the final
approval of a code.

The decision-making process within the NRA revealed its

organizational structure. Charles L. Dearing and A. Heath Onthank, who served in the NRA,
both addressed this important topic. They illustrated vividly the steps that policymakers
had to follow in order to have a code approved by the presidency.32
Each code that was created by industry leaders and approved by the presidency had
certain uniform provisions.33 These included guidelines for production, process, wages and
hours, and an administrative board. The codes also contained within their stipulations’
information from Section 7(a) that dealt with collective bargaining. At any time, during or
after the code had been approved, the presidency maintained the capacity to abolish any
code, or modify it in any way. An administrative board for each code was established
within the industry with representatives that had as their obligation to interpret and
implement the code. Moreover, each code had to contain provisions against unfair trading
practices. As Roosevelt advisor Adolf Berle wrote “the abuses of the past, the chiseling, cutthroat competition, dishonest practices of all sorts, will be eradicated.”34
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In the beginning of the process, a trade association had to apply to the presidency
for the creation and approval of a code. An industry code contained all of the rules and
guidelines that corporations had to follow or they could lose their Blue Eagle status. Most
codes had the approval of a majority of the industry. This meant that most members
agreed with the stipulations of the code. All agreed to follow the rules. Because cut-throat
competition could have proved detrimental to the national economy, and workers did not
benefit from the financial and labor practices that management put forth, the code had to
be cooperatively developed.35
Once a code had been created, a committee from an industry traveled to
Washington, D.C., to seek approval from the NRA and the presidency. Thus, the code was
submitted to the Control Division of the NRA in Washington, D.C.36 Application forms were
completed and returned to the Control Division for review and approval. There were three
documents that were included in the submission: the constitution and bylaws, a letter by
industry leaders providing a statement of purpose, and evidence that the trade association
represented a majority of the interests of the industry. The trade association that released
the code had to represent at least seventy-five percent of the industry in terms of market
share, so that it appeared that they had the interests of the majority of the industry at heart.
Thus, the codes of fair competition that were presented to the NRA had to have the support
of

a

majority

of

the

industry

leaders.
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These industrial and corporate executives sought its approval in their manufacturing
sectors.37
After the passage of the NIRA, the first codes that were approved by the president
became templates for subsequent efforts. Code-writing was uncharted territory. Thus, the
NRA hired code advisors who discussed the plausible provisions that all industries
understood. Some codes were well-conceived and consisted of several hundreds of pages’
worth of stipulations. Further, efforts were made to have codes that were written clearly,
so that industry leaders could conform to the rules and regulations. All together, there
have been submitted “987 codes representing national trade associations and about 3,000
codes representing regional, state, and local associations.”38
Once the codes, constitutions, and bylaws and other information had been
submitted to the NRA, the documents were registered, categorized by industrial sectors,
and distributed to the offices so that they could be discussed, debated, researched and
analyzed.
submission.

The Control Division then informed the deputy administrator about the
Within the deputy administrator’s office, the codes were distributed to

assisting staff members. They were given portions of the codes for research purposes,
depending upon the expertise of that agent. Hence, if a code was produced for the paper
industry, then an assistant in charge of wooden products examined that code. Mandatory
codes were looked at first to ensure that they complied with NRA regulations. Once this
had occurred, a committee consisting of the three advisory board members, members from
37
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the Legal and Research and Planning Divisions, the deputy administrator, and his assistants
was convened.39
At this meeting, a representative from the deputy administrator’s office served as
the chairman. The codes were then revised. New events that affected the codes led to
alterations in some form: omissions and revisions were taken into consideration. Illegal
stipulations were eliminated from the code proposals. Before a code was viewed as
satisfactory, many meetings had been convened and conducted. It sometimes took days or
even weeks before approval at the preliminary stage occurred. The NRA made enormous
efforts to ensure that all codes were constitutional and had a basis in law, which proved to
be important in initial court tests. Once this occurred, a public hearing with the Control
Division took place.40
Public hearings were important.

Participants from trade and labor unions

expressed their viewpoints about the codes and sought to modify code provisions.41 The
preliminary codes were examined further by industry leaders, the Deputy administrator
and his staff, and members of the advisory boards. At these meetings, trade associations
that represented a certain industry stated their case. Participants examined the pros and
cons of each stipulation or provision of the codes. Trade associations, further analyzed and
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contested the aspects and effects of the codes, should they be approved by the president
and became the law of the land.42
Members of the Consumers Advisory Board were present at each hearing to ensure
that industry leaders provided the NRA with information about pricing and production
costs. This prevented the emergence of price increases under each proposed code.43
Normally, public hearings lasted from one half of a day to four days. A public hearing often
lasted well into the early morning hours, because all interests were given a chance to state
their case and claims. However, economist Adolf Berle argued that the public hearings
were not “court procedures.” They were mainly meetings of industry leaders and the
members of the NRA divisions. Public hearings did carry enormous legal weight. The
president did not approve any of the codes or their proposals unless they had been
navigated throughout the negotiation process.44
Next were the post-hearing conferences. They consisted of a series of meetings with
the steering committee representing the industry to iron out problems that had not been
handled in the public hearings. At this time, the codes were prepared for approval. At
these conferences, the final remarks about the codes were given. Once the codes received
the acceptance of the industries, trade unions, the general public as represented at the
hearings, and the federal government, the codes were sent to Roosevelt for his signature.
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The president received “the chief and deputy administrators’ reports, a transcript from the
public hearings on the codes, statistical information from the Research and Planning
division, and a statement of the codes’ formalizing procedures.”45 Once the president
received this information, he could approve the code or reject it. If the code was rejected, it
could be revised and resubmitted.46
Moreover, the codes could be approved with conditions that must be followed. With
Roosevelt’s signature, the codes were sent to the State Department for filing purposes.
Even though the president signed off on the codes, this did not mean that the industry
codes were not modified further. Codes were subjected to change through the enactment
of amendments, if the need arose. It meant that the codes never became outmoded. They
were subject to amendments that modified the stipulations or provisions of the codes.
Finally, once the codes were approved, American companies that complied with the
codes were given the Blue Eagle Seal, which was a form of economic and legal licensing.47
The industrial codes became law. Corporations, even if they did not sign the codes, were
required to adhere to their guidelines.48 In public speeches, General Hugh Samuel Johnson
argued that, if corporations did not comply with industry codes, he could take away their
Blue Eagle Seal.49 Using public opinion by endorsing business practices with the Blue Eagle
became an important mechanism of persuasion.
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A prominent example of the NRA code-making process at work was the making of
the automobile code for the Big Three Automobile companies and the petroleum code that
affected the southwestern states that maintained many drill sites. These codes show how
the NRA affected their labor and financial actions and decisions. The petroleum code and
the automobile code were, in addition, interconnected. Each industry was dependent upon
the other.

It is necessary to illustrate the code-making process by examining the

interconnections between the oil industry, General Motors Corporation, and Ford Motor
Company. The auto industry, however, was concerned with the repercussions of section
7(a) and the introduction of collective bargaining.
production and price controls.50

The petroleum sector focused on

Even though the industries were interrelated, they

emphasized different issues during the code negotiation process.
The petroleum code limited the oil production and the distribution of petroleum in
the United States. Nationwide oil shipments were limited in an effort to decrease supply
and augment the prices for this commodity.51 The oil prices were not supposed to fall
below the costs of production in order to protect the purchasing power of those who
worked in the industry and the profitability of oil corporations. The oil industry, along with
the other industrial sectors, was similarly protected from foreign products that may have
been cheaper or more cost-effective. Tariffs on imports, and the implementation of quotas
that targeted supply levels increased American purchasing power. The oil industry and the
Big Three, especially the Ford Motor Company under Henry Ford, protested vehemently
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against the establishment of this tax on imports and believed that it led to noxious business
practices.
The oil industry during the early 1930s suffered from poor economic and labor
practices. The oil reserves in the private sector increased at an exponential rate, causing a
contraction of oil prices. Technological innovations had made it easier to acquire greater
oil reserves, and there was the collapse of proration schema that had been used to create a
fair pricing system.52

Moreover, scholars, such as historian Norman Nordhauser, have

shown that only since the Hoover administration did the petroleum companies maintain
statistics and other forms of data regarding production. This information was needed
before new regulations were established.53 Political scientist Donald Brand affirmed that
there had been a glut in oil reserves in the United States, especially after more petroleum
was discovered in East Texas in 1930.54 This influx of supply added to the preexisting oil
fields throughout Texas, Oklahoma, and California.55 All in all, oil prices in the United
States had decreased, causing petroleum manufacturers to lose money, because of a lack of
demand and excess supply.56
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Within the petroleum industry, corporate executives continued to argue over
production levels, especially in states located along the Southwest and South. There was an
enormous debate between those who favored high production levels and those who
supported conservation, and thus higher prices, with decreased supply levels.

Many

industrial leaders and policymakers viewed depressed prices or surplus production as a
detriment to that industrial sector, because it led to cut-throat competition and waste.57
On March 7, 1933, James A. Moffett of the Executive Committee of the American
Petroleum Institute or (API) favored a reduction in the level of oil production to only two
million barrels daily, which would have cut levels by a half-million barrels per day.58
Moffett contended that the petroleum industry was in peril, because of high production
levels and depressed oil and gasoline prices. Only Roosevelt could save the industry, it was
believed, because enforcement of conservation laws was lax, and petroleum companies
were ignoring production schema. If production levels were decreased based upon local
and state demand levels, then prices would become somewhat elevated; and businesses in
this industry would have seen higher profits. The NRA could, thus, provide regulation to
ensure the oil industry’s stability.59
On March 27, 1933, there was a conference for the petroleum industry to devise a
tentative plan before the Official Governors Conferences that was held to be on the next
day. The American Petroleum Institute’s plan, that focused on production controls was not
passed or enacted.
57
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Independent Petroleum Association of California, Jubal R. Parten of the Independent
Petroleum Association of Texas, William M. Keck of Superior Oil of California, H.H.
Champlin of Champlin Oil, E.B. Howard, an Oklahoma producer, and J. Edward Jones of New
York, were not supportive of the API’s plan.60
The following day, a committee of fifteen was established. It consisted of governors’
delegates, representatives of the larger oil companies, and the Independents. To counter
the committee of fifteen, Jack Blalock and Jubal R. Parten formed the Independent
Petroleum Association Opposed to Monopoly.

Members of this group controlled

approximately five to ten percent of the industry’s market share. Both groups believed that
it was imperative that they work together to reform the industry or at least develop
solutions to the industry’s problems, but their methods were wholly distinct.

The

Committee of fifteen pressed for production controls and reform, while, initially, the
Independents were somewhat reluctant to make changes to domestic production levels.61
Policymakers had to deal with the issue of supply and whether it was appropriate to
reduce the production and shipment of petroleum goods in the United States.62
Competition among the Independents and industry leaders in the petroleum industry was
intense. Each company sought to out-produce the other in efforts to take advantage of the
national allocation of their commodities. Petroleum companies in the southwest of the
United States had to sell a large quantity of their products, because they offered too many
incentives, such as rebates, coupons and special offers that reduced the oil prices in the
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private sector.

Most industry leaders, however, feared production controls in the

petroleum sector while the Independents favored government regulations and
intervention.
The Independent petroleum merchants were more than willing to give up some of
their autonomy in an effort to have more production controls. They did not approve of an
unregulated industrial sector, as competition from larger companies undermined their
plans.

The Independents, who were represented by the Independent Producers

Association of America (IPA), wanted to promote stability in the petroleum sector.63 If this
meant curtailing some of their autonomous business practices, then they were more than
willing and capable.64 The Independents had grown accustomed to state regulations, and
they understood that the next step—national intervention--would stabilize the oil reserves
in the national economy. Interstate commerce in oil was somewhat difficult to police and
to sanction behavior when violations did occur. Moreover, there were many wells in the
United States that led to problems of excess supply. For example, Texas contained 15,000
wells, and policymakers believed that it would have taken a numerous amount of state
officials to bring the production crisis and the resultant situation under control.65 Also,
Russell Brown who served as general counsel for the IPA was concerned with illegal
shipments of oil in the United States; because this had the ability to depress the petroleum
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market, promote excess oil supplies nationwide, and reduce the profitability of smaller
companies in the petroleum sector.66
In an effort to handle the crisis in oil, policymakers introduced the Marland-Capper
Bill in the spring of 1933 that was intended to regulate the petroleum industry and its
production process.67 It was introduced by Congressman Ernest W. Marland and Senator
Arthur Capper on May 19, 1933.68 Ernest W. Marland was the director of the API and a
member of the oil industry, while Senator Arthur Capper was a petroleum industry
consultant and policymaker. The bill would have established national production quotas,
and placed limits on oil importation, and raised prices for petroleum products. The bill,
some petroleum sector leaders argued, would have overregulated the oil industry, because
the power to regulate oil was given to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes.

The

production quotas devised by the Federal government thus would have been legally
binding. If petroleum companies had disobeyed the laws, then the companies would have
faced federal fines and penalties.
Petroleum industry leaders were divided over this proposal. Although many felt
that regulations were needed, opposition from oil companies may have been the central
reason why the bill failed in Congress.69 With the introduction of the NIRA, policymakers
and oil men supported this law over Marland-Capper. They were more willing to follow the
letter of the law under the NIRA, because they believed that systematic production and
price controls were necessary to handle excess supply issues and increase profitability.
66
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With the introduction of the NIRA, policymakers and oil men abandoned the
Marland-Capper bill. They were more willing to follow the letter of the law under the NIRA,
because of the need to regulate production and control prices.70 During this period, the
NRA industry board was established to police the oil industry. Many independent oil
producers that had favored Marland-Capper argued that the industry needed regulations
and sanctions. The NRA’s code-making machinery was only a step in the right direction.
Normally, it was the independent producers that favored government intervention while
the multinational corporations were against the NRA. Larger companies and smaller
refineries were not intent to adhere to state regulations and laws to control the shipment of
oil products throughout the United States. Small refineries in the Southwest and Southern
California and East Texas may not have been in favor of the NRA and its code-making
authority.

The Independent group, Association Opposed to Monopoly, believed that

overproduction was not problematic in the petroleum industry, but the emergence of
monopolies in any industry was not conducive to a strong national economy.71 The
organization argued for strong anti-trust laws that protected the small producers and
industry leaders.
In June 1933, after the passage of the NRA, one hundred industry leaders for the
petroleum industry met in Chicago to devise the NRA oil code.72 At the conference, the
members of the oil industry lessened their opposition to overall government controls; but
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negotiators on both sides of the table failed to establish production levels for their industry.
Wirt Franklin from the Independent Petroleum Association argued for price adjustment
strategies and unilateral production and shipment levels. He was supported by Harry
Sinclair, E.B. Reeser of the Barnsdall Corporation, and Judge Amos Beaty of Phillips
Petroleum. Other Petroleum industry leaders such as Judge C.B. Ames, chairman of the
Board of Texaco, worried that price controls may affect negatively profit capabilities.
Production controls may have increased oil prices and led to the strengthening of prices
among their companies.

With price quotas, further regulations became unnecessary.

However, R.G.A. van der Woude, president of Shell Petroleum Corporation, argued that
price and production controls favored the consumer.

They were detrimental to the

industry, because prices would become fixed and cost ineffective.

He believed that

industry leaders would lose money, because prices would be frozen at a certain level.73
Price and production controls would have limited the ability of oil companies in the
United States from adjusting the prices of their commodities.74 This economic strategy was
proposed during the initial stages of the debate and discussion regarding the oil code.75 If
the federal government regulated the prices of oil products, then the petroleum industry
might lose control over the determination of the prices for their products. Corporate
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executives would have become dependent upon the authority of government officials.76
Corporations were able to work on their day-to-day operations, but the absence of price
and production controls might have prevented American corporations from establishing
middle to long-term strategies without the assistance and guidance of federal, state and
local officials. This was a problem for oil industry executives, but big businesses benefited
the most from the implementation of the NIRA.77 Big business profited from the NIRA
because they had a greater ability to control production and oil shipments nationwide.
They may have also had more oil contracts for shipments to filling stations in the United
States and may have had a monopoly within the petroleum sector. Some big businesses
also were frowned upon because on occasion, they made illegal shipments of petroleum
that were above oil transportation limits and standards.
At the conference, policymakers and industry leaders created the Chicago Code,
which established a domestic committee of fifty-four industry leaders to gather petroleum
statistics, and other information, so that production levels could be charted and sound
policies devised.78 Industry leaders understood their market demand within the petroleum
sector, and this information assisted in developing petroleum controls. On June 26, 1933,
the board of directors of the API approved the Chicago Code at a meeting in New York City’s
Roosevelt Hotel.79
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The debate between the NRA officials, independent refiners and major companies at
the NRA code conference was over price and production controls. During the negotiation
process, a price adjustment code was established by the Independents; but leaders from
the American Petroleum Institute had approved the Chicago code. The Chicago code
stipulated that multinational corporations and big oil associations could disapprove of
price stabilization measures at future hearings.80 The Independents favored the Interior
Department’s role in the decision-making processes for the petroleum industry and felt
that Secretary Harold Ickes should serve as an industrial oil czar.81 Gulf Oil, Dutch Shell,
Standard Oil of Indiana, and Standard Oil of New Jersey were against the price control
provisions of the oil code. Both sides debated these two codes, because there was some
speculation that supply levels would be reduced with production controls, and petroleum
would become too expensive.82 Both sides speculated about whether cheap sources of oil
would decline or become non-existent.
Many believed that the large oil producers benefited from the production controls,
because they generated more revenue from the higher prices and had the capacity to store
more oil for future needs. When the public hearings were held in July 1933, there was
much disagreement over what the oil provisions should contain. At the public hearings, the
Association Opposed to Monopoly and the Independents fought over the issue of price
regulations. The Association Opposed to Monopoly proposed stronger anti-trust laws even
though Independents and major companies were in favor of production controls and price
regulation.
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government regulations and interference; and felt that they would lose control of their
business practices.83 The federal and state entities, it would become clear, had to work
together to develop a common ground for which all industry leaders could adhere.84
The conflict between both industry groups became so acute that General Hugh S.
Johnson decided to bypass them by proposing and writing an oil code himself.85 He sought
to write a code that could be approved by industry leaders, not just the various
organizations. He presented this proposal at the Washington, D.C., conference on July 31,
1933. General Johnson wanted the cooperation of major companies, such as Standard Oil
of New Jersey, Sun Oil and members of the API. His code reflected the interests of major
multinational corporations in the establishment of production controls.

Many small

companies argued that the production controls led to their bankruptcy, but it did not
matter to General Johnson, who contended that members of the oil industry had to make
sacrifices and establish austerity programs. The only provision of his code that benefited
small refiners was their ability to go before a local board to press for changes if the
production controls proved detrimental to their business operations.86
A federal board would establish state production levels based upon national
statistics, and oil men could negotiate their production levels with government officials.87
Johnson disapproved of price controls inherent in the Chicago code. He accepted instead
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the position of the major companies that opposed this provision.88 Johnson believed that
maximum price adjustments were necessary to prevent an exponential increase in the
demand and prices for oil commodities. On the whole, however, he believed that minimum
standards were not essential to the oil industry. 89
Because of the oil code impasse, Secretary Harold Ickes from the Interior
Department stepped in and devised a code that contained price controls.90 He hoped to
negotiate between the two sides and reach a definite conclusion. Johnson did not take
Ickes’ intervention well. He decided to rework his proposal and included a slight price
adjustment scheme in his new code. As he wrote, “a ratio of 18.5 to 1 between gasoline and
crude petroleum prices was proposed and equally important, the president was given
discretionary power to fix the minimum wholesale price for gasoline.”91 The new proposed
code caused even more controversy, because the opponents argued that lower petroleum
and gasoline prices destroyed profits and the industry as a whole.92
In mid-August 1933, both General Johnson and Ickes presented their proposals to
President Roosevelt at the White House.

Both sides of the negotiations became

increasingly belligerent. Johnson’s code was accepted by the majority of the oil industry,
even though both sides were dissatisfied. Still, the Texas Railroad Commission wanted to
maintain their immense powers over production controls. They were not inclined to have
a separate federal agency dictate to them how they should exercise their authority over the
88
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oil production decision-making process in their state. Roosevelt listened to their protests,
and they retained their power.

However, the new code did not have any anti-trust

stipulations that small producers and the Association Opposed to Monopoly had
demanded.93
In the end, both the small refiners and the Association Opposed to Monopoly
refused to sign onto the final code. Thus, the oil code was not a triumph for the Roosevelt
administration.

The code did, however, win some approval from Gulf, Shell Union,

Standard of Indiana, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, Sun Oil, Atlantic Refining, MidContinent, Ohio Oil, Magnolia and General Petroleum.94 The petroleum industry remained
divided. The oil code was not popular, but served as a compromise between the parties
represented at the hearings and conferences.
On August 19, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the Petroleum code. It contained
many provisions that regulated the oil industry and promised to stabilize production and
prices.95 On August 29, 1933, President Roosevelt appointed Harold Ickes, the Secretary of
the Interior, as the chief administrator for policing and managing the petroleum code.96
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This was important, because General Johnson was not given this responsibility. His role in
negotiating the code and his support of certain factions undermined the president’s ability
to lead the NRA in regulating the petroleum industry. Although Roosevelt selected the
Department of the Interior to administer to the petroleum industry, Johnson did not argue.
Historically, the Department of the Interior controlled federal oil reserves and this
provided Roosevelt with legal precedent to make this decision. Additionally, precedence
had given control over oil to the Interior Secretary. The Petroleum Administration Board
(PAB) was established under the umbrella of the Interior Department, and Roosevelt
selected industry leaders to form a fifteen member Planning and Coordination Committee
(P&CC) to represent the American firms in the petroleum industry.97 Even with the signing
of the petroleum code, there were still some oil proponents and opponents to price and
production controls. Ickes had to continuously deal with this issue for and against whether
price or production controls were satisfactory and beneficial to the oil sector.
The petroleum code established maximum weekly work hours of no more than
forty for employees involved in oil drilling, production, refinery and pipe-line operators.98
The remaining employees, with the exception of executives, supervisors, and their staff
members and pumpers on stripper wells, could work no more than “seventy-two hours in
any 14 consecutive days or no more than sixteen hours in any two consecutive days.”
admitted that price controls would not resolve the national emergency in the petroleum industry if stringent
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Depending upon the region in which employees lived, minimum wages were established
between forty-five to fifty-two cents per hour for most workers.99 Refinery and pipeline
workers were to be paid, depending upon the states in which they lived in the amounts
between forty-two to forty-seven cents per hour. All in all, most employees could earn
about 12.50 to 15.00 dollars per week depending upon their location.100 Next, child labor
was prohibited. Any adolescent under the age of sixteen could not become employed in the
petroleum industry.101
Article III, section (1) of the petroleum code was another important provision,
because it placed limits on production supplies. This stipulation had been a serious issue
among industry leaders and the Senate during the negotiation process for the NIRA.102
Only 100,000 barrels of oil could be produced daily. Approval from the president was
required for all estimates of production figures and the distribution or allocation of
petroleum products throughout the country.

Limits were placed on the shipment of

petroleum products as well. The Petroleum code established quotas for each state that
were to be administered by government officials, and agencies were to be created when
executive staff members were not present. With production and shipment levels, the base
price for gasoline was to be established through executive agencies. The production and
shipment quotas, along with the creation of a base price for gasoline, were important
provisions, because many industry leaders and Congressional members believed that the
99
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emergency crisis of the petroleum industry was due to cut-throat pricing and
overproduction.103 Rebates and other incentives in transactions were prohibited, because
they led to unfair competition among refiners and filling stations.104
Members of the petroleum industry did not want regulations, but stipulations in the
petroleum code were needed by an industry in crisis. The Petroleum code was not written
to regulate trade unionism and collective bargaining, but to address the issues of
production and price stability. In this code, gas and service stations were regulated; and
employees could only work limited hours at those establishments. Gas station owners and
employees were subjected to minimum wage standards, which were put in place to
improve the standards of living and purchasing power of all Americans.105
With the passage of the oil code, the NRA created the Planning and Coordination
Committee that established eight subcommittees, such as the statistical, production,
refinery, marketing, accounting, labor, adjustment and transportation committees for the
petroleum industry.

These committees were organized to work with the petroleum

industry to ensure their compliance with the oil code. They were given the responsibility
to work on the planning aspects of the oil industry and promote fair practices. This
ensured that all members of the petroleum industry could profit and earn revenue from
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NRA guidelines that had been seen as a necessary part of rectifying the economic
emergencies from the Great Depression.106
As the code negotiations in the Petroleum industries were taking place, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt gave a radio address on July 24, 1933, at the White House.107 He argued
that industry leaders and policymakers were working together initially to combat the
credit crunch that occurred from the Banking Crisis.

These same individuals were

establishing the codes of fair competition to reform the manufacturing and agricultural
sectors. Credit had become sound, and policymakers worked on improving employment
conditions in the industrial sector. Roosevelt contended that ninety percent of monetary
resources had been returned to American citizens, who maintained saving and checking
accounts. This was an important step in the right direction for economic solvency. It was
essential to improve the purchasing power of all American workers in the marketplaces of
the United States. It enabled Americans to acquire consumer goods and participate in the
national economy, because of the restoration of high levels of disposable income.
In his radio address, Roosevelt also mentioned that more than three hundred
thousand American men had been put to work following the adoption of the NIRA and the
AAA. Further, more than three billion dollars had been earned in wages by those who had
been put back to work. The wages earned by the principal breadwinners contributed to the
federal government’s revenue and taxation and grants could be used for public workers.
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This would lead to a business cycle in which wages could be reallocated from the private to
public sectors.
Arguing that for many years, Americans had to worry about prices for consumer and
primary goods and high unemployment levels. President Roosevelt pointed to the passage
and implementation of the NIRA and the AAA as a means to address these problems. The
forces that hampered the industrial and agricultural recovery were being addressed. With
the enactment of the NIRA, child labor had been curtailed, and unemployment levels had
been reduced, because the jobs that children maintained in the labor market could be given
to adult men and women.108

By 1934, policymakers, such as Dr. Ruth W. Ayres of the

Consumer Advisory Board of the NRA and corporate executives from the petroleum
industry, argued that oil prices at refineries had increased by 114 percent and were about
127 percent above the session lows in the national economy.109 The NIRA and the codes of
fair competition that NRA officials negotiated had altered the national and even the global
economy, as many other nations were following the lead of the United States.
Roosevelt in his radio address gave credit to the Presidential Reemployment
Agreement. The PRA was a blanket code that many industrial leaders and corporate
executives had signed before the establishment of specific industry codes. The PRA was
important, because “it got the ball rolling” for many corporations in the various industries
that used it as a starting point for their industrial reforms.110 The PRA served to establish
rudimentary codes so that American corporations could begin to reform their business
practices. Corporations, such as General Motors Corporation, supported the NIRA and they
108
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were more than happy to sign the PRA so that the industrial emergency could be
resolved.111
The automobile industry was among the most significant targets to the NRA. The
Great Depression had proven to be a devastating blow for the automobile industry. In
1929, the automobile industry produced five million vehicles; by 1933, the number had
dropped to 1.3 million cars manufactured annually.112 Detroit, which was the center of the
automobile industry, was a city without a prominent relief program for its citizens. It
suffered from one of the highest unemployment rates in the United States. Thus, it came as
no surprise that, with the oil code in place, the NRA began to focus its attention on the
automobile code. One problem that the NRA faced was that the Big Three, especially Ford
Motor Company, was disinterested in the code process. Henry Ford believed in “self-help
and self-reliance,” and he was against the regulation of the automobile industry.113 Henry
Ford did not want new government regulations to change his company’s practices. In
1933, Ford Motor Company was approximately thirty years old. Ford did not want to lose
control over his business operations, if he signed onto a proposed automobile code.114
During the early years of the Great Depression, however, Ford Motor Company experienced
a “total net loss of over $ 107 million between 1931 and 1932 alone.115 Overall, the
automobile industry had performed fairly well in the national economy in comparison with
other industrial sectors up to 1929. Its only concession to joint regulation was under the
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policies of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, to which Henry Ford did not
belong.116
With the creation of the NRA, most automobile industry leaders worried about the
NRA code process. What if individual companies refused to accept the auto code and the
entire industry was not on the same page? Members of the Automobile industry wondered
what Henry Ford would do if they approved an industry code to which he did not
consent.117 The automobile industry was accustomed to the open shop and company
unions.118
In May 1933, the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC) President
Alvan Macauley considered the National Industrial Recovery Act and how it would affect
the automobile industry. He then started the negotiation process.119 The organization
decided to propose codes for the automobile industry and report their findings to President
Roosevelt and General Johnson. Alvan Macauley announced that Edsel Ford, who served as
President of the Lincoln division, would join the committee in May 1933. Alfred P. Sloan,
Jr., of GM, became the committee’s chairman.120 However, on June 21, 1933, after some
consideration, Edsel Ford appointed Herman L. Moekle, who served in Ford’s auditing
department, to join the NACC and represent Ford Motor Company in the negotiation
process.121
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There were eight versions of the automobile code that the National Automobile
Chamber of Commerce worked on. Section 7(a), which was included in the code, was
reworked so that there would be the continuation of the open shop.122 Auto leaders were
concerned with Ford Motor Company. They believed that assurances were necessary, in
case, Henry Ford decided to disapprove of the automobile codes. On the whole, however,
the auto companies resisted collective bargaining guarantees.
Consequently, on June 22, Johnson had a telephone conversation with Henry
Ford;123 and on June 24, 1933, Johnson flew to Detroit to have a conference with Henry and
Edsel Ford. Johnson believed that diplomacy was the answer to the potential crisis in the
automobile sector during the code process. Ford Motor Company had pioneered a high
living wage and reduced work hours. Johnson believed that Ford could find some common
ground in the proposed automobile code. Henry and Edsel Ford, however, opposed any
provision in the industry code based on section 7(a).
At the meeting, Johnson was given the impression that Ford would accept the
automobile code; or, as John Kennedy Ohl pointed out, he would “play ball with the NRA.”
This turned out to be wrong. Henry Ford did not participate in the final discussions. He
had “second thoughts” about the NRA and specifically opposed section 7(a) of the NIRA,
because of what it meant to the open shop. Henry and Edsel Ford sought to implement a
122
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merit clause that was to replace the closed shop. The merit clause would have rewarded
workers for their exemplary on-the-job service and performance. Ford did not want to sign
on to anything that eliminated the open shop conditions in his plants.124 Section 7(a), in
Henry Ford’s opinion, meant that organized labor would begin to represent factory
workers and establish a relationship with management that was detrimental to the
interests of Ford Motor Company.

Ford further worried about price and production

controls, and felt that they were bad for business.
On July 25, 1933, Henry and Edsel Ford discontinued their participation in the
automobile code-making negotiations. They did not travel to Washington, D.C., to present
the final code to General Hugh Samuel Johnson. At this time, industry leaders and trade
unions had organized a meeting to confirm the details of final code before it was sent to
Washington, D.C., to receive the approval of Johnson and President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.125 One of the major companies, however, stood opposed to any code.
To finalize the automobile code, Johnson flew back to Detroit and held conferences
with the National Auto Chamber of Commerce on July 27 and 28.126 Johnson directly
addressed industry leaders at the General Motors Headquarters on July 28.

He was

determined to not undergo the same problems that he had faced with them in 1917. In
1917, for the War Industries Board, General Johnson had to fight with industry leaders
from the automobile industry regarding military production. He hoped to avoid a similar
confrontation with them in 1933 during the approval process for the automobile code.
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Johnson tried to overcome Ford Motor Company’s objections to section 7(a), which might
have laid the groundwork for collective bargaining in the automobile industry. Edsel Ford
tried to convince Johnson to maintain the open shop and to eliminate the section 7(a)
provision from the automobile code.127 Ford felt that Section 7(a) was not needed in the
code. Organized labor was not necessary to the automobile industry and especially not at
Ford Motor Company.128 Sidney Fine, in his important work, quoted Henry Ford:
He (Henry Ford) made better bargains for his men than any labor organizer could.
We have bargained for our men; we have never been compelled to bargain against
them, nor they against us.129
In his meetings with leaders from the automobile industry, General Johnson tried to
assuage their fears and persuade them that he was not attempting to promote the interests
of organized labor, instead of the open shop. He argued that collective bargaining meant
that representatives negotiated with industry leaders for workers’ rights and benefits that
became the norm with the acceptance of the code. The Big Three could still talk to workers
on a separate and individual basis. Employee representatives did not always have to be
present for the negotiations or discussions on the code and industry conditions. With these
new interpretations of section 7(a), the auto leaders accepted the code; and General Hugh
Samuel Johnson returned to Washington, D.C., to examine the preliminary document.130
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Henry Ford refused to accept any codes that were provided to him, but Johnson felt that
one day he would change his mind.131
On August 1, 1933, Robert W. Lea was assigned as the deputy administrator for
discussions regarding the automobile code. It was his job, in the conferences and other
NRA hearings, to negotiate with the automobile associations, industry leaders and
governmental personnel.132 Lea was knowledgeable. He had served as a president of an
automobile company and had been an employee of the Moline Plow Company. He was a
business leader that became a public servant during the New Deal era. The practice of
business leaders working for the federal government had been a traditional form of public
service and a way for corporate executives to give back to the community. It also meant
that business had a strong hand in shaping NRA codes and practices.
On August 24, 1933, General Johnson met again with the National Automobile
Chamber of Commerce. As a result of his meetings, Section 7(a) was reinterpreted to mean
that there would not be the dis-continuation of the open shop but a merit provision was
added to the code.133 On August 26, General Johnson submitted the Automobile code for
the president’s approval.134 On August 27, Roosevelt signed and approved the code.
With the emergence of the automobile code, Henry Ford knew that he had to adhere
to the code regulations even if they did not contain his signature.135 The prospect of
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government oversight worried Ford immensely, because he did not agree with the
provisions about price and production controls or collective bargaining.136 Moreover,
because Ford did not sign the code, his business did not earn the Blue Eagle designation.
Without the Blue Eagle, the Federal government was no longer obligated to purchase Ford
vehicles for public business.137 Ford’s refusal to sign on could have hurt the business
operations of the Ford Motor Company.
Another reason that prevented Henry Ford from signing the automobile code was
that the proposal was devised to regulate employment levels in the automotive industry.
Ford made the crucial decisions for the company, and he believed that the code would force
him to adhere to public sector standards that may not have been entirely in favor of Ford
Motor Company. Thus, Ford Motor Company did not obtain the Blue Eagle Seal that would
have legitimated its business practices. At the same time, Henry Ford complied with the
code even though this aspect would have regularized or probably altered employment
levels at his firm.138 The provision implied that there would be a stoppage of work for the
autumn introduction of new models, but Ford, GM and the other automobile workers
would have to establish employment practices in which employees worked all year. Henry
Ford, Alfred Sloan, Jr., and others acknowledged that there was some down time
throughout the year of automobile production. Corporate executives wanted to ensure
their workers that, with limited weekly work hours, more individual employees could be
hired and work alongside their colleagues.
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By January 31, 1935, amendment 5 of the automobile code did more to eliminate
production breaks in the previous months; and the automobile sector was more prepared
for new vehicle production the following year.139 Further, the automobile code regularized
employment levels in the automotive industry and auto workers could spread out the
hours in which they worked throughout the year.
The automobile code was not as expansive as the petroleum codes as signed by
Roosevelt.140 The auto code established minimum wage standards for auto employees
depending upon region.141 Those employees who lived in heavily populated areas received
higher weekly wages. If employees lived in a city that contained more than 500,000
inhabitants, for example, then they could earn fifteen dollars per week.142 White collar
automobile employees were to have a weekly schedule of no more than 40 hours with the
exception of a period of two weeks during every six months for inventory purposes. Auto
workers were to labor no more than six days per week, or 48 hours in one week. The NRA
and the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce understood that production was
subjected to peaks and slowdowns, because of the issue of supply and demand for vehicles
throughout the year. Both parties were determined to establish level work hours and
eliminate child labor for those below sixteen years of age.
Once the automobile code had been approved, Henry Ford drew criticism for his
failure to support the NRA. Many citizens wrote to the NRA members that Ford was a
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traitor and that his company was against the spirit and breadth of the NRA. He was even
called a “snake in the grass.” Henry Ford’s refusal to sign the automobile code may have
tarnished his reputation as a great industrialist and automotive icon for the American
people but, Ford did have some public supporters.

Some argued that the NRA was

behaving poorly to the “Nation’s Greatest Benefactor.”
Some business leaders supported Ford, because he was standing up against
extensive government regulation that they felt destroyed the national economy. Among
public opinion, some thought that the Federal government should sanction the actions of
Henry Ford; but others felt that he would be affected by the fact that none of his newly
developed cars had the Blue Eagle seal. This alone would be bad for his business, because
it would cost him money if sales declined exponentially. If companies adhered to the NRA,
then they received the Blue Eagle, which legitimated their business transactions. General
Johnson tried to illustrate to Henry and Edsel Ford, that if they did not have the Blue Eagle,
then they could not conduct or transact business in the United States.143
As a result, General Johnson was adamant that if Ford would not comply with
governmental regulations, then the Federal government would cease to purchase his cars
and trucks. Johnson found precedent for his actions in the Executive Order 6246 of August
10, 1933, which stated the following:
The recipients of government contracts were to comply with the applicable
provisions of the code of their industry or trade or if their trade was un-codified,
with the terms of the President’s Reemployment Agreement.144
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One problem that Henry Ford did face was that he had signed the Presidential Reemployment Act (PRA). The Presidential Re-employment Act was a blanket, or universal,
code of fair competition that corporations signed before the NRA industry codes were
established.145

The PRA sought to handle the financial crisis by the improving the

purchasing powers of Americans, lower unemployment levels, and “restore” the business
and industrial sectors.146 The Ford Motor Company was in partial compliance with the
laws, because it did not approve of the automobile codes. But the automobile company was
a party to the PRA. While these events transpired, Henry Ford continued to improve upon
his company’s work environment and employees’ benefits. On September 5, 1933, in part
as a response to the NRA, “Ford announced that his employees would receive wage
increases ranging from $.40 to $1.00 a day. Ten days later the company made it known that
employment would be given to 5,000 Wayne County veterans.”147 Would the federal
sanctions stand, especially after these Ford improvements?148
Ford Dealer R.P. Sabine of the Northwest Motor Company of Bethesda, Maryland,
decided to test the waters.149 The Commerce Department and NRA were troubled, because
Sabine was the lowest bidder on many government contracts. Initially, President Roosevelt
and General Johnson, as well as members of the Labor and Commerce departments, did not
give in to Sabine, who was an independent Ford Dealer. Although Ford Motor Company did
not sign the automobile code, Sabine’s dealership supported the dealer code. Sabine also
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argued that his business was different from that of Ford Motor Company. Their business
operations had been independent and separate. Sabine was a corporate entity that sold
Ford vehicles.
While the debate and struggle between the Ford dealers-principal and the federal
government ensued, Lewis Lorwin of the Brookings Institution argued that there was
significant strike activity in the fall of 1933 at Ford plants, such as in Edgewater, New
Jersey.150 The Automobile industry was deeply troubled by this occurrence, because it
suffered from decreased automotive production and sales. The automobile code did not
curtail workers from fighting for their rights, as the automobile executives struggled with
indecision and concern that the NIRA might not be the proper course of action. Further,
according to Historian Irving Bernstein, in many industrial sectors, several million work
hours were lost to strike activity.151 Were workers disappointed with the actions of their
colleagues and management or did they seek economic change and social justice? Most
employees felt that collective bargaining was a must for the promotion of social, industrial
and economic change.
On October 28, 1933, Sabine contacted the Comptroller General J.R. McCarl, because
his firm did not receive a contract for supplying several hundreds of trucks to the Civilian
Conservation Corps, although he had been the lowest bidder.152 Sabine commented that his
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bid had nothing to do with the operations at Ford Motor Company, and he had sought
approval for the contract for his dealership alone. Two thousand three hundred vehicles
were involved in this deal, and the Ford dealership bid was $200,000.153
On November 10, 1933, the Comptroller General asserted that Ford’s signature on
the code was not as important as his adherence to the code. The Ford Motor Company was,
in fact, in compliance with the code in terms of paying wages to its employees; and Henry
Ford had already reduced work hours. He did his best to adhere to code provisions.154
Compliance enabled Ford Motor Company and its independent vendors to bid for
government contracts without being sanctioned by the Federal government, even if Henry
Ford had not signed the code.155
As a result, as historian Sidney Fine reported, “on December 1, 1933, the Secretary
of Agriculture Wallace awarded Sabine a contract for over eight hundred trucks for the
Civilian Conservation Corps. By March 1, 1934, approximately $1 million in government
contracts had been granted to Ford dealers.”156 The battle between Ford Motor Company
and the Federal government was not over. On March 14, 1934, Roosevelt signed an
executive order 6646 that stipulated that a certificate of compliance of the industry codes
was necessary to obtain government contracts. Sabine was unable to obtain further
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contracts. Although he and his dealership complied with the dealers’ code,157 Ford had not
signed a certificate of compliance.
The Federal government relented on the executive order some months later,
because the acquisition of Ford vehicles was more cost-effective. It is interesting that
Henry Ford did not agree with the code process, although he was not in violation of the
industry code.

He followed them to the letter and sought to improve the working

conditions of his employees. Throughout this battle between the Roosevelt administration
and Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor Company witnessed profitability. Its business
operations did not suffer from a lack of a Blue Eagle Seal. Historian Sidney Fine argued
that:
Indeed, whereas the Ford Motor Company (including Lincoln) had suffered a net
loss of $7,888,718 after taxes and accounted for only 21.5 percent of the total new
passenger cars and truck registrations in the United States in 1933, in 1934 it made
a profit of $21,362,118 after taxes and increased its percentage of total new car and
truck registrations to 28.8.158
Despite Ford’s profitability, there was another battle in May 1934 between
Northwest Motor Company and the federal government. The dealer sued the federal
government, because the latter would not accept the dealership’s contract, even though it
was the lowest bid for the acquisition of American vehicles. The Press Digest from May 9,
1934 stated that the federal judiciary had to decide whether the executive order from April
1934, that established that bidders for government contracts that operated within the
codes of fair competition and carried the Blue Eagle Seal, was legally valid and
constitutional.159 Remember, Northwest Motor Company operated under the code for
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dealerships, but Ford Motor Company did not sign the automobile code; and the dealership
sold Ford cars and trucks. While this case was filed, Henry Ford lost a case against the
Departments of Interior and Agriculture. Neither department would consider Ford’s bid
for vehicles for government personnel.
Justice Daniel W. O’Donoghue, who served in the District of Columbia, argued that
Ford was not following the letter of the law, even though he had signed the PRA.160 While
Henry Ford’s bid was thirty thousand dollars less than Chevrolet, the latter obtained the
contract. Ford was dissatisfied with the results of this case, and he appealed to the Court of
Appeals for a positive settlement. But in July of 1934, corporate executive at Ford Motor
Company signed the NRA auto code and this ended the war between Henry and Edsel Ford
versus General Johnson at the National Recovery Administration.161 Now Ford Motor
Company was in complete compliance of the auto code.
Examining General Motors Corporation during this period, industrial conditions
were somewhat different from the norm.

During the negotiation process for the

automobile code, President Sloan and General Motors Corporation expressed their
gratitude and approval for this process.

Moreover, Sloan was supportive of General

Johnson, because Sloan thought that Johnson would be competent and astute.162 Sloan was
in favor of the industry codes.163 He believed that higher wages for his employees at
General Motors Corporation and at other businesses prevented the exploitation from
160
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management in the job market. Sloan decided to work with trade unions, rather than
against them, even though unionization at his firm had not occurred at this time.164
Employees benefited from improved wages and this was one reason why he supported the
codes.
From 1932 to 1935, General Motors was not faring very well financially. Sales
figures for the period were not inspiring. In 1932, annual sales reached 510,060 vehicles
while, in 1933, General Motors experienced some improvements in the sense that it sold
755,778 to consumers.165 In November of 1932, General Motors did not sell more than
12,780 cars; and the situation did not improve until November of 1933, when General
Motors sold 35,417 cars. The shift in car sales may have caused Sloan to favor the NIRA
and the industry codes that were established in August 1933. He believed that the industry
would perform better with the codes in place, even though he refused to negotiate with
unions.
By examining the sales figures, Sloan and other corporate leaders knew that the
national economy was in a financial crisis. Sloan may have thought that the industry codes
were a step in the right direction for improved economic growth and expansion. He
differed from Henry Ford who was not a member of the National Automobile Chamber of
Commerce; and initially, Ford did not support the automobile code. Not surprised with the
passage of the NIRA, Sloan knew that Roosevelt would enact this law. He was convinced
that it was the right thing to do for the American people. The law was important, because
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by 1933, there were only fifteen automotive leaders in this industry sector and General
Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation were in the top three
spots.166 The automotive industry was becoming more competitive with fewer companies
in operation. Industry leaders attempted to rely on the Roosevelt administration to devise
resolutions to this crisis and to improve economic conditions for American workers and
corporate executives.
With the passage of the NIRA, Sloan was certain that the industrial crisis would be
resolved. He continued to communicate with the leading automakers in the industry and
coordinate corporate policies to complement the NIRA. He even became a member of the
Industrial Advisory Board within the National Recovery Administration.167

Sloan

attempted to link his corporate practices at General Motors Corporation to the principles
and policies inherent to the NIRA. He sought to follow the letter of the law, because he
believed that Roosevelt was correct in his assertion that the United States was in an
economic downturn.
Sloan believed that the NIRA benefited workers, because of the increased wages,
limited working hours, and corporate incentives that were put in place with the code.168
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Moreover, he sought the corporate advice of the Business Advisory and Planning Council,
which was an industrial organization. This think tank had as members, Gerard Swope of
General Electric, Walter Teagle of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and Louis Kirstein
of Federated Department Stores.169 Sloan joined this group, because he was satisfied its
qualified and important members gave the organization public legitimacy.

Sloan also

joined the Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA. With business leaders joining the NRA,
many grassroots activists may have felt that the agency promoted big business interests.
Remember, corporate executives had worked for the WIB during World War I, and it only
made sense that they would continue in the employ of the NRA.
Sloan did have some initial reservations when he joined the IAB, because he did not
approve of the closed shop or in extensive government regulation of industry. Organized
labor unions continued to be a problem for his industrial psychology.170 He agreed with
improving the conditions for workers, but he was concerned with the policies of trade
unions. He was not sure if trade unionism worked or whether it benefited American
workers.

With the NRA, Sloan became pro-active and decided to become a dynamic

participant in the negotiation process. He was certain that this law worked. He differed
from his colleagues and the National Association of Manufacturers, who believed that this

economic turnaround. Lastly, he contended that Americans, in this period, would have to choose between
government regulations of the national economy or a system of laissez-faire.
169
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new law was harmful to American workers. He was not suspicious of the law, but he had to
overcome the disapproval of his colleagues.171
Over time, Sloan did have some reservations about the NRA.
disappointed with the agency.

He became

He also felt somewhat disappointed, because of the

unsuccessful efforts to devise sound industry strategies and policies.

Sloan tried to

promote competitive industrial policies, but he became convinced that the New Dealers
would not create legislation or codes that would augment free enterprise and free trade
globally. Sloan did not believe in inflationary policies or low wages; but he sought to
establish an industrial code that served the interests of corporate executives and
employees.
During the Great Depression, General Motors Corporation was the only automobile
company to earn significant levels of profit. If General Motors was performing well, then
why did Sloan become so dissatisfied with New Deal politics?172 Initially, he supported the
NIRA wholeheartedly, but over time, he became disillusioned with the NRA and the tactics
of government agencies.173 Did he believe that the NRA was attempting to tell automakers
and other industry leaders how to run their businesses? This may have been the case. As
the months progressed and the NRA regulations did not change the nature of the national
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economy, Sloan sought to change his industrial outlook and his support shifted to the right.
He became a supporter of NAM and began to give speeches on behalf of this
organization.174
The National Association of Manufacturers was supported by businessmen who
were conservative and wholly Republican. Sloan was under the group impression that the
NRA suppressed industrial competition and penalized corporations, such as GM, that were
financially independent, stable, and efficient. Sloan was not pro-labor; but he believed in
giving workers the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, he was concerned that politicians were
not listening to their constituents when they crafted the NIRA and other industrial laws and
codes.
In summary, by 1934, Sloan began to part company with the NRA and the IAB. This
was important, because initially, he had been supportive of this agency. Sloan may have
realized through his efforts with the IAB and other entities that the Roosevelt
administration could not devise industry codes that regulated successfully the
manufacturing sectors of the United States. He may have believed that the NRA was
attempting to tell corporate executives how to run their businesses, and it may have been
disconcerting to him. Sloan differed from Henry Ford and other industry leaders, who
viewed the NRA with contempt and disdain. In 1933, Sloan held out hope that Henry Ford
was wrong in his assertions and that the NRA was a step in the right direction for industry
leaders. By 1934, Sloan was overcome with dismay at the policies of the NRA. It may have
been the industrial advice that he received from the NRA; and trade unions, which caused
him to rethink his position. All in all, Sloan changed his mind and began to support more
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conservative viewpoints and ideas for General Motors Corporation. He may have felt that
this was the only way that he could realize industrial improvements to the national
economy.

He may have speculated that he could not depend on the Roosevelt

administration and its efforts to drive the national economy in a positive direction.
By examining the sources for General Motors Corporation, it is difficult to determine
why Sloan modified his political views. Initially, Sloan was supportive of the NRA, but he
changed his tune in 1934.175 Sloan even became a member of NAM, which opposed any
federal intervention or regulation of the market. Moreover, it is impossible to pinpoint
exactly when Sloan changed his mind or what act of the federal, state, or local authorities
influenced him to become more conservative.
All in all, both the petroleum and automobile sectors experienced many industrial
highs and lows in the 1920s and 1930s.

The oil and automobile industries’ code

negotiation processes also reveal the difficulty of talks between the NRA and industry
leaders. The normal process that industry leaders and the NRA had to take in order to
receive approval for the codes was not the same for different industries nor did they
always follow protocol.

General Johnson had to take extraordinary steps during the

negotiation process for both oil and auto industries. He realized that the process would not
be easy. The oil industry was concerned with the pricing of their commodities as well as
the production process and levels. Small refiners did not have the same profitability as the
larger multinational corporations. Both entities were afraid that the NRA and its codes
would be bad for business. However, change was necessary in order to mitigate the effects
of the national economic emergency.
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companies were concerned with maintaining their profitability.

Thus, policymakers,

scholars and corporate executives asked themselves whether the industry codes prevented
economic growth or expansion.

The industry codes led to the emergence of highly

regulated industries, but corporate executives had to determine for themselves if the codes
were effective in bringing about economic change and sustained growth.
The automobile industry underwent the same process. Industry leaders worried
about the effects that the closed shop had on prices and the sales of their products. Henry
Ford also protested vehemently against the automobile code, because he did not want to
lose control over the business operations of Ford Motor Company. Would overregulation
and collective bargaining destroy his business? Henry Ford believed in the open shop and
disagreed with policymakers and organizational think-tanks, such as the Brookings
Institution, that sought to include Section 7(a) in the automobile code.
The automobile code would have altered the relationships that management had
with its workers. Workers for the Big Three would have been represented during the
negotiation process for wages and workers’ benefits. If they were represented by an
outside party, such as a trade union, then workers would gain access to information about
labor policies from their union representative.

This would have enabled them to

understand their rights. The industry leaders may have felt that the information that
workers received would have been harmful to their corporate practices and policies.
General Johnson, however, worried about radicalism among trade unions. He did not
believe in the strike, but he approved of collective bargaining; because he fostered a
professional environment between workers and management. In many ways, Henry Ford
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and General Johnson had these principles in common.

The NRA reflected Johnson’s

positions.
It is also important to note that during and after the negotiations for the automobile
code, both General Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company encountered some labor
difficulties. General Motors had to contend with the Flint, Michigan sit-down strikes
conducted by over three hundred hourly workers at Fisher Body and Chevrolet plants.176
Ford Motor Company was subjected to the Edgewater crisis in New Jersey where over one
thousand men participated in demonstrations.177 In terms of the 1933 automobile strikes
at Ford Motor Company plants, Henry Ford placed the blame on bankers and other
financial managers.178 Both events occurred in the 1930s when there were efforts to
cement trade unionism in terms of the recognition of the United Auto Workers in the
automobile sector. General Motors also faced strike activity at seventeen plants in the
United States in 1937. General Motors plants in Indiana, and Missouri are mentioned in
contemporary newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal.179 The situation throughout the
country was tense and severe.
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Most workers had been receptive to Ford Motor Company before the 1930s, because
Henry and Edsel Ford were noted for improving wages, benefits and limiting weekly work
hours while Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., negotiated with workers to prevent sanctions and the overregulation of the auto industry. After much political and labor pressures, both Ford Motor
Company and General Motors Corporation signed the auto codes, but in 1935, when the
NIRA was declared unconstitutional, both firms experienced some labor and civil
disobedience as workers began to fight for their rights as employees of multinational
companies that they felt had the financial resources to improve work conditions and
benefits.
The emergence of the NIRA was a watershed in American economic history. The Big
Three companies argued that the negotiation process for the codes was without
precedence. Industry leaders and NRA officials did not have any laws or statutes that they
could apply to the propagation of industry codes.

This new intervention probably

threatened the automobile industry that, unlike the rest of the industries of the national
economy, was starting to recover in the early 1930s in terms of corporate sales and the
investment of retained earnings. Would their business practices be hindered or hampered
if the codes were approved and came to the forefront? This was a question that the
automobile industry did not want to address. The NIRA was established to target reforms
to a national emergency in the United States. Businesses suffered from a lack of economic
growth and confidence in public officials in the United States, but what about the oil and
Big Three companies? Would the Big Three and their vendors become a casualty if they
adopted the code? Would it hurt business? It was a chance that industry leaders did not
want to take.
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CHAPTER 8: OPPOSITION TO THE NRA AND CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURTS

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president, in 1933, many senators, such as
Key Pittman of Nevada assumed that he would encounter difficulties pushing his public
agenda.1 Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican senator from Michigan, argued that the
federal government required a tyrant or dictator who had the capacity, intellect, and
astuteness to get his initiatives through Congress; but overall, the administration’s One
Hundred Days required no extraordinary measures.

Historian James T. Patterson, in

Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, asserted that President Roosevelt and the
Congressional Democrats were able to pass eleven pieces of legislation, in the early
months, with only forty hours of debate.

In 1933, the Democratic Party had an

overwhelming majority, with 311 Democrats to 116 Republicans in the House of
Representatives while the Senate had 60 Democrats to 35 Republicans.2
One problem that Roosevelt faced was that as he signed new legislation into law, he
encountered more opposition from Southern Democrats.

Southern Anti-New Dealers

became his enemies and staunch opponents. Segregationists opposed the broad sweep of
his programs. Small government proponents saw the New Deal as overreaching. Many
Congressmen were angered by Roosevelt and his success, especially as the Democrats
pushed his agenda through Congress. But Congress could not push the New Deal aside,
because Roosevelt had a political mandate in 1933. Many Democratic Senators, such as
Carter Glass of Virginia, Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma, Millard E. Tydings of Maryland,
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Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina, and Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia were against the New
Deal and voted against many of Roosevelt’s legislation.3

As Roosevelt became more

successful, he experienced backlash from Congress. After the passage of the Agricultural
Adjustment and the National Industrial Recovery Acts, he sought to justify their enactment
and rally support. Once enacted, the AAA, NIRA and the NRA lost their backers.4 This lack
of enthusiasm for the NRA caused government officials, such as Donald Richberg and
General Hugh Samuel Johnson, to travel the country to draw up support from the American
people.5
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 and the National Recovery
Administration it created provoked serious controversy in the political and economic
spheres.6 Although the NIRA had only a two year life-span, it faced much opposition among
business leaders, especially in the petroleum and automobile sectors; this opposition
would lead to political and legal challenges. Passed in response to a national economic
emergency,7 the NIRA was not easy to enforce: it restricted some trade and this limited the
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operations of some businesses.

Conservative Republicans argued that there was an

absence of precedent that justified the enactment of this law. Although there was much
opposition to how the law was enforced, many corporate executives still signed the
Presidential Re-Employment Agreement and the industrial codes in 1933.
As the opposition to the NRA grew, chief NRA administrator General Johnson, and
Donald Richberg, as legal counsel to this organization, struggled to defend the NIRA and the
role that the NRA played in the recovery. They were not successful. Pushback against the
NRA also prompted Roosevelt to speak to Congress and the American people in support of
the agency.

Most importantly, legal challenges to the constitutionality of the NIRA

eventually succeeded. By mid-1935, the Supreme Court declared the NIRA invalid, on the
basis of its infringement of the Commerce clause to the Constitution and the due process
provisions of the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. This chapter will provide
readers with some of the arguments behind the opposition against the NIRA. It will look at
some of the legal arguments for and against this law. It will discuss whether the NIRA held
a prominent place in addressing the industrial and economic emergencies present in the
United States during the Depression decade.
Shortly after the passage of the NIRA, Alfred E. Smith, four-time New York State
Governor and Presidential hopeful, criticized the law in a New York Times column.8 He
argued that the United States had entered a new era in which collectivism and
governmental regulation had become a mainstay. The way of life based on American
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Individualism and self-help had passed. In his commentary, Smith argued that the passage
of the NIRA marked a new stage in United States’ history. He questioned whether progress
was made in the American legal system with the passage of the NIRA, because the law was
unprecedented. He argued that if “the terms of the Recovery Act are carried out literally
the tendency will be to cripple initiative, legalize and even officially encourage monopoly,
raise prices and require higher tariffs to maintain the new structure.”9 Smith wondered
whether the limited nationalization of the American economy represented by the NRA was
a step in the right direction.10 Further, he asked how much nationalization was necessary
to promote positive change. Was the establishment of state enterprises the next step?
Raising the specter of a state-controlled economy, Smith voiced political opposition to the
core programs of the New Deal.

His stance differed from FDR, who asserted that

centralized planning and federal regulations were necessary in the private sector to
address the economic crisis.
Smith wondered about average citizens and how they were affected by this law. He
questioned whether they would be “lost in the shuffle.” This last point was important,
because Smith wondered whether ordinary citizens would become active participants in
the national economy and benefit from the changes in industry laws. If Americans were
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“lost in the shuffle,” then they would lose their political voice and become unresponsive to
changes in the national economy. Smith did not believe that the Roosevelt administration
was on the right path, and he did not think that the recovery would occur with the
enactment of the New Deal laws.11 Although Smith no longer served as a public official
after 1935, he still maintained a powerful and determined base of support in the United
States. His ideas even carried some political weight in the Roosevelt administration,
because he was a Democrat and Roosevelt’s predecessor as the New York State governor.12
Alfred Smith was the prominent voice of the small business owners who held some
reservations about the New Deal, especially the Agricultural Adjustment and National
Industrial Recovery Acts. The national economy was becoming more industrialized and
small business owners and small farmers no longer held a prominent voice in the White
House. With the New Deal, the small business communities began to realize that their
power in the national economy was waning and their interests were no longer as essential
to the government.13 This led to some opposition among small businesses for the New
Deal, because their presence in the manufacturing sectors was no longer influential. They
perceived that they were losing federal support for their industrial practices and business
concepts.
Alfred Smith asserted that economic and political developments had altered
corporate perceptions about appropriate industrial and business standards that prevailed.
11
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Small farmers, businessmen and other industrial leaders may have felt out of place as
participants in this newly-developed national economy no longer responded to their
needs.14 The national economy was run by large multinational corporations who had
hundreds to thousands of employees and produced substantial amounts of consumer
goods each year. This new economy changed the ways in which the federal, state and local
governments viewed the small business community in relation to dominant international
corporations. But as a consequence of this newly developed national economy, historian
Alan Brinkley argued, most Americans believed that the federal government had to step in
to rectify the absence of equalitarian economic, financial, and industrial environments
during the crisis.15 The federal government had to become proactive and assertive to deal
with new issues of inequality.
In Invisible Hands, historian Kim Phillips-Fein, affirmed Alan Brinkley’s and Alfred
Smith’s assertions. She argued that, by the early 20th century, big business began to
dominate the national economy.16 They had triumphed over American regionalism as the
United States became a powerful and industrial nation-state. The interests of small farmers
and small businessmen became outmoded and obsolete, as large corporations, such as Ford
Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, hired thousands of employees and
produced massive amounts of consumer goods at a rapid pace. These modifications to the
national economy troubled those who felt that the world had gone astray. They believed
that American workers would not benefit from this newly-formed centrally planned
national economy. According to Kim Phillips-Fein, it was large multinational corporations,
14
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and not just small businesses that led the industrial and economic counterrevolution
against Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda.17
In September 1933, Henry Harriman, the president of the United States Chamber of
Commerce, attempted to convince corporate executives and working Americans to stand
against the closed shop and to promote the open shop in the workplace.18

As a

conservative, Harriman sought to prevent liberal interpretations of section 7 (a) of the
NIRA from coming to the forefront. He opposed the closed shop or unions and attacked it
as an accepted practice in the industrial sectors.19 Harriman also praised automobile
executives who established the merit clause in compensation schemes. The merit clause
provided management with the opportunity and the industrial structure to advance and
reward its employees on the basis of their work ethic and performance on the job.20 In
November 1933, the Republican party, citing an American Federation of Labor survey,
intensified the debate. The GOP argued that, since the emergence of the NIRA, wages
earned had not increased; and the agricultural and manufacturing sectors that had adopted
processing taxes or industrial codes had gone into decline.21 Similarly, the Chamber of
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Commerce insisted that farmers had not generated more proceeds from the sale of their
commodities then before.

Prices for farm goods in stores increased, but ordinary

Americans lost valuable purchasing power.22
In January 1934, the Republican party launched a new attack on the Roosevelt
administration. The Republican National Committee complained that the federal deficit
had increased at an exponential rate, due to the enactment of New Deal laws.23 Its
members argued that maintaining a balanced budget should have been the goal of the
Roosevelt administration. Moreover, they contended that there was a lack of confidence in
the Executive Branch, because of its excessive spending programs.

The federal

government, they proclaimed, was in peril, because of Roosevelt’s policies. Henry P.
Fletcher, the Republican National Chairman, argued, in August 1934, that the Roosevelt
administration was on the path toward socialism or collectivism.24 He stressed that the
Roosevelt administration was promoting policies that were akin to a command economy in
the Soviet Union.25
Members of the National Recovery Administration, such as Donald Richberg,
defended the practices of the NRA.26 In the New York Times in November 1933, Richberg
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stated that there was a misunderstanding between NRA members and industry leaders in
terms of how to enforce the provisions of the industry codes. Roosevelt, in response to
general criticism, established the National Recovery Review Board in order to handle
complaints from business leaders, especially small companies.27 The NRA and its subagencies had over thirty labor lawyers that handled litigation cases and worked in
conjunction with the Department of Justice to ensure that there were no violations of the
law. Labor attorney and Donald Richberg’s legal colleague Charles S. Darrow was selected
in May of 1934 to head National Recovery Review Board. Darrow’s obligation was twofold. He had to determine whether the suspension of anti-trust laws led to monopolistic
behavior in the private sector and to discover whether small businesses were affected by
the adoption of industry codes.28 Some small business owners had voiced concern, because
they felt that multinational corporations could use the industry codes to drive them out of
the marketplace causing bankruptcy.
More to the point, Richberg asserted firmly that the NRA was not a public
dictatorship over the private sector.29 It had not been established to coerce corporate
executives or to tell them how to run their business operations. The intentions of the NRA
were to regulate industries in the national economy, not to take them over. Richberg had
to address the question as to whether Congress provided the Executive Branch with too
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much legislative power and control.30 Corporate executives continually had consistently
challenged the roles of government in the private sector.

Their argument against

government regulations surfaced against the NRA, because corporate elites feared
government interference in their businesses. Government regulations were, by contrast,
difficult to enforce; and it was not clear how to promote corporate compliance of the
industry codes.31
Richberg affirmed that policymakers, along with private citizens, understood that
the national economy was capitalist, not communist or socialist. He made clear distinctions
between the communist dictatorship in Russia and the democratic values present in the
American government and economy. Without a combined approach between the private
and public sectors to regulate the national economy, Richberg argued, he feared that more
direct government intervention might have become necessary.

His New York Times

articles, further, contended that the NRA was the middle path between “the 18th century
individualism and the 19th century socialism.”32 Roosevelt had taken a new path toward the
economic recovery and this meant that neither old world Individualism nor socialism were
suitable as solutions for the industrial crisis. Did he imply that the NRA as a government
agency could fit within classical economic theories, or was extensive state intervention into
the economy a necessity for policing the entire system? From Richberg’s perspective, the
30
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NRA was designed as a gradual approach toward regulating the national economy, one
justified by the continuing economic crisis.
In December 1933, the New York Times published an editorial article that challenged
perceptions that the NRA was an institution approved by industry leaders. The staff
reporter stated that 98 percent of manufacturers did not support the licensing provisions
of the NRA nor the stipulations behind the Blue Eagle. These corporate executives did not
support collective bargaining, such as section 7(a) of the industry codes.33 At the WaldorfAstoria, that year, members of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) met for a
two day conference to discuss industry and economic policies. NAM initially supported
Roosevelt: but by 1934, it became disenchanted with the New Deal, especially the NIRA,
and sought legal change.34 James A. Emery, as NAM general counsel, stated that section
7(a) and the licensing provisions of the NIRA should be separated. He argued that industry
self-regulation should remain a mainstay of the manufacturing sector and that the licensing
provisions of the NIRA and section 7(a) were wholly detrimental to the American
economy.35 If the licensing provisions were separated from section 7(a), and a company
violated the collective bargaining stipulations, then management would not lose its Blue
Eagle designation. Additionally, businesses would not have to maintain the closed shop or
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lose their industrial mandate, if they changed their approaches toward trade unionism.36
This suggestion implied that if corporations violated section 7(a) of the NIRA, then they
would not automatically lose their Blue Eagle license.
What was neglected in the New York Times report on the conference was some
perspective on how ordinary Americans viewed the law. How did most American voters—
as distinct from business—view the NIRA, and did they believe that the law was a
detriment to their social conditions? Did the average American live decently, because of
the enactment of this law or did they earn less in wages and lose their ability to subsist
during this economic emergency?37 Donald Richberg, in a Rotary Club speech in Chicago,
attempted to respond to this problem of inequality by stating that he believed in high
wages as long as it did not destroy the production process.38 He also sought to increase
prices but did not want American workers to lose their valuable purchasing power. He
took to heart the interests of ordinary Americans and sought to use the NRA as a
springboard for change.
Although the National Association of Manufacturers criticized publically the NRA,
Donald Richberg responded in the New York Times article that appeared on the same
month. In it, he defended the actions of the NRA in its efforts to devise guidelines and
quotas for the national economy. Specifically, he stated that:
Not long ago I said that the Recovery Administration was seeking to establish a halfway house of democratic cooperation for the common good, midway between the
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anarchy of unplanned, unregulated industrialism and the tyranny of state control of
industry.39
Richberg stressed that it was necessary to develop coordinated strategies for businesses so
that they functioned properly in a hostile economic environment. Only then could the
American public receive the consumer goods that it needed. Thus, he argued that it was
necessary to coordinate their industrial strategies and work together in a collective way to
stimulate growth and change. Traditional and classical economic tactics no longer worked,
and Richberg believed that it was now necessary to establish a centralized approach to
regulate the marketplace.40
Richberg’s last statement touched on how the NRA was designed to assist ordinary
Americans live better and improve upon the struggling economy. The same workers who
produced consumer goods could not afford to purchase them in the marketplace.41
Working people were faced with economic crisis, but they wanted to accomplish more than
just survival.42 They wanted to thrive, and the NIRA was established to help them along
this path. Many Americans remained unconvinced that the NIRA was the answer to their
financial prayers.
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Throughout the short life of the NRA, General Johnson and Donald Richberg
defended its policies; but criticisms and opposition to the NRA did not abate.43
Policymakers and industry leaders believed that the country faced a severe economic
emergency, but solutions to the crisis were a source of conflict.44

There were no

agreements about the steps that Roosevelt could take to resolve the economic collapse.
When the NIRA was devised and approved, industry leaders, such as Henry Ford and
members of the NAM were cautious. They did not know if this was the right step or what it
meant for their industry in particular. Members of the oil industry, for example, did not
want an industry czar to have control over the creation of their business practices, price
structure, and decision-making processes. Many businessmen worried, because the NIRA
was the first law of its kind to have provisions that required business compliance with
government-negotiated federal standards.
Some scholars, lawyers and political activists were concerned with the passage of
the NIRA. They looked for legal precedents to prove or challenge its constitutionality.45
They understood the interconnections between the state and federal judiciaries, and they
sought to use both entities to affirm the NRA and the NIRA. Initially, NRA supporters
argued that prior cases could be discovered and used to promote the validity of the NIRA.
These supporters had to reach back into court decisions from the late 19th century to affirm
their legal positions and stances.
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During the late 19th century, the United States was no longer viewed as just a
regional power by global actors. The country had become an industrial and economic
powerhouse; and this had an effect upon the business community. The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act was enacted in 1890 to protect the interests of small business owners from the larger
corporations that monopolized the private sector.46 Amendments to the law established
more penalties for violations of its provisions.

The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914

continued this tradition by protecting small business owners from large monopolistic firms
or combinations who controlled the manufacturing sectors. The law also was one of the
first steps toward the legitimation of trade unionism, because it provided workers with the
legal tools that they could use to pursue their rights to external representation.47 But what
impact would these laws have on Americans workers and voters? Would these laws have a
detrimental effect upon the open shop and lead more businesses to adopt trade unionism?
All in all, section 7 (a) of the NIRA was the legal culmination of efforts by trade
unionists to protect American workers that had begun with the passage of the Sherman and
Clayton Anti-Trust Acts. The provision provided workers with new rights to bargain
collectively in the workplace, curtailed the legitimacy of company unions, and promoted
the close shop, which the business community believed was detrimental to their
interests.48 The conservatism of the business community and some policymakers, such as
the Anti-New Deal Southern members of the United States Senate, may have been the
46
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reasons for the conservative Supreme Court decisions in the early 20th century that
established the right or freedom to contract, which recognized contractual workers as
corporate property.
From the late 19th century until the early 1920s, state courts as well as the Supreme
Court applied the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to address the rise of
contract labor.49 Historian James Gray Pope, in The Promises of Liberty, argued that, when
American workers were inhibited from striking, organizing, collective bargaining or merely
fighting for their labor rights, they cited the Thirteenth Amendment, which had eliminated
slavery and the perception of workers as a commodity or chattel property.50 Yellow dog
contracts, labor injunctions, and other worker hindrances were viewed as unconstitutional
to labor leaders, because they invalidated the provisions of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
In 1897, the United States’ Supreme Court decided in Allgeyer v. Louisiana that a
state law that required any insurance business to operate under state licensing provisions
was unconstitutional. In citing Butchers’ Union Company v. Crescent City Company, Powell v.
Pennsylvania, and Milliken v. Pratt, the court affirmed that a citizen should have the right to
enjoy the benefits of selling his labor and the freedoms associated with maintaining an
occupation.51 Citizens could enter into contacts that allowed them to sell their labor and to
benefit from any industrial position for which they decided to work. But the “right of
contract” was used to undermine trade unionism and Federal and state attempts to
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regulate labor. It was argued that workers could not earn a decent living with restrictions
on their rights to work.
Moreover, as Christopher Tomlins has argued, business leaders before the Great
Depression hampered any efforts at promoting trade unionism through extensive use of
labor injunctions and other laws. Management believed that it was necessary to maintain
high production levels and provide families with low prices for consumer goods. This
undermined any steps at sustaining external industrial representation in the workplace as
long as there were substantial employment numbers in each manufacturing plant.52
Strikes were viewed as a necessarily evil, because they hindered the production process
and threatened the supply of consumer goods in the marketplace.53 Efforts at developing
trade unionism were suppressed by legal authorities, when workers were conscious of
their difficult working conditions and limited employment status.54 This problem had to be
overcome if workers were to fight successfully for their industrial rights.
In 1905, the United States’ Supreme Court heard the case Lochner v. New York, in
which Justice Peckham wrote the 5-4 majority decision.55 In citing among others, Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, Holden v. Hardy, Atkin v. Kansas, and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, he argued that
a New York law that inhibited workers in bakeries from working overtime and that had
maximum work hours was unconstitutional, because it hindered employees from
supporting their families financially.56 The court argued that citizens had a right to work in
the private sector and often in order to take care of their households. They believed that
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the New York law violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Americans had to right to due
process and the loss or deprivation of their life, liberty and property was
unconstitutional.57 Employers argued that the New York law that prohibited overtime
obstructed a worker’s ability to earn a decent living. Limiting work hours was a detriment
to small companies that had to increase their labor costs and were, thus, forced out of
business. The right of contract repeatedly was used to justify the invalidation of labor laws.
In Vegelahn v. Guntner, a Massachusetts court case in 1896, the majority decision
stated that striking or picketing was illegal and illegitimate.58 Changes in these practices
began around World War I. President Woodrow Wilson established the National War
Labor Board during the First World War. Further, the 1930 Supreme Court case Texas &
New Orleans Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks allowed for collective bargaining
by workers in the Railway industry.59 In it, the Supreme Court held that the Texas & New
Orleans Railway Co. attempted to establish a company union called the Association of
Clerical Employees, and prevent the introduction of external representation.60
The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks sought to represent railway workers; and Justice
Hughes decided that labor organizations should not be hampered from promoting trade
unionism. He argued that employers could not use injunctions to establish company
unions and inhibit the spread of trade associations. This decision upheld section 2 of the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, because it allowed for collective bargaining without the
interference of corporate management. The judgment also substantiated prior court cases,
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such as Stuart v. Hayden, Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Railroad Commission,
Washington Securities Company v. United States and Bodkin v. Edwards.61

Permitting

injunctions to curtail the spread of trade unionism was viewed as unconstitutional and
violated section 20 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. Lastly, federal injunctions to inhibit trade
unionism took away the rights of workers present in the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution,

because

it

obstructed

employees

and

their

pursuit

of

external

representation.62
The Fifth Amendment became an important provision, because business leaders
believed in maintaining their due process and rights to control their private property or in
this case, their employees once they had signed individual labor contracts.63 The First
amendment dealt with the rights to assemble and many scholars wondered if strikes or
even collective bargaining were in violation to this constitutional stipulation. Corporate
leaders also received more state and federal rights because of the issue of federalism.64
The business community was viewed as benevolent patriarchs that had the peoples’
interests in mind.

But one problem that corporations encountered was that state

governments had the ultimate policing powers of business leaders. If employees could
appeal to state governments to recognize trade unionism and collective bargaining, then
workers’ rights could be promoted.
The Federal government changed its political outlook with the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, especially section 1,
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prevented the use of temporary or permanent injunctions to end strikes if a company had
national business operations.65 The strike or boycott was considered legitimate, and
injunctions to limit strike activity were not justified, if it restrained the Commerce clause of
the Constitution.66 The Clayton Act of 1914, however, was one of the first Congressional
attempts to provide relief to workers affected by the strict enforcement of anti-trust laws.67
If the Clayton Act had not been declared unconstitutional in 1923, then the NorrisLaGuardia Act would have been unnecessary. Section 6 of the Clayton Act stated that the
labor powers of any worker were not forms of chattel or property. Section 20 of the
Clayton Act stated that when the acts of trade unions interfered or caused injury to the
employers’ property rights, then this activity was unconstitutional.68 Thus, the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts gave workers more substantive powers in conducting labor
remedies, such as the right to boycott or strike.69 Injunctions to end boycotts or strikes
were viewed as constitutionally invalid.70
During the Great Depression, policymakers such as President Roosevelt and General
Johnson were increasingly disenchanted with the judiciary, because of the conservativism
of the United States’ Supreme Court and state entities. They, along with other critics,
argued that “judges’ values are the law and they make decisions for the federal institutions
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in which they represent.”71 If a judge established a decision that was contrary to the beliefs
or operations of a business or even a state entity, then it might take years before a new
decision could be rendered that affected pre-existing laws in a constructive way. Thus, the
conservativism of a court could be maintained for many years until there were new
members of judiciary that might hear a related case and overturn the prior ruling. The
slow pace of judicial change meant that the court was conservative, even in times when
liberal legislation challenged and attempted to rework the system of laissez-faire
government.72 Judges, for the most part, were reluctant to invalidate the government
approaches to the American market. Roosevelt’s New Deal programs confronted classical
judicial perceptions that limited and dismantled its provisions until after 1935.

Neither

judges nor policymakers change their value systems overnight. They lingered for a long
period of time, unless new members join and infuse their ranks. 73
By the mid-1930s, employees and firms in opposition to the NRA and AAA filed
court cases that challenged the NIRA, but few cases were supported by workers. The NIRA,
moreover, did not spell out the mechanisms that American workers could take to redress
violations of the industrial codes of fair competition.74 This implied that contacting a local
union was not an effective step for workers that suffered in the manufacturing, retail,
insurance and finance sectors. Before Norris-LaGuardia, workers were subjected to labor
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restrictions as it pertained to trade unionism. Section 7(a) of the NIRA was the first step in
promoting the use of independent labor organizations to address work-related violations.75
In January of 1934, Franklin Delano Roosevelt asserted that it was necessary to
speak to the American people in an address to Congress, because of worker-related fears
about the implementation of the NIRA in industry.76 He hoped to restore the confidence of
Americans in the NIRA, even though there was much discontent in this industrial system
and about the industry codes. He argued that the American people should not move back
to the runaway market competition and instability that had caused the crisis. Americans
had to move in the direction of industrial and centralized planning, because it was the only
way to create stability in the marketplace and economic security. The NIRA and AAA had
enabled Americans to move forward, but confidence in the laws was uneven. Corporate
executives who had initially supported the NIRA viewed the new agencies with skepticism
and with the critical eyes of organizations such as NAM.77
On March 5, 1934, the president gave another address to the General Conference of
Code Authorities and Trade Association Code Committees in Washington, D.C.78 Before the
NIRA was passed, Roosevelt had argued, competition in the national economy was cut-
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throat.79 Corporate leaders tried to expand their business operations and improve their
financial positions at the expense of their colleagues and other economic counterparts.
Competition was often unfair, and many Americans were victims of corruption and
ruthlessness. Roosevelt emphasized that the NRA ameliorated competition. Its adoption of
centralized planning to the national economy in order to starve off the crisis was an
attempt to stabilize the democratic market, not take over market capitalization. Roosevelt
did not believe that he had overstepped his bounds, as he sought to use new domestic
approaches to get Americans back to work.
The purpose of the NIRA was to stabilize the national economy, to enable it to
become structured so that the buying or purchasing power of all Americans improved.
Industry, labor, and the public were to work together for the economic success of the entire
nation. With the NIRA, there was to be a balance between the interests of industry,
government, and workers’ advocates.

All Americans could benefit from the NRA’s

economic modifications of the public and private sectors. Addressing his critics’ concerns,
Roosevelt argued that the NIRA had employed constitutional means to reform the national
economy. Further, Roosevelt argued that “the government could not forever absorb the
whole burden of unemployment.”80
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By 1934, however, many journalists, newspapers and businessmen were no longer
supportive of the NIRA. Many of them believed that the national economy was not stable,
or improving. Conservative reporter Frank Kent, for example, argued that only 1.5 million
jobs had been created since 1933, when the NRA was adopted by the Executive and
Legislative branches of government. Business owners also were dissatisfied with the NRA.
Republican Senator William Borah from Idaho persuaded the United States’ Senate to
conduct hearings on the NIRA so that industry leaders could express their reservations and
outright opposition.81 Borah argued that his office had received approximately “nine
thousand complaints,” and he wanted them addressed.82 The NIRA was so unsuccessful as
a national policy initiative to the business community, Senator Borah insisted that
corporate leaders should not adhere to the provisions of industry codes. If any business
executives were sanctioned by the federal government, then Borah told them to let him
know. Borah would clear the names of the business leaders affected by government
officials who sought to enforce the codes.
From 1934 onward, Senators Borah and Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota continued to
pressure the Roosevelt Administration because they believed that the NRA and AAA
promoted controversial price and production standards.83 They believed that this was a
step in the wrong direction for the American people.

Further, throughout the Great

Depression, Senator Borah campaigned in Idaho for many of his Anti-New Deal Republican
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colleagues, such as Frank Stephan, 1934 candidate for governor.84

Borah supported

Republican candidates that were against the policies of the Roosevelt Administration. He
was a staunch conservative and a strong opponent of the New Deal. However, after 1935,
Borah somewhat changed his political outlook because he asserted that the Herbert Hoover
and the Old Republican Guard failed to prevent the Great Depression and hampered the
economic viability of the American people.85

He was against the exploitation of the

American people by the Republican party, but continued to argue that Roosevelt sought to
establish a governmental dictatorship by political mandate to resolve the economic crisis.
The problems that business leaders and conservative policymakers faced were in
section 7(a) and the emergence of collective bargaining as an important provision of the
NIRA. Conservative businesses had long relied on Liberty of Contract arguments in labor
law. Commonwealth v. Perry in 1891 illustrated this point vividly, because workers were
given the rights to sell their labor rights in American marketplaces.

At no point did this

legal precedent acknowledge workers’ limitations in individual bargaining. In the early
1920s, the United States’ Supreme Court increasingly relied on the 13th and 14th
amendments in an effort to protect American firms.86 The employer had the right to dictate
the conditions of employment. In two cases decided in 1921—American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council and Truax v. Corrigan, collective bargaining and other labor
rights were viewed as unconstitutional. It hindered the rights of employers to utilize the
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labor rights of their employees.87 American Steel Foundries held that trade unionism, and
collective bargaining, had become legitimate industrial and labor practices, because of the
passage of the Clayton Act of 1914.88

Employers argued that strikes and industrial

syndicalism interfered with the rights of management to use its corporation’s property in
the appropriate fashion.89 Thus, the labor laws that governed the American private sector
benefited the firm and protected the property rights, not employees.
These two court cases were important, because they addressed workers’ rights in
the labor market.90 Workers had the right to sell and own their labor: but once they
became employed, then the labor powers of workers became the property of that firm.
Further, employers could not own the labor rights of their workers while employees had
the right to sell their own labor assets to the firms of their choice. This implied that
employers could control the business operations, and production and labor costs of their
firms.

This principle served to disfranchise employees in the workplace.

American

workers did not completely control their labor and could not use trade unions to fight for
their labor rights.91
More importantly, court cases that challenged the constitutionality of the NIRA
increased dramatically after 1934. Criticisms of the law were manifold. First of all,
scholars and policymakers questioned whether Congress had the power to expand its
legislative power under the Commerce clause of the United States Constitution.92 Further,
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they asked whether the NIRA extended or enlarged the legislative powers of the Executive
branch and its myriad agencies.

The key questions were how much regulation was

necessary to affect interstate commerce, and whether the commerce clause and interstate
commerce were interwoven.

Many scholars have contended that Congress had the

constitutional power to develop regulatory policies for the federal level, but there were
some repeated challenges to this framework. Yet, regulations were imperative to police the
system, which became essential if the government was to intervene in the economic crisis.
The meaning of interstate commerce and the commerce clause, however, was expanded
under the NIRA, which aimed to “revive” the national economy and promote an expanded
role for the federal government to regulate interstate commerce.
David B. McCalmont, Jr., from the Yale Law Review, argued that Congress and the
Executive Branch received extensive legislative powers under the NIRA to curtail the
economic emergency that had occurred after 1929.93 If this was the case, then Congress
and the Presidency maintained this expanded responsibility until the economic emergency
had ceded. But were these powers limited to the economic emergency? Still when it
ended, would federal authorization be curtailed?94
Second, legal scholars asked whether due process was inhibited under the NIRA.
Traditionally, price controls had been shown to lower prices for consumer goods and, one
might add, for labor services and raw materials. The NIRA and the AAA were different in
the sense that they aimed to raise prices for commodities in the United States and globally.
93
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Raising prices as a government policy was largely uncommon before the Great Depression:
but traditional economic approaches had failed to resolve the crisis. The New Deal, which
was engaged in persistent experimentation, sought to use industrial codes and price
guidelines as a way to fix the economy.95 In most court decisions before 1934, however,
justices contended that the regulations for lowering prices for commodities and consumer
goods were unconstitutional.
Third, challenges to the NIRA asked whether Congress expanded its role as a
mechanism for promoting interstate commerce under this law. Could Congress have the
legislative capacity to regulate interstate commerce by inhibiting the shipment of goods
from American corporations without a license or the Blue Eagle Seal? Could Congress
devise a law that promoted collective bargaining and thus eliminate yellow-dog contracts
from the economic and industrial discourse? Legal experts at the time affirmed that
Congress had the power to expand its legislative capacity and embody its legislative
qualities in other federal entities, but legal challenges also asked whether the NIRA
interfered with the separation of powers between the three federal branches of
government.96 Further, they asked whether the NIRA violated due process. If an employer
was entitled to enter into contracts with his employees and to use their labor for the
benefit of his corporation, was it unconstitutional?

These questions were important

because strikes, collective bargaining, and restricted contracts were affected by the NIRA.
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The new law expanded Congressional and Executive powers into uncharted territory in the
judicial system.97
The courts had to decide whether due process was affected negatively by the NIRA.
If employees were recognized by an outside party that bargained for their benefit, then this
might interfere with the relationship that employees had with their employers?
Supporters of the NIRA argued that the provisions of the industry codes of the NIRA did not
interfere with due process and they had been accepted by policymakers as the letter of the
law. Stipulations that limited weekly work hours or fixed minimum wages were widely
seen as solutions to the unemployment crisis. In many ways, it appeared that due process
was promoted with the NIRA, because Congress was expanding the ability of American
corporations to resolve this national emergency though government channels. The NRA
created industry codes that reformed the national economy and made it easier for
businesses to conduct economic and financial transactions. The provisions of the codes of
fair competition were put in place to enlarge the business operations of American
businesses and due process as well.98
Another problem that the courts had to address was whether it was within the
scope of the legislative powers of Congress to regulate intrastate commerce. Did the NIRA
expand the powers of Congress to govern companies in the national economy that
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conducted local business or intrastate commerce?99 What if a corporation employed
thousands of workers in the manufacturing sector but decided to lay-off a number of its
employees.

This act affected interstate commerce in a negative way, because the

corporation was reducing its manufacturing capacity nationally. Each state where the
corporation that had employees was affected by the reduction in employment levels,
especially if the company curtailed its national or international business.
Small, regional or local businesses were considered wholly different, and Congress
arguably had less capacity to regulate them, if their business was intrastate and outside of
the NRA’s jurisdiction. Legislators and other policymakers had to decide whether the
corporation that reduced its workforce could be regulated by the federal government, due
to the impact of its business practices; they also needed to decide the limits of regulation.
Did the federal government need to treat the operations of small businesses differently
than multinational corporations? If unemployment levels increased in the United States,
could Congress regulate interstate commerce in an effort to reduce the lay-offs and allow
for the hiring of more American workers? These were important questions, because they
dealt with the role of the federal government in the national economy. Congress, the
Judiciary, and Presidency all shaped the roles that businesses played to enhance economic
growth and job creation.100 By 1934, these questions came to the surface and corporations
brought court cases to challenge the government powers.101
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As a result of the criticisms of the NRA, opponents brought several dilemmas to
federal court cases to challenge the provisions of the law. Initially, these cases appeared in
the district courts, courts of appeals, and state supreme courts. Over time, the United
States Supreme Court became involved. It reviewed the NRA case, Schechter v. the United
States in 1935, which declared the NIRA unconstitutional.102 These cases addressed the
constitutionality of the industry codes, the public works provisions, and collective
bargaining provisions in section 7(a).
In 1934, there was one intriguing case that dealt with violations of section 7(a) of
the NIRA. The case was Bayonne Textile Corporation v. the American Federation of Silk
Workers, Raphael Brown, Olga Sacaroff and Nathan Burn. Bayonne Textile was submitted to
the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey in February 1934, and it was decided on May
4, 1934. Bayonne factory was a producer of silks and rayon fabric. Corporate executives
felt that the strike that took place on their grounds interfered with their property rights,
violating the due process clause of the Constitution.103 With the emergence of the NIRA, a
code was established for this industry; and the Bayonne factory was in compliance with all
of its provisions. Management argued that the strike that followed crippled the Bayonne
factory’s operations, and the behavior of the strikers was not conductive to a positive work
environment. In the decision of the court, Chief Justice J. Heher argued that:
Insults, indecent and annoying language and abusive epithets were hurled at
complainant’s employees, by pickets acting for defendants, as they passed to and
from the complainant’s plant; that they were threatened with physical violence if
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they did not withdraw from complainant’s service; that windows of complainant’s
plant, about thirty in number were broken by defendants, or those acting on their
behalf and etc.104
The Chief Justice asserted that there was some violence between the members of the trade
association and management at Bayonne Textile Corporation. But was this violence alleged
or did the plaintiffs have some evidence to prove that these incidents occurred? Would it
make a difference in the case or favor the plaintiff and their beliefs that strikes were wholly
detrimental to their business operations?105
In the Bayonne Textile Corporation case, Joel Gross served as the attorney for the
plaintiff while Edward Bennett of Cole & Morrill was the lawyer for the defendants.106 In
this case, Bayonne Textile Corporation argued that their property rights had been violated
because of trade unionism. According to the plaintiff, the American Federation of Silk
Workers interfered with the corporation’s business operations, because its members had
told employees to stop working during normal business hours.107 There was a work
stoppage, or strike, that caused the corporation to lose money. Arguably, it destroyed the
relationship that workers had developed with management.108
The Bayonne Textile Corporation argued that it was stipulated in the Constitution
that businesses had control over the labor powers of its workers. In particular, this case
dealt with the court’s interpretation of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth amendments
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to the constitution.109 Workers had to capacity to sell their labor powers in businesses to
which they were employed. Once workers became members of any American firm, they
lost control over their labor process.

Workers did not maintain control over their

individual rights, conditions, and wages: and businesses claimed that workers’ labor rights
were placed within any firms’ jurisdiction.

In this case, the judges listened to the

arguments. In their decision, they remanded the case to the lower court and altered the
order of the trial court with further instructions.110
This was a significant case, however, because it dealt with the collective bargaining
provisions of the NIRA. Did workers have the right to join unions, organize and bargain
collectively with management or other corporate officials?111

Did workers lost their

individual rights if they became members of trade unions and went on strike? If the court
answered the first question in the affirmative, then workers maintained the right to control
their labor and to hire an outside party to represent their workplace interests. The
defendants argued that under the NIRA, the codes of fair competition allowed employees to
place limits on work hours and to have minimum wages and other employee benefits. But
the codes were not absolute. Workers had the capacity to bargain if they felt that their
employee rights were infringed upon or if management offered benefits that were not on
par with industry standards.112
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On the other hand, the corporate plaintiff cited the Fifth Amendment of the United
States’ Constitution, which gave citizens the right to “make contracts for the sale of the
labor of others or for their own labor.” The Fifth Amendment stipulates that corporations
could not lose their property rights without the due process of the law.113 Justice Heher
cited Adair v. United States, Coppage v. Kansas and Hitchman Coal and Coke v. Mitchell to
validate the right of workers to sell their labor in the workplace, the right of trade
associations to unite workers, and use collective bargaining to fight for improvements in
the workplace.114
Further, this decision was important. Workers could bargain collectively during the
negotiation process. There was the right of all citizens to labor in the marketplace, and
their labor powers were owned by American corporations, who could dispose of their labor
as they saw fit. Workers could sign contracts in which they provided employers with
access to their labor powers. Does the right to sign employment contracts to provide
corporations with their labor power imply that workers could join trade unions or were
they forbidden? Employers were given the right to use the labor of their employees to
produce for the national economy, but always within limits. State labor laws had, for more
than a century, defined certain conditions as hazardous and unsafe, and regulated women’s
and children’s labor. Employers had the basic right of using their property to promote
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successful business operations and policies. The question was whether firms also could coopt the labor rights of employees as the property of management.115
In Bayonne Textile case, the work stoppage had been authorized by the strike
committee of the trade union under defendants Brown, Sacaroff, and Burn. They were
responsible for bringing about the strike.

The plaintiffs, however, were under the

impression that the NIRA eliminated strikes, although workers could bargain collectively
for their rights, but Chief Justice Heher argued that the plaintiffs were wrong in their
assertions. The NRA law was a temporary measure designed to rectify the economic
emergency brought on by the Great Depression.

In

addition,

the

NIRA

established

industry codes: but they could be re-negotiated if management did not agree with them or
workers felt that they did not produce a positive work environment. Further, as Heher
cited Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company, trade unionism was legal under the NIRA,
and company unions could be supplanted by independent labor unions that sought to
organize workers.116
As a result, the decision in Bayonne Textile case was a victory for the defendants
and trade unionism. Workers could strike, and the NIRA did not limit them in this capacity.
The Fifth Amendment, which dealt with due process and property rights, was not
applicable to this particular strike and on the court cases that followed. Workers had the
ability to bargain collectively, but the strike was a part of this function. It was a crucial part
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of the negotiation process. This case established important worker’s rights that were not
supplanted easily and management no longer had direct control of the labor skills and
rights of workers.
In late 1934 and 1935, there were four cases that dealt with violations against the
petroleum industry code. The fifth case revolved around the live poultry code. It was to be
the final case that decided whether the NRA could establish industry codes or codes of fair
competition. The four other cases were Panama Refining Co et al v. Ryan et al; Amazon
Petroleum Corp. et al v. Ryan et al; Locke v. the United States; and State Ex Rel. Lee, Atty.
General v. Continental Oil Company. Lastly, the case to decide the future of the industry
codes was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. et al v. the United States. These decisions were
important, especially the Panama Refining and Schechter cases argued in the United States
Supreme Court, because the Hughes Court, with the exception of Justice Benjamin N.
Cardozo, did not believe in an expanded role for the national or federal government.117
Generally, legal historians, such as David Atkinson, have argued that the Hughes Court
maintained the belief in limited government, which frustrated the efforts of the Roosevelt
administration to handle the economic emergency confronting the United States.118
The Panama Refining Case was argued in the United States’ Supreme Court on
December 10 and 11, 1934. A decision was rendered on January 7, 1935.119 Chief Justice

117

David Atkinson, “Mr. Justice Cardozo and the New Deal: An Appraisal,” Villanova Law Review 15, no. 1 (Fall
1969): 68. The Hughes Court consisted of Harlan Fiske Stone, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Louis D. Brandeis, Hughes,
Roberts, George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, and James McReynolds. Melvin I. Urofsky, A
March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 656.
118
William E. Leuchtenburg, “When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme Court and Lost,” Smithsonian
Magazine, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/showdown.html. (accessed September 15,
2013). The Hughes Court featured the Four Horseman—Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, George Sutherland and
Willis Van Devanter, who nullified many New Deal laws including the NIRA and the AAA.
119
S. Clay Williams, Chairman, NIRB to Hon. Jeuett Bhouse, president of the American Liberty League, January
1935; Donald Richberg Papers; National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland. The pamphlet discussed

322

Hughes wrote the final decision. He began his statement with a discussion of the NIRA and
how it pertained to the petroleum industry. He stated that the executive order from July
11, 1933 (no. 6199) regarding the transportation of oil shipments statewide prohibited
excess shipments of oil to other states in an effort to stimulate petroleum prices.120 The
executive order applied to state laws regarding quotas, and there was a universal standard
for oil shipments that was established by the other executive orders or state laws. Another
executive order dated July 14, 1933, (no. 6204) listed the federal penalties for violations of
transportation and state shipment standards to be imprisonment of no more than six
months and a fine of no more than 1,000 dollars. Under the NIRA, general penalties for
federal offenses were fines of no more than 500 dollars, and imprisonment was the
same.121
On July 15, 1933, the Interior Secretary Harold Ickes was given the authorization to
handle the executive orders of July 11 (no. 6199) and July 14, 1933 (no. 6204). Moreover,
the amendment to these executive orders dated July 25, 1933, and the petroleum code
dated August 21, 1933, were put under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior.
The NRA was not given the responsibility to administer the executive orders or the
petroleum code. Under the Petroleum code, the Interior Department received reports on
production and shipment data from industry leaders of the petroleum sector.122 From this
data, the Interior department regulated the petroleum industry and ensured that there
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were regular shipments made across the country.

The shipment amendment was

important, because it was determined in Congressional proceedings and the executive
orders that shipments to other states were in excess of demand causing the prices for
petroleum products to decline substantially.
Two cases, Panama Refining Company and Amazon Petroleum Corporation
challenged the shipment clauses in state and federal laws and statutes.123 In Panama
Refining Company, the oil company had a refining plant in Texas as well as oil and gasoline
leases in that same state.124 The Panama Refining company sued the federal government to
prevent the enforcement of shipment requirements and regulations from section 9(C) of
the NIRA.125 Violations of section 9 (C) occurred when oil shipments were made to states
in excess of their petroleum quotas.126 In this case, the plaintiffs contended that the NIRA
gave the president powers that were beyond its legislative scope. Their business
operations were intrastate, not interstate.127

Congress could regulate only corporate

business relations if their practices were national, not local.128 Moreover, the plaintiff
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argued that the law violated the commerce clause of the United States’ Constitution. The
NIRA had infringed upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution that dealt
with private property and due process.129 Lastly, the decision stated that Legislative and
Executive branches of the federal government must maintain distinct political powers.130
This prevented the blurring of political power of the three federal branches of government.
The Amazon Petroleum Corporation case was brought to the federal court system in
an effort to prevent the state of Texas, especially the Railroad Commission, from imposing
restrictions on the production and distribution of oil statewide.131 Supposedly, the state of
Texas, if it enforced the NRA provisions, would be in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. The plaintiff challenged the petroleum code and declared
that it was not constitutional, but reasons were not given for how the petroleum code
infringed upon the Fourteenth Amendment. In both cases, heard by a district judge, the
plaintiffs were granted an injunction so that they would not have to adhere to shipment
requirements because of the unusual delegation of legislative power that had illegally been
granted to the Interior Department and NRA.

In the case, the court prevented the

enforcement of section 4 article III of the Petroleum code. On appeal, the Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the defendants; and the case was dismissed. Both cases made it to
the United States Supreme Court on the basis of a writ of certiorari that had been given on
October 8, 1934.132
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In the decision in Amazon Petroleum, Justice Hughes examined the shipment
provisions of the petroleum code. He argued that shipment quotas that had existed under
the petroleum code (section 4, article III) had been eliminated with the executive order of
September 13, 1933.133 Thus, the shipment quotas ceased to exist when these cases had
been submitted to the federal judiciary for scrutinization. Consequently, the Court could
not deal with provisions for shipment quotas that were no longer in force. Interior
Secretary Ickes had issued regulations IV, V, and VII of the petroleum code, but they had
been altered with subsequent amendments, and their meaning had changed wholly in
character.134 This part of the decision was significant because it illustrated the lack of
consensus on how to enforce the petroleum code and its myriad stipulations.
Next, the Supreme Court decided to examine section 9(C) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act to determine if Congress provided the Executive branch with legislative
powers that were beyond its scope.135 The petroleum code dealt with the transportation
quotas in excess of state or federal requirements. The question became whether Congress
or the Executive branch had overstepped its regulatory bounds.136 The Court argued that
section 9(C) of the NIRA was specific and not vague. It provided states with regulatory
powers regarding interstate and foreign commerce in terms of oil shipments. It did not
attempt to control the production of petroleum commodities, as Hughes contended,
133
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however, it provided the Executive branch with enormous regulatory powers over the
petroleum industry in terms of its policy and enforcement provisions. Congress had
provided sweeping powers to the Executive branch of government when it passed the NIRA
in the first place to allow for the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce. But with the
NIRA, Congress had not established itself as the principal regulator of the petroleum
industry because the Interior Department controlled fundamental aspects of enforcing the
industry code for this sector.
In regards to shipments that exceeded state guidelines, Congress had not developed
a regulatory strategy nor had it created a particular policy to target the issue. Section 9(C)
of the NIRA went beyond the delegation of power from the Congress or the states, and
Hughes and the majority of the Court viewed it as unconstitutional.137 Moreover, the
majority argued, legislative power was hampered by the creation of an Executive branch
agency such as the NRA. The court cited Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm’n, Union Bridge Co. v. United States, Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, and
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson to affirm his decision.138 Hughes reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, and the case was remanded to the district court with instructions.
Locke v. the United States was another case that addressed violations of the NRA
petroleum code. This case was argued in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. The
initial case had been brought before the District Court of the United States from the Eastern
District of Texas in which Justice Randolph Bryant wrote the decision.139 On January 25,
1935, the Circuit Court of Appeals’ Justice Sibley rendered his decision. This decision was
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important because instead of just revoking a company’s Blue Eagle designation, a plaintiff
actually faced jail time and fines. This may have been one of the first instances in which an
industry code was enforced through the use of tangible penalties.
Justice Sibley, who provided the court’s final decision, discussed the specifics of the
case. Originally, the case was brought to the District Court, because N.S. Locke and his
colleagues sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the excess production and
shipment restrictions of oil or petroleum products from wells, as determined by the
Railroad Commission of Texas.

The plaintiff (federal government) had argued that

overproduction of oil products had contributed to lowered prices and destroyed interstate
commerce. With the emergence of the NIRA and the petroleum code, the Texas Railroad
Commission had accepted a quota of five percent of its producing capacity. However, the
Commission and some refiners were producing at levels above the quota, while others
were in compliance.140 This may have been an instance in which equal treatment was not
given to all companies in the oil sector. Equal protection and justice may have been lacking
in the enforcement of the petroleum code.
In the District Court case, the defendants were found to be in non-compliance of the
NIRA and petroleum code. Locke tried to argue that the NIRA was invalid, because only
Congress, not the Executive branch, had the capacity to legislate rules pertaining to
interstate commerce. Further, all powers that were not enumerated in the United States
Constitution were given to the state entities and the people. Locke’s argument was not
considered valid in the critical eyes of the court, and he was sentenced to 90 days in jail.
Even with jail time, Locke remained non-compliant. In his decision at the Court of Appeals
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case, Justice Sibley argued that, if the District court had failed to make the proper decision,
continuing to violate the law was not the answer. Any constitutional issue could only be
corrected in court, not through civil disobedience. Locke had been in contempt of court by
violating the injunction. Sibley believed that the decision from the District court was
correct, and affirmed their finding. Locke violated the petroleum code and the NIRA by
infringing upon others and not adhering to the federal injunction. If Locke had not violated
the prior court decision, then the Court of Appeals could have reversed the decision and
ruled in his favor. But Locke was non-compliant and uncooperative, because he was
dissatisfied with the previous court decision. Sibley cited Brougham v. Ocean Stream
Navigation Co., Schwartz v. United States, and O’Hearne v. United States to validate his
position.141
State Ex Rel. Lee, Atty. Gen. v. Continental Oil Company was federal case decided
regarding the failure to comply with the petroleum code and the NIRA.142 The initial case
had been argued in the District court from Laramie County, Wyoming, presided over by C.O.
Brown. The most recent case had been decided on April 16, 1935 by Justice Riner.
Continental Oil Company was the “largest producer, manufacturer, seller, and distributor of
gasoline in Wyoming.”143 The company was based in Delaware, but it had a virtual
monopoly over the sale and distribution of gasoline in Wyoming. Since 1931, the company
had been supplying gasoline to the state of Wyoming’s service stations: but it had been
141
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charging greater sums for its gasoline in Wyoming than in Delaware. The issue in this case
dealt with the national price for gasoline charged by Continental Oil Company. The plaintiff
was attempting to determine whether Continental Oil violated article 2 of chapter 117 of
the Wyoming Revised Statutes, the NIRA, and the petroleum code. Citing Budge v. Board of
County Commissioners of Lincoln County, State v. Smart and State v. Kelley, Brown decided
that constitutional questions had to be examined and resolved first in a trial court before
they can be decided in a state supreme court.144
The court asserted that the plaintiff had to follow the necessary procedures and
allow lower courts to explicate the issue and determine if violations were present.145 This
case was significant because the court justices argued that there were legal or judicial
procedures that had to be followed in any case that was brought to the local, state or
federal levels. These legal procedures enabled the judiciary to function in the appropriate
fashion and failing to comply by the laws caused unnecessary hardship on both plaintiffs
and defendants. It was necessary for court justices to ensure that the rules were followed
in any case brought in the United States.
The first four important cases challenging the NRA dealt with the petroleum code
and violations against some of its provisions targeted the codes of fair competition that
contained stipulations for price regulation, and production and shipment controls. The
Supreme Court case that decided the fate of the NRA codes was, however, the Schechter v.
United States, which did not deal with petroleum but the live poultry code. Allegedly, the
Schechter firm was disappointed by the federal charges against it and believed that the
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federal government, through the use of the poultry code, was too involved in the financial,
agricultural and industrial operations of its business.146
Justice Hughes stated that New York City maintained the largest poultry
marketplace in the United States. The Schechter brothers were butchers that operated in
Brooklyn and New York City.147 Most of the time, the Schechter brothers purchased their
poultry within New York State in the West Washington Market and the Manhattan railroad
stations. But on some occasions, poultry was obtained from vendors in Pennsylvania. The
dispute was over whether the Schechter brothers were engaging in interstate commerce.
The Schechter brothers were affected by the live poultry code that was approved on April
13, 1934. Section 7(a), or stipulations regarding collective bargaining, was included within
its provisions, but minimum wages and maximum work hours were itemized in the code as
well. According to the live poultry code, employees were not authorized to work more than
40 hours per week and minimum wages consisted of .50 cents per hour.148 Child labor
provisions were comprised of limiting employment to individuals sixteen years of age and
older. Children were excluded from participating in the labor market.
In terms of violations to the live poultry code, the Schechter brothers were alleged
of committing eighteen offenses.149 There was one count for conspiracy, two counts for
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violating minimum wages and maximum hours’ provisions of the live poultry code, and ten
counts for straight killing. There were further six counts for selling “unfit chickens,” and
violating inspections for their products, two counts for making inaccurate reports and
keeping inaccurate data, and a count for selling to dealers that lacked a proper license as
approved by New York City.
Joseph and Jacob E. Heller were the lawyers for the Schechter brothers, while
Attorneys General Cummings and Donald Richberg attempted to prosecute the
offenders.150 Initially, the prior case had been argued in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (Eastern New York) and was brought to the Supreme Court by a writ of
certiorari.151 The Schechter brothers in the Court of Appeals case had been found guilty of
16 out of 18 violations of the live poultry code and conspiracy.152 The plaintiffs, however,
argued that the federal government, especially the Executive branch, had overstepped its
bounds and had been vested with extensive legislative powers to regulate interstate
commerce.153 The Hughes court cited Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, because it addressed
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the issue of Congressional delegations of power to other government agencies or
branches.154 Moreover, the court argued that the federal government had violated the due
process clause and the Schechter brothers had been deprived of their property and due
process, as enumerated in the Fifth Amendment.155
The Schechter case was argued on May 2 and 3, 1935, and a decision was rendered
by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes on May 27, 1935.156 There was a six to three
decision to declare NIRA and the codes of fair competition unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court focused on Schechter’s issues. In the Schechter decision, Hughes argued that the
NIRA and industry codes were devised throughout the United States, because of a national
economic emergency. An emergency, however, did not serve as justification to create laws
that violated the Constitution. All laws, regardless of why they were created in the first
place, had to be viewed within the range and scope of the Constitution. Just because there
was an economic crisis did not suggest that a law contained more constitutional authority
or weight.

Laws have been developed during times of stability and crisis but their

constitutionality, no matter why and when they were created, could be questioned in the
court system.157
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Second, Hughes decided to weigh in on the question of the delegation of legislative
powers to an Executive branch agency such as the NRA.158 He looked to the Panama
Refining case for answers. He discovered that the Panama Refining case dealt with the
transportation or shipment of oil or petroleum products statewide and to other countries.
The question became whether the president could prevent excess shipments of those
products if they lowered the prices for those goods within the states that received their
shipments. In that case and its application to the Schechter case, Hughes attempted to
determine the meaning of what constitutes a fair code. The NIRA did not itemize the
qualities of fairness, or a fair code, but only unfair competition was addressed. In this case,
Hughes tried to determine how the concept of fairness applied to the poultry code and the
NIRA in general.
With the emergence of the Federal Trade Commission Act (sections 5 and 11), the
term “unfairness,” was viewed as an action that was unlawful.159 This established new
legal precedent. The NIRA dealt with establishing fair codes, while the Federal Trade
Commission handled unfair economic and industrial acts. Both laws were wholly different
and provided the federal government with broad powers to enforce the law and regulate
the national economy. As the government argued, violations of the NIRA were similar to
infringements against the FTC and should have been handled accordingly.

With

disapproval, Hughes argued that Section 3 of the NIRA, which established the codes of fair
competition, was unconstitutional. Hughes argued that the NIRA and its code-making
158
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abilities was an unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the Executive
Branch.160 For this specific part of the Hughes court decision, he cited Federal Trade
Comm’n v. Raladam Co., Federal Trade Comm’n v. Keppel, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech Nut
Packing Co., and Federal Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co.161
Third, Hughes decided to address the intrastate transportation actions of the
Schechter business.162 He affirmed that the Schechter brothers conducted their business
transactions, a majority of the time in New York State. The codes that dealt with wages and
hours pertained to interstate exchanges, not intrastate ones. Citing Brown v. Houston,
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Landon, Industrial Association v. United States and Atlantic Coast
Line v. Standard Oil Co., the Hughes court argued that the activities of the Schechter
brothers were maintained in New York, especially their dealings with the general public.163
In terms of the Schechter’s transactions in Pennsylvania, Hughes stated that just because
primary goods flowed into New York State from other parts of the United States did not
imply that those transactions after the fact flowed elsewhere.164 The wage and hours
provisions of the live poultry code did not apply, because the Schechter Company’s actions
were intrastate and did not affect the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone concurred but for different reasons.165 They
argued that, in terms of the Commerce clause of the United States’ Constitution, the
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dissenting justices could not find any directness in terms of the relationship between
intrastate versus interstate commerce.

The dissenting justices wondered when an

economic transaction was viewed as affecting interstate commerce.166
transaction considered solely local or conducted within the state?

When was a

What was local

commerce versus national or international commerce? Moreover, Justice Cardozo argued
that local or interstate commerce should not be studied or viewed in a vacuum. It had to be
examined in conjunction with other legal parameters. The wages and hours provisions that
made up the live poultry code lost their meaning, once it had been determined that the
actions of the plaintiffs had been within the state of New York and not state or
nationwide.167 The actions were local and the code collapsed under its weight after the
actions of the Schechter corporations had been enumerated and illustrated vividly in the
case.
With all of the challenges to the NIRA in the federal judiciary, do legal scholars
currently believe that the NRA law was constitutional? By employing dialectical skills,
lawyers from this period argued in favor of and against this important law in American
political history. The NIRA was targeted to resolve a growing economic emergency, but
temporary lawmakers and legal authorities, from the period, did not agree on the best
approach to handle this industrial dilemma. Clearly, there was and is evidence on both
sides of the matter. Further, the enforcement of the NIRA was problematic, which implied
that the codes of fair competition were not the sole causes of court challenges.

federal government and believed that the United States’ Constitution was a pro-active document that should be
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There is an underlying principle here that must be pointed out. Roosevelt had
differed from the previous administrations on the scope of federal control over the national
economy. The court cases that determined the constitutionality of the NIRA did not answer
the question about how much regulation of the national economy was necessary to
promote economic growth, only whether the Constitution provided for such regulations. It
would take the enactment of the Wagner Act of 1935, when judges affirmed the federal
government’s expanded role in the national economy to alter federal court opinion of
executive power, but the NIRA set the stage for these political discussions. Further, the
federal judiciary did not become on board with Roosevelt until after the nullification of the
NIRA and AAA. Once federal judges began to realize that New Deal legislation had become
a necessity, and that it had public support, they ceased supporting challenges to those laws.
In terms of the NIRA, hindsight allowed policymakers to take elements of the NIRA and
apply them to future legislation. After the Schechter case, those Americans who were
determined to improve upon their daily work conditions and their elected officials, and
even Supreme Court judges, came to agree that the Federal government had to play a role
in the process.
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CHAPTER 9: EPILOGUE: THE LEGACY OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT
OF 1933

In many of his 1932 campaign speeches, President Herbert Hoover argued that the
election was “more than a contest between two parties.”1 Rather, it was a battle between
two different political ideologies.2 Two ways of life were at stake.3

In his campaign

speeches, Roosevelt countered that “bold and persistent experimentation” was needed to
establish economic growth, reform industrial and business practices, and stimulate
corporate profitability.4

If one experiment did not work, he argued, these scholars,

industrialists, business leaders and policymakers should try alternative strategies. Both
candidates asked what role should the federal government take.5 Should policymakers
establish a strong, centralized federal government with responsibility for individual
welfare and regulating the national economy, or should the federal government maintain a
limited role?
Throughout the economic crisis, Americans witnessed a change in how political
officials viewed government and in their ideas about making government work. Public
1
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opinion came to the surface during this time period, and ordinary Americans began to play
an active role in the government process by writing letters to their Congressional
representatives and to the president and in listening to speeches on the radio. Political
officials were beginning address the concerns of ordinary citizens with more respect,
because they made themselves more visibly a part of the political process. Their votes
mattered. Some policymakers, such as former Democratic Governor of Colorado, William E.
Sweet, argued that the problems that Americans faced during the Great Depression were
similar to those experienced by Britons over one hundred years before.6 Industrial and
self-discipline had been lost, and the codes of fair competition served to bring them back.
Implicitly, elected officials had to maintain a balance between supply and demand and that
only the codes of fair competition could strike a healthy equilibrium.
After 1929, the United States faced trying economic conditions. There had been
some minor depressions throughout the 1920s, but 1929 became a devastating year for the
United States. The Great Crash was detrimental to national economy in the United States;
and for some, it signaled the beginning of the end to Old World Individualism. Both Hoover
and Roosevelt were prominent public officials who attempted to devise resolutions to
address these dismal economic conditions. But were they both successful in solving the
Great Depression? Was the American way of life changing for the better? Did the struggle
over governmental powers under the New Deal yield results?
Throughout this dissertation, I have discussed the reasons for the coming of the
Great Depression and sought to add to this economic debate by discussing how the New
Deal programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and National Industrial Recovery
6

Sweet was the Democratic governor of Colorado from 1923 to 1925. He ran unsuccessfully for U.S. senator in
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Act (NIRA) were designed to mitigate this economic emergency. The AAA handled the poor
economic conditions of the farming community. It established a processing tax for farmers
to produce smaller amounts of crops through production controls and used quotas to
improve liquidity and strengthen commodity prices. With farmers producing limited crops,
the prices for agricultural goods were supposed to increase in value. But did this work?
Some policymakers, farmers, and scholars believed that the AAA reemphasized the farm
economy, while other contended that the economic situation became worse. In both cases,
the question might be asked “better for whom”?
The NIRA was designed to regulate the industrial sectors; but in the petroleum and
automobile industries, the NIRA may have caused more problems than it was able to
resolve. Many corporate executives from the petroleum industry sought to avoid price and
production controls, because they did not want government to regulate their sector. In the
automobile sector, Henry Ford sought to bypass industrial codes and maintain his control
over Ford Motor Company. General Motors, Chrysler, and the small vendors worried about
their economic future, because of Henry Ford’s resistance to the NIRA’s guidelines. Ford
did not want government regulations of his business operations. He particularly worried
about the enactment of section 7(a) of the NIRA. What would it do to his company and its
efforts to control its healthy industrial environment? Although Ford did not sign the
industry codes for the automobile sector until 1934, he adhered to the letter of the law.
Henry Ford maintained higher wages, benefits, and limited work hours for his employees,
but the question is why did Ford comply with the industry codes, if he did not approve of
them?
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Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., and General Motors Corporation took a different political
approach to the NIRA. Initially, Sloan was supportive of the law. A member of the
Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA, he backed Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential
election. Satisfied when Roosevelt gave his inauguration speech on March 4, 1933, Sloan
had high hopes for the administration, but he saw them dimmed by 1934. Sloan believed in
good wages for his employees and benefits, but he did not approve of the closed shop or
trade unionism. With the introduction of the industrial codes, Sloan became concerned
that the NRA was attempting to tell corporate executives how to run their businesses. He
soon took a more conservative stance and switched to back the National Association of
Manufacturers, who opposed the NIRA in the mid-1930s. In Sloan’s view, the public and
private sectors had merged too much. He worried that he would have to surrender his
control over General Motors to an outside party or the public sector similar to the debacle
of 1920, when Durant was ousted, because of his stock market dealings on Wall Street.
Collective bargaining was Sloan’s chief concern. Although he believed in some workers’
rights and benefits, he was not inclined to have workers assert themselves over the
company’s profitability and economic livelihood.
With the decline of the NIRA and the NRA, the codes of fair competition that held the
automobile industry together came asunder. After 1935, there were many strikes in
Detroit and throughout the Midwest.7 Auto workers had supported Roosevelt and believed
in the principles behind the NIRA. They were sorely disappointed when the law was
declared unconstitutional. The United Automobile Workers understood that, in order to
improve upon the workers’ rights through collective bargaining, the negotiators had to
7
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agitate for social and economic justice among the Big Three, because it had the greatest
market share. By August 1935, the United Auto Workers was established and began to act
aggressively to unionize the auto industry.8
Overall, the UAW’s approach worked. It was not, however, until the coming of the
Second World War that workers at Ford Motor Company, received the right to bargain
collectively, which had been initially a guarantee under the NIRA’s Section 7(a). Finally, the
UAW decided not to strike against Ford Motor Company due to the particular conditions at
the company. Ford had not signed the automobile code until 1934, but the firm catered to
its workers to ensure that working conditions and benefits were strengthened.
Before the NRA or even the War Industries Board (WIB) during World War I, the
federal government was decentralized and lacked a common hierarchical system to
organize its agencies. Moreover, political parties and interest groups played dynamic roles
in the enactment of laws and their implementation. On the whole, there was little federal
and state development except for periods of war prior to the 1930s. Even though federal
agencies were separate from the private sector, business and industry leaders influenced
government policies, laws and statutes. In the political environment of the early New Deal
period, the passage of the NIRA and the emergence of the NRA were watershed
developments, as they were without precedence. The NRA had to “start from scratch,”
because it did not have many models on which to base to the new agency.9

Moreover,

scholars argue, that the NRA was staffed with industry leaders, business executives, and
corporate heads.

8
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collective bargaining took a backseat. These individuals did not believe in “cut-throat
competition,” but they sought to steer the NRA and its economic organizations in a more
conservative direction.
Despite constitutional limitations, there is some counter evidence to the abovementioned ideas. The NIRA might have worked, if it had been given more time. It needs to
be examined more closely to discover the tenets that did work so that they could be
improved upon. Former New Deal president of the American Economic Association, John
Maurice Clark, contended that over four million jobs had been created, because of the
passage of the NIRA in 1933 in both the private and public sectors.10 He showed that
500,000 jobs were created each month until 1934, when his article was written. Moreover,
work hours had been reduced from 43 to 37 ½ per week while hourly wages improved
from 43 ½ cents to 52 ½ cents.

With these positive developments, the Roosevelt

administration was on the right track in terms of creating sound economic public policies.
But scholars may never know completely if the NIRA was a success or failure, because the
law was declared unconstitutional in May 1935.
In the spring months of 1935 and winter of 1936, the United States’ Supreme Court
declared the AAA (Butler v. the United States)11 and NIRA (A.L.A. Schechter v. the United
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States)12 unconstitutional. The court further invalided the processing tax under the AAA
and the codes of fair competition of the NIRA in two separate cases.13 The NIRA had been
up for Congressional renewal for two additional years, but it did not pass. Roosevelt,
however, was able to renew some segments of the National Recovery Administration until
April 1, 1936.14 Many members of the NRA lost their jobs, and only a limited amount of
personnel was allowed to stay on and work regulating the industrial sectors. Their duties
were to enforce the emergency stipulations of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, and they were limited to assuming this role. In addition, Roosevelt was angered by
these judicial developments, and he sought to regulate the Supreme Court with his court
packing bill or the Judicial Reform Act of 1937.15
The Judicial Reform Act of 1937 was to infuse new blood into the federal judiciary
and turn around the conservative bias of the court. It allowed for the retirement of federal
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judges who had been 70 years of age or older and had held judicial tenure for 10 years or
longer.16 When a federal judge reached a certain age, moreover, new judges could be
appointed in an effort to “pack the court” with new members. This bill, if passed, would
have created the judicial and political foundation on which Roosevelt could obtain more
favorable decisions:

but the bill was dependent upon Senate approval for the new

appointees. Thus, Roosevelt would have increased his executive powers, but he would
have had to still rely upon the Congress for appointment purposes. For the general public,
Roosevelt’s plan was an executive overreach. It contributed to the fraught relationship
among the Federal Judicial, Executive, and Legislative branches of government in the
United States during this period and also cost Roosevelt and his New Deal political capital.
Did the Judicial Reform Act of 1937 have public support?17 Overall, the nation was
equally divided over the issue. Support for the proposal averaged about 31 to 46 percent
while disapproval for the bill was about at 41 to 49 percent.18 The New Deal programs
were popular, but others believed that the court bill went too far in seeking to regulate the
behavior of the Federal Judiciary. During most of the New Deal, the Supreme Court
maintained its conservative stance. The justices as a whole opposed the design and context
of President Roosevelt’s proposals. The NIRA and the AAA were declared unconstitutional,
16
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because the Supreme Court did not agree with the centralized planning of Roosevelt’s New
Deal proposals and laws. The national economy was moving in new directions as it had a
more international face; but that did not mean all understood the trend. The Supreme
Court may not have realized how globalism affected the federal, state, and local authorities.
The Supreme Court was further divided about whether the expanded role of government in
regulating the American national economy should be allowed. The Judicial Reform Act was,
in this sense, a short term failure in its reform of the court, but it had other consequences.
Although the Judicial Reform Act of 1937 did not pass Congress, the Supreme Court
became more liberal in its decision-making.19 The Court became more supportive of
federal government acts and policies. It began to understand that government agencies
had to play a dynamic role in providing benefits and services to the American citizens,
especially in times of great need. More to the point, the Federal judiciary revised its
interpretation of Executive powers and the Commerce clause.

In 1935, it found the

National Labor Relations Act, among other legislation, constitutional.
The NIRA was the first peacetime measure to apply centralized planning
mechanisms to the national economy.20 The law was written to reduce competition and
alter the system of laissez-faire government, which many felt no longer worked. Roosevelt
was convinced that the NIRA mitigated the negative efforts of overproduction, which had
19
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reduced wages as employers sought to lower labor costs, and thus to prevent corporate
bankruptcies from weakening the American private sector.21 In 1933, many Congressional
members felt that the bill was a necessity, because it would have strengthened the
industrial sector.

Throughout the NIRA, policymakers, such as General Hugh Samuel

Johnson and Donald Richberg, defended the practices of the NRA; but the NRA remained a
controversial government agency. Under the NIRA, wages seem to have increased and
work hours decreased. Child labor was curtailed throughout American corporations. The
measure had been put in place to reduce cut-throat pricing in the crisis economy, but
doubts remained.22
This dissertation argues that both Hoover and Roosevelt were responsible for the
economic turnaround of the national economy during the 1930s. Hoover took on a macro
approach in his decision-making processes, because of his wartime experiences in Belgium
during the First World War. He examined the international system and attempted to
produce intergovernmental reforms. He also created one of the most important agencies—
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)—in bringing about some recovery.23
Roosevelt looked at domestic conditions and sought to create national laws that applied to
the American crisis. In the end, the policies of both presidents helped to moderate the
effects of the Great Depression.
There were many lessons that can be drawn from the NIRA. First of all, the
purchasing power of the American people was an important factor to address in the crisis.
In the consumer-based economy, goods were developed and produced for the American

21

Ibid, 169-170.
Leonard Silk, “The United States and the World Economy,” 476.
23
R.G. Tugwell, “The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,” The Antioch Review 13, no. 4 (Winter 1953): 419-420.
22

347

public.

A predominantly agricultural economy had been replaced by a powerful

manufacturing nation-state.

Now, with new government mechanisms, the consumer

economy was put back on trade.
Second, most nations, by the 1930s, witnessed the coming of powerful global
conditions that contributed to policies that affected all nations collectively. Collective
security within such institutions as the League of Nations and later the United Nations
began to promote united efforts at regulating global conditions.

Both Hoover and

Roosevelt were important political figures to the changing global role of the United States,
because they realized that the world was becoming a smaller place with global citizens that
interacted globally. The domestic character of the early New Deal should not obscure that
Roosevelt also saw the importance of the domestic recovery for the global economy.
Roosevelt sought to devise strategies that enabled Americans to move forward, but
he could not govern this country without taking into consideration the policies of other
nations, especially its allies. The NIRA was a step in the right direction toward recovery.
Many of the provisions of the NRA were thought-provoking and remain in use in
contemporary American society, such as child labor laws, collective bargaining between
businesses and trade unions, and higher wages and benefits, and work hour limitations.
The questions that scholars had to ask is whether they were a better off, because of the
NIRA or whether, because the private sector reasserted itself after it was declared
unconstitutional?
The NIRA had its pros and cons, but overall, the law had the interests of the
American people at heart. The NIRA continues to be seen as a controversial law, but it was
developed during a time in which Americans had been “grasping for air.” One question that
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scholars will have to ask is, if the NIRA was detrimental to the American economy, what
could have replaced it? Were there any pieces of legislation that could have supplanted the
NIRA and promoted economic change? But if economic revitalization, in terms of Gross
Domestic Product growth, occurred with the emergence of the Second World War, does
this mean that both Hoover and Roosevelt were wrong in their political assertions?24 We
may never know. But to ask these sorts of questions opens the political debate in this
country and throughout the world. Hopefully, this dissertation will start a new discussion.
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ECONOMIC REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HERBERT HOOVER, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT OF 1933
by
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation seeks to place the National Recovery Administration (NRA), a central agency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, in historical context. It explores the NRA’s origins in the political
agendas and ideological arguments of presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as they
reshaped the federal government’s role in bringing about an end to the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The dissertation most closely focuses on Roosevelt’s enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933, the response of the Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation in the automobile
sector, and the petroleum industry to the NRA’s passage.

The approval and implementation of

industrial codes established minimum price levels and production controls for petroleum commodities
that reformed the oil sector; but they also generated opposition to the New Deal.
Following recent studies, this dissertation argues that, through the New Deal, President
Roosevelt sought to expand the roles that federal government played vis-à-vis everyday citizens.
Roosevelt realized that Americans required financial assistance of the federal government when there
was an economic downturn or collapse that was beyond their control. Similarly, this dissertation argues
that, with the emergence of the NIRA and section 7(a), collective bargaining and trade unionism came to
the forefront and provided American workers with more tangible rights and benefits. If President

406
Roosevelt had not restructured the economy by providing relief to ordinary Americans and promoting
industrial reforms, then the United States might not have recovered or recovered as robustly from the
Great Depression. Certainly, the nation’s economic and political structures were altered by the “bold
experiment” of the NRA and the New Deal as a whole. Finally, the NRA did, in fact, have an impact on
ordinary citizens through the slow decline of unemployment and an increase in hourly wage rates. From
the corporate perspective, the power of the regulatory state, as embodied in the National Recovery
Administration, had to be resisted; still, the NRA was but one example of the further intervention of
government power in the private market.
In step with other studies, the dissertation contextualizes the New Deal by contrasting
Roosevelt’s approach from that of his predecessor, Herbert Hoover’s steadfast belief in American
Individualism and self-help as the foundation of his approach to the economic crisis. He believed that
everyday Americans could pull themselves up by the bootstraps and become economically viable
without federal intervention. Hoover promoted private charities and local relief, not public sector
involvement to address the problems of deprivation and destitution among ordinary Americans. In the
end, even as he created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which was a first step toward the
New Deal, Hoover became a severe critic of Roosevelt’s policies.

In contrast, Roosevelt’s NRA

experiment, despite opposition and its dismantling in the wake of Supreme Court decisions, became a
milestone in the growth of presidential power in the twentieth century and furthered the integration of
federal government agencies into the private sector.
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